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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

IRAQ

PART 8

January to December 1954

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
IRAQ—PART 8

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

VQ 1011/1

No. 1

IRAQ: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1953

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received January 18)(No. 11. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *January 11, 1954.*

In accordance with the instructions contained in the Marquess of Salisbury's circular despatch No. 078 (L 6/6) of the 9th of September, 1953, I have the honour to transmit to you as an appendix to this despatch a chronological summary of the year's events in Iraq.

2. The year 1953 will be remembered in Iraq for two events; the accession to the throne of King Faisal II, and the formation of the first Iraqi Government of a new type and background. The year also witnessed a striking increase in Left-wing and Communist sentiment.

The Palace

3. King Faisal, having completed his schooling at Harrow in the spring of 1952, spent some months travelling in the United States and elsewhere, and finally took up his residence in Bagdad in October 1952. During the next few months he toured the country and in May celebrated his coming-of-age and accession. Great efforts were made to mark the solemnity of the occasion and delegations came from no less than thirty-two countries. The Queen was represented by His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, who received a particularly warm welcome.

4. King Faisal opened his reign in good auspices. He has a simple and engaging manner and, despite his English education, is a good Arabist. The country was glad, too, to see the end of the Regency, as the Emir Abdul Ilah's popularity had for some time been waning. As the year continued, it was satisfactory to observe that the young King seemed to be gaining in confidence and to be retaining his personal popularity. Fears about his health have also not materialised. But it must be admitted that there are shadows in his path. To start with, the Emir Abdul Ilah still appears to exercise

as much authority as he had when Regent. In itself this may be no bad thing as the Emir may give more disinterested political advice than the King's other counsellors. But it means that there is very little "new look" in the palace, especially as no major changes have been made in the palace staff, which is neither honest nor efficient. Still more important, the King's advisers seem intent to place him on a pedestal above his subjects rather than let him mix with them in the traditional Arab way, and also to reduce his contacts with foreigners to the minimum. For example he was, I think, the only Sovereign in the world, except for the aged Ibn Saud, who allowed the local celebration of Her Majesty's Coronation to pass by without notice. Perhaps it is felt that at all costs he must not appear to be in the pocket of the British. But all in all, the general result is regrettable.

Internal Affairs

5. The year opened with martial law in force as a result of the riots in November 1952, and General Nuruddin Mahmud in office as Prime Minister. Under his auspices parliamentary elections were held in January and resulted in a sweeping victory for Nuri Said's supporters. This was facilitated by the most blatant rigging on the part of the palace and by a boycott of the elections on the part of almost all who were opposed to Nuri. Having carried out this necessary duty, the general somewhat reluctantly resigned and the Regent entrusted the Premiership to Jamil Madfai, one of the oldest and least competent of the old brigade. It was unfortunate that General Nuruddin's resignation left a sense of bitterness in the army, where it was thought that he had been shabbily treated.

6. Jamil Madfai's Government was chiefly notable for containing no less than four ex-Prime Ministers and representing the most reactionary forces in the country.

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During its six months of office it accomplished no social reforms worth recording except to reduce the price of bread. In addition, Nuri Said, as Minister of Defence, introduced a number of measures for improving the welfare of both officers and other ranks, and laid plans for expanding the armed forces for which both British and American assistance were invited. As time passed, the Government earned an unsavoury reputation for malpractices and the general discontent became more pronounced.

7. It had apparently been intended to make a change immediately after the King's accession, but the change did not come till September when, after a number of false starts, Dr. Fadhi Jamali was eventually given the task of forming a Government. A Western-educated man himself, he chose his colleagues from the younger generation, who also have a Western background, rather than from the parliamentary majority. The old Ottoman-trained Iraqis were for the first time discarded and, even if Dr. Jamali's Government proves to be short-lived, its formation marks something of an epoch in Iraq's history. As in all changes there are gains and losses. The younger men are keener, work harder and (so far at any rate) are less corrupt and more genuinely interested in reform than their seniors. On the other hand, they are more parochial in outlook, more chauvinistic and somehow smaller men. The Shias, who are now more fully represented in the Government than ever before, bear all the marks of the underdog. The greater their power becomes, the more difficult will Iraq be to deal with.

8. The new Government published no programme until Parliament met in December, when its programme was set out in the Speech from the Throne. But it lost no time in showing its intention to carry out reforms in the political, social and economic fields. Martial law was quickly abolished (only to be reimposed in Basra Liwa a couple of months later, after what was clearly a political strike in the oil company), the ban on political parties was lifted, and both Ministers and Development Board showed refreshing signs of activity. One of the few positive acts of Jamil Madfai's Government had been to reconstitute the Development Board and create a Ministry of Development alongside it. This is an untidy arrangement and was probably put through chiefly for the purpose of dislodging the then vice-chairman of the board. In that it succeeded. It should be said, however, that the present Minister is a hard-working and

honest man and the board appears to be working with less friction than formerly. It also has more money at its disposal as the oil revenues come rolling in. No attempt was made during the year to denounce the agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company, though conversations were held with a view to revising it in Iraq's favour.

9. The Government's programme of reforms, which cover a wide field, is at the time of writing largely in the paper stage. Whether they will ever get further can only be a matter for speculation. The old guard and their younger adherents are clearly only biding their time to trip up the upstarts who are now in office. The administrative machine, too, is in no shape to introduce or run a welfare State and, though Dr. Jamali is aware of this and has plans to strengthen the Administration, he himself has little realisation of the problems involved. So the path of reform will certainly not be smooth. Nevertheless, Dr. Jamali, though foolish, vain and not too strong a character, has basically the right idea. It may be, as the Crown Prince asserts, that the old Governments were not as bad as they are now painted. But it is undoubtedly the case that discontent with prevailing conditions has been steadily growing as more and more people come to realise how few benefits they are getting from the country's increasing wealth. If things are allowed to drag on as they have been for so long, an explosion seems inevitable. Communists and fellow-travellers have shown a notable increase of activity in the past year and they seem now to have obtained a powerful hold among the students, the lawyers and some of the industrial workers. They are also extending their activities into the countryside. These revolutionary forces, be it noted, are directed not only against Nuri Said and his friends but equally against the new reformers. Whether the latter will have the strength to contain them is one of the major question-marks as the year ends. But there is no reason to believe that a return to the rule of the old guard would even be successful for long in maintaining order, let alone in introducing reforms. They threw their hand in within a matter of hours when challenged in the streets in the autumn of 1952.

Foreign Affairs

10. In the field of foreign affairs Palestine has continued to dwarf all other questions. The year opened under the shadow of Lord Llewellyn's speech at the United Nations

Assembly and closed under the shadow of Qibya. It was enlivened during its course by Sir Winston Churchill's vigorous reassertion of his life-long devotion to the Zionist cause, and by Mr. Eric Johnston's ill-starred visit to the Middle East to try and solve the question of the Jordan waters. All the three Iraqi Governments who held office during the year maintained the same attitude of suspicion, resentment and intransigence whenever the question of Palestine was raised. Dr. Jamali has taken advantage of local Communist propaganda urging friendship with the people of Israel, to tar communism with the Zionist brush.

11. Dr. Jamali's Government, whose members learnt their ideas on their nationalism at its Western source, are nothing if not vigorous Arabists. The idea of Arab unity has a more intense meaning for them than for most of their predecessors. That is the principle. The practice is much as before, and Iraqi relations with other Arab States cannot be said to have greatly changed, though in the case of Jordan there has been some improvement, due less to any action on the part of Iraq than to a change of Government in Jordan. But the improvement did not go so far as to permit the Iraqis to respond to Jordan's request for a loan. Dr. Jamali is in fact himself an obstacle to any radical improvement in Iraq's relations with other Arab countries, owing to his unconcealed ambition to bring about some form of union with Jordan and Syria. This is not desired by either the Jordanian or Syrian Government and is welcomed nowhere less than in Saudi Arabia. For that and other reasons Saudi-Iraqi relations have remained cool. The Egyptians have lately started putting out tendentious reports apparently designed to weaken Iraq's position, possibly from the perennial fear that Iraq is trying to usurp Egypt's place as leader of the Arab world. This does not contribute to brotherly love, but it is the normal condition of the Arab States to be at loggerheads. Nevertheless they manage to unite when faced with what they regard as an "imperialist" issue. For example, despite the coolness in Iraqi-Saudi relations, the Arab idea combined with Saudi money has been enough to prevent any Iraqi newspaper from publicising the British case over the Buraimi dispute. Our position in the Persian Gulf is regarded here as a relic of imperialism and the Iraqis would dearly love to add Kuwait to their territory. No progress has been made with the delimitation of the Iraq-Kuwait frontier.

12. Relations with the Western Powers continue bedevilled by the Palestine question. To this has been added the question of French North Africa, on which feeling here has grown stronger. The Iraqis have always detested the French. They hate them still more to-day and it is a little surprising that they have been granting so many big contracts for development projects to French firms. The French have been very active in bidding for such contracts (which are likely to involve them in heavy monetary losses), and it may be that one of their principal motives is to keep the Germans out. Politically the Germans have the advantage as they have always been popular in Iraq. Nor has their popularity been affected by their agreement to pay large reparation to Israel, which is attributed to American pressure. Now their firms are entering the Iraqi development market in a big way.

13. The Americans, too, have been very active over the past year. Mr. Dulles paid a flying visit to Bagdad during his Middle Eastern tour in May. Point IV officials have increased in number. The advice of the American member of the Development Board is sought on every problem and American advisers are particularly well entrenched in agricultural development. The United States Government are now planning to give free military aid to Iraq, which the Iraqis are very anxious to receive. Hitherto they have bought all their military equipment from the United Kingdom, but they now believe that they cannot afford to carry out with their own resources both their development programme and their plan for strengthening the armed forces. Iraq lends itself to the attentions of dollar diplomacy, as its pride is never great enough to refuse a gift. But it will not quite sell its soul and no amount of dollars will affect the Iraqi attitude on such emotional questions as Palestine. Indeed, my American colleague has been seriously exercised about the deterioration of the United States position, which is largely due to Palestine and their pressure tactics. There is a grave danger lest, by a combination of free gifts and a blundering diplomacy, the Americans will end by seriously weakening our own position without getting very much out of it either for themselves or for the free world in general.

14. As to ourselves, it must be said that we must look to our laurels. Although in visible trade in 1953 we have done well, our exports to Iraq being over twice the value of those of the United States, our

closest rival, and over six times those of Germany, we are no longer unchallenged. In the economic field we have enterprising and energetic competitors, particularly in the United States, Germany and France, who have been winning big contracts where our own firms have either not troubled to bid or have been outbidden. Nevertheless, we have not been inactive during the past year. In the summer a first and successful meeting was held in London of the Anglo-Iraqi Economic Committee. In the autumn a useful visit was paid to Bagdad by a Treasury delegation, led by the Economic Secretary. This was followed by a high-powered mission of British business men, and preparations are under way for holding an important trade fair in Bagdad next autumn. In spite of Point IV the number of British experts working for the Iraq Government continued to increase during the year. On the cultural side the British Council is doing fine work and its head has the closest relations with the Prime Minister and the Iraqi educational authorities. Militarily, British officers have been seconded to work out plans with the Ministry of Defence for the expansion of the Iraqi forces. Our personal relations with Iraqis have remained as good as ever and, though the palace seems to be rather more aloof than in former days, both the King and the Crown Prince are as affable as possible when one sees them.

15. But our main difficulty lies in the political field. It may be considered under two heads, our treaty relations and our attitude to "Arab" problems. It is our earnest desire to maintain the basic advantages we enjoy under the present Treaty of Alliance. The Iraqis think differently, though they received a salutary shock when it looked as though Persia was about to come under Tudeh domination. But they are searching for some arrangement under which they can enjoy the best of both worlds. They would like to have our protection, provided it really is protection. But they would like to have it without our maintaining bases in their country. That they regard as a mark of inferiority. The question has not been formally raised during the past year, perhaps because the Iraqis were awaiting the result of our negotiations with Egypt, but it will have to be faced sooner or later.

16. As to the "Arab" problem, we are at a disadvantage because whereas our interests are world-wide and we cannot sacrifice our relations with, say, France for the sake of the Arabs, the outlook of the Iraqis is parochial. What they see, they see very clearly (more clearly, indeed, than we do),

but they live in blinkers. They feel, for example, about Palestine with a passionate intensity. We find the whole subject rather a bore, distracting attention from graver matters, and cannot understand why the Arabs should not be willing to settle down with the Jews and leave them in possession of a small corner of the enormous Arab world. There is no solution in sight to this problem and it is no exaggeration to say that so long as Israel exists, our relations with Iraq will be clouded for the foreseeable future.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Jedda, Amman, Tel Aviv, the Head of the British Middle East Office, the Political Resident, Bahrain, Her Majesty's Consul-General, Basra, and Her Majesty's Consuls at Kirkuk and Mosul.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF EVENTS, IRAQ 1953

(General Nuruddin Mahmud's Government)

January 17.—Parliamentary elections. Majority obtained by supporters of Nuri al-Said.

January 22.—Resignation of General Nuruddin Mahmud. Accepted January 23.)

January 24.—Opening of Parliament by the Regent.

January 24-28.—Abortive attempt by Nasrat al-Farisi to form a Government.

January 29.—Government formed by Jamil Madfai.

February.—Contract for second stage of Wadi Tharthar project awarded to a German firm.

March 6-19.—Student unrest in Bagdad.

March 14.—Royal tour of Muntafik and Kut.

March 21.—Approach by Taufik Suwaidi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British and American Ambassadors requesting assistance in expanding Iraqi defence forces.

March 24-29.—Visit of Kamil Chamoun, President of the Lebanon.

March 29.—Ratification of Treaty of Friendship between Iraq and India (signed Bagdad, November 10, 1952).

April 5-15.—King Faisal accompanied by the Regent visits Basra and the Persian Gulf.

May 2.—Accession of King Faisal. Visit of His Royal Highness Duke of Gloucester.

May 17-18.—Visit of United States Secretary of State.

May 19.—Resolution of Iraqi Parliament protesting against friendly references by Sir Winston Churchill to Zionism in his speech of May 11.

June 2.—Removal of press censorship.

June 18.—Riot by Communist prisoners in Bagdad Central Jail.

June 19.—Press censorship reimposed.

June 27-July 1.—Visit of King Hussain of Jordan.

July 1.—Price of bread reduced.

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July 5.—Development Board awarded contracts for two new bridges in Bagdad to a German firm.

July 13.—Law creating Ministry of Development published in the *Official Gazette*.

July 21-August 10.—Anglo-Iraqi Economic Committee visits London.

July 23.—Prorogation of Parliament.

August 12-16.—Visit of King Faisal accompanied by the Crown Prince to Jordan.

August 16.—Shah's arrival from Tehran.

August 22.—Shah's return to Tehran.

August 29.—Resignation of Jamil Madfai's Government.

September 2.—Riot in Kut Jail.

September 3.—Visit of United States officers in connexion with United States Military Aid to Iraq.

September 17.—Government formed by Dr. Muhammad Fadhil Jamali.

September 19.—German Minister presents credentials.

September 21-October 1.—Visit of Jordan Economic Delegation.

October 5.—Martial Law raised (after being in force since November 1952). Press censorship removed and political parties allowed to resume activities.

October 1-5.—Visit of Mr. R. Maudling, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, accompanied by Sir Leslie Rowan.

October 20.—Rent Restrictions Ordinance promulgated.

October 21.—Iraqi Prime Minister's visit to Jordan for meeting of the Arab League Political Committee to discuss the Qibya incident.

October-November.—Professor Iversen visited Bagdad in the latter half of October and early November when the draft of his report on Iraqi monetary policy was approved.

November.—Important road contract awarded to a French firm.

November 15-27.—Visit of British Trade Mission.

December 1.—Opening of Parliament. King Faisal's first Speech from the Throne.

December 5-19.—Strike of Basra Petroleum Company employees at Basra.

December 15.—Proclamation of Martial Law for Basra Liwa.

December 16.—Suspension for one year of nine newspapers for their treatment of events in Basra.

December 17.—Return to Bagdad of Nuri al-Said after two months' absence.

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No. 2

REPLIES BY THE HOUSES OF THE IRAQ PARLIAMENT TO THE KING'S SPEECH

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received January 25)

(No. 14. Confidential)
Sir,

Bagdad,

January 13, 1954.

With reference to my despatch No. 206 of the 8th of December, 1953, I have the honour to report that both Houses of the Iraq Parliament have approved without a division their replies to The King's Speech. The Senate's reply is a brief and anodyne document expressing gratitude to The King and good wishes for his reign. The Chamber of Deputies' reply is slightly more political in tone since it expresses the hope that the Chamber will be able to carry out its duties and to support constitutional life and stability in the country.

2. In my despatch No. 212 of the 23rd December, I reported that a number of Senators and Deputies of Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party had promised the Prime Minister their unconditional support. The possibility that the debate on the Speech from the Throne might be the occasion for a major challenge to the Government was thus discounted in advance. Nevertheless, the debate ranged over a wide variety of topics and afforded a number of interesting sidelights on the mentality of the Iraqi politician.

3. Probably the most interesting feature of the whole debate was the Prime Minister's outspoken and vigorous condemnation of Communism. In conversation with me afterwards, Dr. Fadhil Jamali claimed that his speech had made an immense impression on the House; but though the speech may have had some effect, Dr. Fadhil Jamali is always liable to over-estimate the effect of oratory, particularly his own, and the debate as a whole showed clearly that very few of the Deputies have much idea of the realities of Communism or the political situation as a whole.

4. The Prime Minister placed Communism together with Zionism in the forefront of the problems facing the Government. He warned the Chamber not to be taken in by Communist tactics. The Government, he said, did not wish anarchy to be spread in the name of liberty and would not permit this to be done in the name of the Constitution. The worker, the peasant and the student must be educated to save them from becoming the dupes of Communist propaganda. (To encourage the Iraq Government in their efforts I instructed my Information

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Officer to bring this to notice of other Information Officers for possible use elsewhere. I also told the Prime Minister of my action to his unconcealed self-satisfaction.)

5. From the debate which followed, it was quite evident that although Deputies were prepared to say a perfunctory word here or there in condemnation of Communism, they had no sort of realisation of the threat it represents to the values they profess to defend and that they regard it as simply one problem among many others of much greater interest and concern to Iraq—in particular "Western imperialism," which they regard as a more immediate because more visible threat, Palestine, Anglo-Iraqi relations, and the participation of Iraq in a Middle Eastern defence scheme. The speech of Ismail Ghamim, one of the more irresponsible Opposition Deputies, was particularly illuminating. He had himself been at a Communist-inspired "Partisans of Peace" conference in Vienna and had seen through it. But should not, he suggested, the Prime Minister, who had attacked the "Partisans of Peace," attack also the "spies of Britain" such as the "Brotherhood of Freedom" and the Freemasons?

6. During the debate a number of Deputies pressed the Government to declare their intentions in regard to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The Prime Minister told me that if necessary he would say that he considered that the Treaty should run its course; but although the subject was, I understand, raised in connection with the supply of arms and the existence of British bases in Iraq during a secret session on the 30th of December, there appears to have been no substantive discussion of the Treaty itself and the Government were able to avoid a direct reply. The Prime Minister did, however, speak firmly in reply to other criticisms on Anglo-Iraqi relations. An Opposition Deputy from Mosul accused the Government of voting at the United Nations solely in accord with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government. Dr. Jamali had little difficulty in refuting this. When criticised on the absence of an independent Iraqi foreign policy, he replied by referring to the passages in the Speech from the Throne on a collective Arab policy; and both he and other Government spokesmen referred to the plans which Iraq has since put forward to the Arab League for a federation of Arab States. After a particularly virulent charge of British pressure, Dr. Jamali denied vehemently that he had been subjected to such pressure on any occasion since he had become Prime Minister, adding that "the age of bogeymen (djimms) is past." The next day a Left-wing nationalist paper published a cartoon of a minute Prime Minister, towered over by a figure labelled "British Djimm" of Piltownian aspect and gigantic dimensions.

7. The Prime Minister was in great difficulty with regard to defence policy, since the lack of unanimity on this subject within the Cabinet made it impossible for him to make any firm statement of Government policy. Various Deputies referred to Dr. Jamali's earlier recognition of the necessity for defence arrangements with the Western Powers and one Deputy claimed to find this opinion of the Prime Minister's irreconcilable with his opposition to Israel since it was well known that the Western Powers regarded a peace settlement with Israel as an indispensable preliminary for the organisation of the Middle East Defence Organisation. Dr. Jamali went no further in his reply than stating that Iraq should strengthen itself militarily and economically, since whichever side she should subsequently wish to take she must be strong for defence against any invader. The Prime Minister was also questioned about reports emanating from Egypt that Iraq was considering a revision of the Saadabad Pact to link it with joint defence schemes such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. One Deputy interpreted this alleged Iraqi move as a means to bring pressure on Egypt during her negotiations about the Canal Zone, and there was also mention of an Egyptian protest to the Iraqi Government. Dr. Jamali replied that no Egyptian protest had been received. He had personally remonstrated with the Egyptian Ambassador about the Egyptian report on this subject and had pointed out that no reconsideration of the Saadabad Pact had taken place. If there were any such reconsideration, Iraq would first approach Egypt in view of the unity of aims which linked the two countries. He had previously told me that he thought the Egyptians had concocted this report for home consumption. While thus offering a mild rebuke to the Egyptians, Dr. Jamali was nevertheless at pains to emphasise his Government's support for the "national policy" of the present Egyptian Government.

8. On internal affairs the Prime Minister said that Iraq had immense material potentialities capable of making her one of the most prosperous countries in the world; but these could be exploited to the full only if Government and people

worked together. Long-standing abuses could not be corrected overnight and Iraq's problems could not be dealt with by the Government alone. The people should give the Government time and co-operate with it. There must be an efficient and honest governmental machine and the Government were working hard to provide one. In particular they had resolved to "save Ministers the trouble" of appointing and promoting civil servants by entrusting this task to a neutral commission. Some Opposition Deputies commented that so far little progress had been made in this direction.

9. There was criticism in both Houses of the unrepresentative character of the present Chamber of Deputies and the Government's weakest point, namely, its lack of a majority of its own in even this "unrepresentative Chamber." In the Senate, Salih Jabr urged a dissolution and the organisation of "free and honest elections," though as reported in Mr. Hooper's letter No. 1012/6/54 of the 12th of January to Mr. Falla, it seems unlikely that he or his party would really be prepared to face a general election if one were to come before the end of the present Parliamentary Session.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Cairo and Tel Aviv and to the Head of the British Middle East Office, Fayid.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

VQ 1015/7

No. 3

REPORT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION SUBSEQUENT TO THE RESIGNATIONS OF THE MINISTERS OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received January 25)

(No. 21. Confidential)
Sir,

*Bagdad,
January 20, 1954.*

In my telegram No. 16 of the 9th of January I reported the resignation of the Ministers of Economics and Social Affairs. Before Abdul Rahman Jalili and Hassan Abdul Rahman joined Dr. Jamali's Government in September, both they and their party, the United Popular Front, which had consistently opposed in Parliament the continuance of martial law in force since November 1952, asked for assurances that it would be rescinded. It was in fact abolished shortly after Dr. Jamali's assumption of office. The reimposition of martial law in the Basra province after the strike in the oil-fields in December last caused the United Popular Front to dissociate itself from the Government's action and to demand the resignation of its two members from the Cabinet. It so happened that both Abdul Rahman Jalili and Hassan Abdul Rahman were absent from Iraq at this juncture and it was only after some delay, which gave grounds for assuming that personal desire to continue in office was conflicting strongly with allegiance to a moribund party, that they finally resigned and their resignations were accepted.

2. In the course of a conversation with me on the 18th of January the Prime Minister reviewed the position in which his Government now found itself. He said that he was in no hurry to replace the two men who had resigned as he did not know whether he himself would be continuing in office much longer. As I have already reported, Dr. Jamali's Government relies for its parliamentary majority entirely on Nuri al Said's Constitutional Union Party. Although, as stated in my despatch No. 212 of the 22nd of December, the Constitutional Union Party promised the Government its full support, it is in the nature of things that that support would not in practice be unconditional, and Dr. Jamali complained to me that Nuri Pasha was now pressing him to go slow over various reforms which were likely to harm the immediate interests of some of the Constitutional Union Party's adherents. At the same time Nuri Pasha is urging him, as I reported in my despatch No. 2 of the 6th of January, to enact the new Press law and the new law of associations which would automatically abolish all existing political parties and oblige them to apply to the Minister of the Interior for permission to reconstitute themselves. It is Nuri's view that after the passing of this law, such permission would be refused to the Opposition parties, the Independence Party

and the National Democratic Party. Dr. Jamali said that he agreed that both these laws were desirable, but he felt that they would not be well received by the public if some of the reform legislation promised in the Speech from the Throne had not been enacted first. He considered, he said, that the first duty of the Government was to combat the spread of Communism and he was convinced that this could only be done by executing a programme of moderate reforms such as Nuri was now asking him to delay. For this and other reasons Dr. Jamali concluded he felt less sure of Nuri Pasha's backing than he had been.

3. Disagreement over the priorities to be accorded respectively to what may be described as repressive reforms and progressive reforms is not confined to Nuri al Said and the Prime Minister. It splits the Cabinet itself and, in particular, as reported in my letter No. 1012/8/54 of the 13th of January to Mr. Allen, the Minister of the Interior is of Nuri Pasha's way of thinking. The Prime Minister is, however, adamant that he must create in the public an atmosphere of confidence in the Government by progressive reforms before proceeding to take restrictive measures. He insists that his scheme of reforms must come first and he told me that he would resign if prevented from carrying it out. He is, however, prepared to be patient before taking any irrevocable decision.

4. There are none of the usual and persistent rumours concerning a successor to Dr. Jamali—though Hikmat Sulaiman has been mentioned—which normally precede a change, and it is safe to assume that the Palace has not as yet withdrawn support from Dr. Jamali. Whether, however, the Palace would attempt a trial of strength with Nuri Pasha on his behalf if the Constitutional Union Party seriously tried to oust him is very doubtful. Faced, therefore, with losing the support of some of the members of his Government and that of the majority party in Parliament, Dr. Jamali's position is precarious.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

V 1071/29

No. 4

IRAQI PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS ON IRAQI-SYRIAN RELATIONS

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received March 5)

(No. 137. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)

Bagdad,
March 5, 1954.

My telegram No. 135: Syria.

The Iraqi Prime Minister told me to-day that despite Press reports he had no intention of visiting Syria. Though it was always his policy to promote as close unity as possible with Syria, he would leave the initiative to the Syrian Government and make no sensational move on his side. He would not interfere in Syrian internal affairs (these assurances have only limited value as Dr. Jamali expects his resignation to be accepted within the next two days, and no one knows who will form the next Government).

2. Dr. Jamali went on to express the hope that we would not support France in a policy alienating Syria from Iraq. He alleged the French were greatly upset by recent events in Syria (this was confirmed to me by the Syrian Chargé d'Affaires) and he had reason to believe that the French were toying with the idea of instigating the Israelis to attack Syria if Syria tried to unite with Iraq. I said that I was sure we should do nothing to alienate Syria from Iraq. As for the French, while I could well believe that they might not welcome anything in the nature of an Iraqi-Syrian federation, I thought their idea of instigating the Israelis to attack Syria was completely far-fetched. Dr. Jamali replied (begging me to respect his confidence) that he had this from an American source. Anyway it would be typical of the French.

3. He added that the French Ambassador had asked to visit him to-morrow. Presumably he will deliver a message similar to that reported in Amman telegram No. 115. If so he is likely to get a dusty answer.

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VQ 1015/17

No. 5

DETAILS OF DR. JAMALI'S NEW CABINET

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received March 13)

(No. 63. Confidential)
Sir,

Bagdad,
March 10, 1954.

In my telegram No. 144 of the 8th of March, 1954, I reported that Dr. Fadhil al Jamali had formed a new Government at the King's request. I now have the honour to state that members of the new Cabinet, a list of whom is annexed to this despatch, were sworn in on the morning of the 8th of March.

2. As I reported in my despatch No. 32 of the 3rd of February, Dr. Jamali's previous Government did not enjoy a strong position. It depended for its existence not only on the support of the Palace, which is the normal position of any Government in Iraq, but also on the acquiescence of the Constitutional Union Party led by Nuri al Said who controlled a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. It had for some time been apparent that members of the Constitutional Union Party were reluctant to support the more controversial of the Government's reforms, many of which would affect their personal interests, and that the Palace, particularly the Crown Prince, probably influenced by Nuri al Said whose opinions I outlined in my letter to Mr. Allen (No. 1012/20/54) of the 10th of February, were also cooling in their support of Dr. Jamali. It was, however, not so much this basic weakness of their position which precipitated the Government's resignation as the constitutional provision that no Minister who is not a Member of either House of Parliament may remain in office longer than six months. As Dr. Jamali's previous Government was formed on the 17th of September, 1953, it was necessary that those Ministers in his Government who were not Members of Parliament should either become so or be replaced by the 17th of March.

3. It was thus not altogether unexpected when the Crown Prince asked in my absence from Bagdad to see the Counselor on the 27th of February and informed him that Dr. Jamali had submitted his resignation. The Crown Prince added that he hoped it would be possible for Dr. Jamali to resign and re-form his Government, thereby disposing of the constitutional difficulty and allowing any Minister who was not in Parliament a further six months' tenure. Although Dr. Jamali had previously expressed to me his view that such a procedure would not accord with the spirit of the Constitution, he evidently allowed his scruples to be overcome. His resignation became public knowledge on the 6th of March, after having been strongly rumoured for some days previously, and on the 8th of March it was announced that he had agreed to form a new Government.

4. It will be seen from the annexed list of Ministers that, apart from a rearrangement of certain posts, Abdullah Bakr, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Abdul Amir Alawi, former Minister of Health, have left the Cabinet as well as two of the former Ministers without Portfolio, Sadiq Kamouna and Muhammad Shafiq al Ani, who had been temporarily in charge of the Ministries of Economics and Social Affairs respectively since the resignation on the 9th of January of the two Ministers belonging to the United Popular Front. The newcomers to the Government are Ahmad Mukhtar Baban (No. 23 of the 1953 Personalities Report), formerly Head of the Royal Diwan (where he is succeeded by Abdullah Bakr), Musa Shabandar (No. 81) at present Iraqi Ambassador in Washington, and Ali Mumtaz al Daftari (No. 30), former Minister of Finance in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in 1953. All three of these new Ministers are Sunni Muslims, while two of those now discarded are Shia; the Shias in the new Cabinet are thus fewer in number than in the previous one. It is also notable that of the new Ministers only one, Ali Mumtaz al Daftari, who has a seat in the Senate, is a Member of Parliament and none of them is a member of the Constitutional Union Party, whose representation in the Cabinet is thus no stronger than before.

5. Although it is not yet known what undertakings Dr. Jamali may have been able to obtain from the Palace in return for his agreement to serve again, it seems that the internal position of his Government must remain subject to the same weaknesses as previously. As long as the present Parliament remains, Dr. Jamali will still need the support of Nuri al Said, and this is only likely to be forthcoming if the Government's programme of reforms is kept sufficiently mild and its programme of security measures is sufficiently severe. At present, so I have

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been told by the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Jamali has no promise of support of any sort from Nuri Pasha. An indication of Dr. Jamali's intention to go slow over reform—thus appeasing the Constitutional Union Party—is provided by the transfer of Abdul Karim al Uzri (who is anathema to Nuri Pasha) from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Development. Abdul Karim al Uzri had been the driving force for major reforms in the previous Government, and it is likely that his successor, Ali Mumtaz al Daftari, will be more moderate. The appointments of Ahmad Mukhtar Baban and Musa Shabandar, both of whom are personal friends of Nuri Pasha, have been made likewise to secure his backing. But it is by no means certain that Nuri's henchmen, and in particular Dhia Ja'afar and Khalil Kanna, will not continue to snipe at the Government as occasion offers.

6. The change of Finance Minister has come at an inopportune moment from an administrative point of view. The budget should by now have been submitted to the Chamber for debate and enactment. Abdul Karim al Uzri had completed his budget and it is unlikely that Ali Mumtaz would be prepared to accept it as it stands, particularly if, as one is bound to suppose, the object of appointing him as Minister of Finance has been to reassure the more conservative members of the Constitutional Union Party. Accordingly, the Government intends to adjourn the Chamber for a month to enable the new Finance Minister to study and, if necessary, to amend the budget. This will probably entail the prolongation of the sittings of Parliament, when they are resumed, well into the hot summer months.

7. The interval before Parliament reassembles is apparently also to be used to pass by decree the Law of Associations and the Press Law, both of which have been under study for some time, as well as a law for providing for a state of emergency. This was drafted long ago but no Government has ever been able to put it into force. The Law of Associations would abolish all existing political parties and oblige party leaders to apply to the Minister of the Interior for permission to re-form their parties. The intention is to refuse permission to the Independence and National Democratic parties. Neither the Crown Prince nor Nuri Pasha, both of whom I saw yesterday, appear to be worried by the possibility of disturbances if and when these decrees are promulgated; but to have their hands free to deal with any trouble the Government will have to keep on good terms with the conservative landowners, and this will be another factor tending to slow up reform.

8. Another question which the new Government will probably have to settle is that of the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of elections. Dr. Jamali is known to favour dissolution and is said to have promised Saleh Jabr, whose Popular Socialist Party boycotted the elections of January 1953, that new elections would be held in the near future. Ali Mumtaz likewise recently told a member of my staff that he favoured holding fresh elections, probably in the autumn. Opposition to the dissolution of the Chamber can naturally be expected from the majority in the present Chamber. The Crown Prince also has told me that he would not wish elections to be held until at any rate the end of the present session of Parliament, and he is of the opinion that any new Chamber will be very similar to the present one.

9. The main significance of the present Cabinet reshuffle will thus probably be to confirm the Government's recent tendency to slow down its programme of reform, as set out in the Speech from the Throne on the 1st of December, 1953, as part of the price of its remaining in office. It seems unlikely, however, that all reform will be abandoned, if only because, having dangled this bauble before the public, it would be dangerous to snatch it away. It also seems to me that Dr. Jamali is unlikely to emerge with much credit from his second tenure of power. By nature a Liberal and coming to power initially as head of a Government of reform, he is—probably from a desire to remain in office and from personal vanity—allowing himself to be used to pass repressive legislation, which even the Conservative Governments of the past have not been able to enact. It can scarcely improve his reputation. It seems to me that he is really a child in politics and is being made the instrument of men far cleverer and less scrupulous than himself.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, Ankara, the Head of the British Middle East Office, and the Regional Officer at Beirut.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

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Enclosure

THE CABINET

(FORMED ON MARCH 8, 1954)

Dr. Muhammad Fadhil al Jamali	...	Prime Minister.
Ahmad Mukhtar Baban	...	Deputy Prime Minister.
Said Qazzaz	...	Minister of Interior.
Musa al Shabandar	...	Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Ali Mumtaz	...	Minister of Finance.
Abdul Karim al Uzri	...	Minister of Development.
Arkan Abadi	...	Minister of Social Affairs.
Dr. Abdul Majid al Qassab	...	Minister of Health.
Jamil al Urfali	...	Minister of Education.
Dr. Abdul Majid Abbas	...	Minister of Communications and Works.
Hussain Makki Khammas	...	Minister of Defence.
Muhammad Ali Mahimud	...	Minister of Justice.
Ali Haider Sulaiman	...	Minister of Economics.
Abdul Ghani al Dalli	...	Minister of Agriculture.
Rafail Butti	...	Minister without Portfolio.

No. 6

NEW AMERICAN INITIATIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS IN IRAQ

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received March 15)

(No. 160. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)

Bagdad,
March 15, 1954

Your telegram No. 64.

The new American initiative in the Middle East, of which significant features are the Turkish-Pakistan Agreement and the offer of military aid to Pakistan and Iraq, seems likely to have considerable repercussions on Iraq. Nuri's projected tour seems intended to prepare the way for Iraq's association with America, designed which I believe to be warmly supported by the Palace. And since, as I now learn, Nuri is travelling as a delegate of the Iraqi Government, his statement of policy must be regarded as almost an official statement of the Iraqi Government's views.

2. Any reorientation of Iraq's foreign policy on the lines suggested will meet with strong opposition, not only from neutralist opinion in Iraq itself, but also abroad. In Iraq opposition is already active and the Prime Minister, whom I saw yesterday, was somewhat apprehensive of the possibility of disturbances, though he claimed that the Government was ready to deal with them. Among the Arab States opposition will come from Egypt who sees her position threatened as leader of the Arab world, and from Saudi Arabia who has just refused American aid for herself and certainly does not wish to see any strengthening of Iraq. Hence the Iraq Government's keen interest in the action of Syria, for if Syria also joined the opposition, Iraq would have the whole of the Arab League against her. Elsewhere there will be opposition from India, Israel (including her supporters in the United States) and possibly France. My French colleague says that his Government see some danger in a disturbance of the equilibrium and its repercussions upon the Western position in the Middle East. My United States colleague suspects that what the French really have in mind is that any strengthening of Iraq by United States aid might enable the Iraqi Government to bring stronger pressure upon Syria in the direction of union.

3. One must therefore foresee a period of uncertainty in which the Iraqi Government will be pulled in one direction and then another both by local and

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foreign opinion. I suggest that we should be considering all the implications from the point of view of our interests so that we can give timely advice as the situation develops.

4. There seems to me to be two dangers:—

- (a) If Iraq associates herself with an American-sponsored agreement between Turkey and Pakistan and also accepts United States military aid, our own position here will be weakened *vis-à-vis* the Americans.
- (b) If the whole plan falls through as a result of local and foreign opposition, Iraq may turn away from association with the West and towards an Arab and neutralist policy. Any undue pressure is likely to have this result. These dangers, I suggest, can only be avoided if we and the Americans concert our policy and are seen to be resolved towards the same objective. In particular, it would be as well to put the Americans on their guard against doing anything which might undermine our position in the bases.

VQ 1701/23

No. 7

REPORT ON THE FLOODS IN THE TIGRIS BASIN

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received April 3)

(No. 79. Confidential)

Bagdad.

March 31, 1954.

Sir,

It is too early to report in detail about the floods which have recently occurred in the Tigris basin in Iraq, but I think I should inform you briefly of the position as it stands at the moment. It is already clear, as my recent telegrams will have indicated, that they constitute a disaster on a national scale for this country.

2. In my first report on the floods in my telegram No. 189 of the 25th of March, I said that the danger was being used by the Iraqi Prime Minister as a pretext to cancel the meeting of the Arab League in Bagdad which had been fixed for the 31st of March. When he told me this at dinner on the previous evening, Dr. Jamali did not seem particularly alarmed. The following evening, too, the authorities were sufficiently confident to enable me to report that Bagdad did not appear to be in danger. It was not long, however, before the danger to the city became very real. A spell of warm weather in the middle of March had begun to melt the exceptionally heavy snows in the mountains of Turkey and Kurdistan, and the level of the River Tigris was already high when, on the night of the 23rd-24th of March, there were phenomenal storms of torrential rain all over central and northern Iraq. This produced an unprecedented flow of water, not only in the Tigris itself but in its tributaries, and very soon the level of the river in Bagdad was at danger point. To save the city a number of breaches were made upstream on the night of the 25th-26th of March. This was not enough, however, to prevent flooding in the river front houses on the following day, but thereafter the water in the bed of the river fell slowly. Further breaches were made above and below the city on the night of the 26th-27th. All the upstream breaches were made in the eastern bank of the river with the result that the agricultural country north and east of the town became increasingly inundated. It was not, however, till the night of the 27th-28th of March that the water from these breaches reached the northern and eastern bunds of Bagdad. By midday on the 27th, East Bagdad became an island six feet or more below the level of the floods protected by these surrounding bunds. The question was whether they would hold. The position was made more difficult by the flooding of the river Diyala, south of the city, which made it impossible to draw off the flood water into that river. Control of the water defences was put in the hands of the army on the 28th of March.

3. The Iraqis seem to have risen to the occasion remarkably well and really put their hearts into preventing a major disaster. Both army and police have been constantly at work and even the students, including the girls, appear to have done a constructive job in filling sandbags and stacking them on the bunds. Mr. Hardy, the British Director-General of Irrigation, has rendered outstanding services during these troubled days.

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4. The situation, nevertheless, causes grave anxiety. The amount of land ruined, houses and food-stocks destroyed and population evacuated, not merely around Bagdad itself but over vast areas of the country, is still unknown, but is bound to be enormous. There will be, therefore, a very large problem of relief and reconstruction. At the moment the population is keyed up to face the crisis and is too preoccupied with the problem of its survival to think overmuch of politics. But that moment will pass and the country will find itself faced with the countless unexciting and intractable problems of restoring its broken economy. It is then that one may expect troublemakers to get busy and they will find thousands of desperate persons ready to hand as inflammable material in addition to their normal source of supply. Already there are mutterings that the Government found itself completely unprepared. Nothing had been done in advance to provide for flood control, evacuation, feeding and public health. There are mutterings, too, against the King and the Crown Prince for not having come back earlier from Pakistan and for not circulating more among the population manning the defences or among the thousands of evacuees. Actually they did in fact cut short their stay in the Persian Gulf by several days and they have paid numerous visits to the defences. But the publicity organisation of the Palace is so bad that what has been done is not made sufficiently known.

5. A particularly difficult problem will arise from the fact that one class known as the Sarifa-Dwellers (these are very poor people who immigrated to Bagdad largely from Amara and have been squatting on the outskirts of the city for several years in reed huts) have had to be moved from outside the bund into Bagdad itself. They always constituted a danger in times of trouble as they are constantly ready to loot, but when they were all squatting together in one area the authorities could keep a certain check on them. Now they are dispersed over the town. They have every reason to become disaffected and, more important, a large percentage of the police is drawn from their ranks. Both in the event of the evacuation of East Bagdad and in the event of economic disasters or hunger, they would, therefore, be tempted either to loot deserted houses or to attack food stores in the event of shortage, and the authorities might not be able to count upon the police to curb them. The only consoling feature is that the present evacuation of these unhappy people may, if no major disaster yet overtakes the city, oblige the Government to carry out its plan for the provision of permanent dwellings for them and an improvement of their lot. Another difficult problem is likely to be an astronomical rise in food prices, which is difficult to check in any country in times of shortage and quite impossible in the Middle East.

6. I have formed a local British Committee to assist over relief work, and the Royal Air Force at Habbaniya have already provided large quantities of sandbags. As soon as I know a little more of the dimensions of the problem I may ask you to approach the Anglo-Iraqi society in London to organise a relief fund in the United Kingdom.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Amman, Washington, Ankara, the United Kingdom Commissioner at Karachi, and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

VQ 1701/51

No. 8

FURTHER ACCOUNT OF THE FLOODING IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN IRAQ

Mr. Hooper to Mr. Eden. (Received April 20)

(No. 85. Confidential)

Bagdad.

April 13, 1954.

Sir,

I have the honour to give you a further account of the flooding in central and southern Iraq described in Sir John Troutbeck's despatch No. 79 of the 31st of March. The continuance of flooding in the valley of the River Tigris has still

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prevented any accurate estimate of the damage suffered by Iraq in consequence of this disaster. It is also too early for measures of rehabilitation, and the Iraqi authorities can as yet only concentrate on immediate relief. The danger to Bagdad which still exists, though it is less acute, continues to give pause to political activity though not so completely as in previous weeks.

2. At the time of Sir John Troutbeck's despatch under reference, the level of the Tigris at Bagdad was slowly dropping and so it continued until Monday, the 5th of April. On the 1st of April the bund on the west bank of the river gave way near Daura some ten miles south of the city, cutting rail and road communication with Basra and the direct road to Hillah. Since then, the railway to Mosul and the road to Falluja and thence west to Damascus or south to Hillah have remained the sole land links with the outside world, though flooding in the Euphrates is now threatening these. On the 31st of March and the 1st of April there were further severe storms in Turkey and Northern Iraq and the arrival of the resultant waters which was forecast for the 5th of April, was awaited with extreme gloom by the authorities. It was at this time that, as reported in my telegram No. 226 of the 3rd of April, after consulting the British Director-General of Irrigation, I thought it advisable to pass a confidential warning to key members of the British community to enable them if necessary to put in train the evacuation to Habbaniya of mothers with young children in case the flood overtopped, or broke through, the embankments round the town. The Iraqi authorities used the period of grace to reinforce the bunds and to construct a substantial earthwork between Bagdad and the now flooded Muaskar Rashid. The event, happily, belied expectations; and though the river rose, the situation never looked as critical as on the night of the 29th-30th of March. After a slight fall, a further rise occurred on the 10th of April, this time accompanied by a strong wind, which caused waves to break over the bund in various places on the east of Bagdad inducing a general sense of nervousness. It produced at one moment a near-panic when it was rumoured that the bund had given way in the Alwiya quarter, one of the main residential districts of Bagdad with a large number of British, American and other European residents. On this night the Bagdad Broadcasting station remained "on the air" the whole night broadcasting reassuring announcements. Since then the wind has died down and a slight fall in the level of the water has occurred.

3. The main body of the flood which at the end of March had threatened Bagdad, had, by the 7th of April, created additional flooding in the Kut area and the authorities were and continued to be concerned about the township of Aziziya, lying about halfway between Bagdad and Kut, which is now an island. Preparations have been made for its evacuation by river craft.

4. During the course of the past fortnight the relief measures taken by the Iraq Government have begun to take effect. A Higher Relief Committee with appropriate sub-committees was formed, as reported in my telegram No. 14 of the 3rd of April, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Social Affairs. With the aid of volunteers and two helicopters lent by the United States Air Force, food parcels are being made and dropped to marooned villagers and farmers. The thousand tents supplied by Her Majesty's Government for civilian use have been made into a tented camp; and displaced persons and those living in huts below the bunds (who have generally been the originators of panicky rumours) are being induced and, in some cases, obliged to enter it. Three further camps on similar lines are planned to hold a population estimated at 40,000. Efforts are also being made to relieve the inhabitants of Aziziya and of Kut.

5. In all this the Iraq Government have received considerable external aid. In my despatch No. 84 of the 10th of April, I described the large contribution of Her Majesty's Government and British firms and individuals in both to saving the city and to relieving the distressed. The Sheikh of Kuwait has subscribed £100,000, and King Saud is said to have given £150,000 to the relief fund. The Government of the Soviet Union has donated to the Iraqi Red Crescent Society an imposing sum in roubles variously estimated, according to the exchange rate used in calculating the equivalent, at from £4,000 to £10,000. Egypt and Jordan are said to have sent doctors. Turkey has sent doctors and blankets. Pakistan has contributed half a million sandbags, but has had difficulty in transporting them here. The Governments of Persia and India have also made gifts of money. In addition to the British community in Iraq, the American, French, Pakistani and Indian communities resident here have made their own collections for the central fund.

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6. The Iraqi cultivator is a long-suffering man, and I do not expect that it will be he who will be the first to complain but rather those who will exploit his misery for their own ends. But at the moment, both peasants and those who have been displaced from their mud-walled, reed-roofed huts outside Bagdad are bearing their misfortunes with surprising patience, and the volume of genuine complaint is small. Needless to say, the Istiqlal (Independence) and National Democratic Press, now that it seems unlikely that their skins will be in danger, are beginning to revert to form. They are abusing the Government and Irrigation Department for not having foreseen the floods and taken preventive measures, conveniently forgetting that they led the opposition to the "squandering" of oil revenues on such projects as the Wadi Tharthar scheme. They are criticising the alleged paucity of the aid they have received from abroad—though had the "imperialists" been in reality as they are daily described by the extremists, Bagdad would have been left to her fate—and are busily suggesting interested motives for the aid that has been given. When Parliament reopens and the ineffectiveness of the Government's efforts at reconstruction becomes more apparent, as no doubt it will, these attacks can be expected to increase and to command more support. Sir John Troutbeck in his despatch under reference, and I in my despatch No. 84 of the 10th of April, have drawn attention to the gravity of the problems confronting the Government and their failure to realise the full extent of the difficulties which they will have to face; and there is no doubt that a difficult time lies ahead when the waters recede, the tension and excitement of the emergency is followed by the inevitable reaction, and the country has to settle down to the unspectacular drudgery of reconstruction.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

R. W. J. HOOPER.

VQ 1015/21

No. 9

COMMENTS ON THE RESIGNATION OF SAYID UZRI FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF Dr. JAMALI

Mr. Hooper to Mr. Eden. (Received April 20)

(No. 86. Confidential)
Sir,

*Bagdad,
April 14, 1954.*

In his despatch No. 63 of the 10th of March reporting the formation of a new Government by Dr. Muhammad Fadhil al Jamali, Sir John Troutbeck commented that the substitution of Sayid Ali Mumtaz al Daftari for Sayid Abdul Karim al Uzri had been made to obtain the support of conservative elements in the Chamber and in the country, and it probably denoted that the programme of mild social reform set forth in the Speech from the Throne last December was being abandoned.

2. It is evident that Sayid Uzri himself believes this to be the case since he has now submitted to the Prime Minister his resignation from his new post of Minister of Development. He will thus be one of very few Iraqi Ministers who have resigned on a question of principle. Although it is only in the past few days that the fact that he has resigned has become widely known (it is still not yet officially admitted), he himself recently told the Oriental Counsellor that he had resigned on the 9th of March, the day after the formation of the new Government, and had not attended a single Cabinet meeting since then. In his Ministry he has confined himself to despatching routine business. He said that he had only agreed to join the Cabinet at all because Dr. Jamali was a personal friend and had insisted that his defection would discourage other former colleagues whom the Prime Minister wished to retain in his new Government. While there may be truth in this statement, I suspect that Sayid Uzri felt it to be in his interest to remain in the Government until his election to a vacant seat in the Chamber on the 14th of March was safely accomplished.

3. Sayid Uzri stated that immediately his resignation had been received by the Prime Minister, he had been asked by King Faisal to continue in office until the King had returned from Pakistan. Thereafter, the Prime Minister had again

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requested him to hold his hand until the immediate danger of floods was past. He intends, however, to insist that his resignation be accepted within the next week or so.

4. Meanwhile, Dr. Fadhil Jamali continues blithely on his way. He is unsuccessfully pressing Nadim Pachachi, the Minister of Development in Jamil Mada'i's Government last summer, to take the portfolio of Development. He appears scarcely to realise the storm which will confront him when Parliament reassembles on the 19th of April or the magnitude of the problems with which the recent floods will confront him, his Government and the administration as a whole. He assumed power in September, 1953, as the head of a Government of social reform, and such popularity as he has enjoyed with the public has derived from that fact. The loss of Abdul Karim al Uzri, who was the architect of the social programme outlined in the Speech from the Throne, will undoubtedly weaken him seriously.

5. Dr. Jamali has, moreover, lost in personal stature in the course of the last three months. His reputation for integrity, intelligence and good intentions still remains but he has forfeited respect by lack of judgment, of power to lead and of stability of purpose. His position has admittedly been difficult. Despite the most formal promises of unconditional parliamentary support, Nuri Pasha al Said and the Constitutional Union Party have never in fact been more than lukewarm in their backing. They have whittled away at the programme of social reform and, in particular, at the land tax, until almost nothing is left. There has been hardly a single measure on which the Prime Minister could confidently go ahead. In another man this difficult position might have been expected to breed caution and discretion, but Dr. Jamali has, as one deputy put it to Sir John Troutbeck, "abounded in declarations," many of which encouraged false hopes which are now turning into disillusion. He forfeited the sympathy of the Press by assuring them that Parliament would not be prorogued and then proroguing it the following day. He has forfeited the sympathy of the politicians by trying to be all things to all men. He has disappointed Nuri al Said and the older generation who hoped he would dissolve the political parties (thereby, as they believe, sparing them the odium of doing it when they next return to power) because having undertaken to do so, he did nothing. His own Ministers openly criticise the instability of his ideas. The deputies treat him with undisguised contempt, often not troubling to rise as is customary when the Prime Minister enters the House.

6. In the field of foreign affairs, Dr. Jamali has two fixed principles. He is the declared friend of the West. He is more outspoken in this respect than Nuri al Said has ever been or is ever likely to be. On Palestine he is intransigently Arab. Though changeable in most other ideas, he has been pleasant and frank to deal with and this Embassy has had closer and more confidential relations with him than with almost any Iraqi Prime Minister in recent years. But even in foreign affairs he has been the victim of his own wishful thinking and his lack of popular and parliamentary support. For instance, he informed the United States Ambassador and Sir John Troutbeck last January that, despite criticism, he was anxious and ready to accept United States military aid. Since the offer of it was made in mid-March, however, he has procrastinated, because he fears that the need to submit it to Parliament would provoke a storm—in the streets rather than in the Chamber—too violent for him to weather. The belief that he is trying to bring Iraq into the Turkish-Pakistani pact has brought him the distrust of the other members of the Arab League and his persistent advocacy of Arab federation has likewise aroused suspicion.

7. When the floods recede and the need for immediate relief gives place to the necessity for patient and thorough-going measures of rehabilitation, the political and economic problems will, I fear, be too great for Dr. Jamali, and his Government seems unlikely to survive the next three months. If it falls, it will disappear with very little positive achievement to its credit; and with it will disappear a good many high hopes and much of Dr. Jamali's political reputation.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

R. W. J. HOOPER.

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No. 10

UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO IRAQ

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received May 10)

(No. 97. Secret)

Bagdad,

Sir,

April 28, 1954.

With reference to my telegram No. 287 of the 26th of April I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the notes exchanged between the American Ambassador in Bagdad and the Prime Minister of Iraq by which the United States Government undertakes to give military aid to the Iraqi armed forces.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

No. 677

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AMERICAN EMBASSY,

April 21, 1954.

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the Foreign Office Memorandum of March 1953 requesting the United States Government to provide arms assistance to Iraq, and the Embassy's interim reply of June 1953, stating that the United States Government was giving this request careful consideration. I am now pleased to inform you that the United States Government has acted favourably on this request and is prepared to grant military assistance to the Government of Iraq. Such assistance will be provided subject to the provisions applicable to legislative authority and will be related in character, timing and amount to international developments in the area. In addition, it is proposed that any such assistance be provided in accordance with the following terms and such additional arrangements as may from time to time be agreed upon.

1. It is the understanding of my Government that the Government of Iraq will use such equipment, materials or services as may be provided solely to maintain its internal security and its legitimate self-defence, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other State.

2. My Government also understands that the Government of Iraq agrees that it will:—

- (a) Join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and maintaining world peace;
- (b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;
- (c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;
- (d) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defence capacities; and
- (e) take appropriate steps to ensure the effective utilisation of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.

3.—(a) The Government of Iraq will, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, furnish to the Government of the United States, or to such other Governments as may be agreed upon, such equipment, materials, services in excess of Iraq's own requirements or other assistance as may be agreed upon in order to increase their capacity for individual and collective self-defence and to facilitate their effective participation in the United Nations system for collective security.

(b) The Government of Iraq further understands that the Government of the United States may request the Government of Iraq to facilitate the production and export to the United States, under terms and conditions to be agreed, of raw and

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semi-processed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Iraq. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable requirements for domestic use and commercial export of Iraq.

4. It is further understood that your Government will not without the prior consent of the Government of the United States, transfer title to or possession of any equipments, materials, information or services furnished, that your Government will protect the security of any items, information or services furnished and that your Government will, upon request, negotiate appropriate arrangements for the protection of patent rights relating to the defence effort.

5. In the mutual interest of both Governments to ensure maximum possible realisation of the objectives of this agreement, the following arrangements are also proposed:—

- (a) The Government of Iraq will establish procedures which will protect from attachment, or seizure or other legal or administrative process any funds allocated to or derived from any programme of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United States.
- (b) In accordance with the prevailing laws of Iraq, the Iraq Government will pay all customs duties and dues and local taxes and dues (if any) on equipment and materials imported into Iraq pursuant to Paragraph 1 of this Note.
- (c) The Government of Iraq will offer for return to the Government of the United States, in accordance with mutually satisfactory procedures, any equipment or materials furnished under this agreement which are no longer required or used exclusively for the purposes stated in Paragraph 1.
- (d) The Government of Iraq will receive the personnel of the Government of the United States who will discharge in Iraqi territory the responsibilities of the Government of the United States under this agreement and who will be accorded facilities and authority to observe the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement. The number of personnel assigned under this paragraph will be governed by mutual understanding between the two Governments as the programme develops. Personnel so assigned will be granted the same status, privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by personnel of United States Technical Missions presently operating in Iraq in accordance with existing agreements.
- (e) The Government of Iraq agrees to extend to personnel assigned to Iraq under the terms of the agreement, the same privileges with respect to the import of personal property for their personal use as are accorded personnel assigned to Iraq under the terms of the Technical Co-operation Agreement of April 10, 1951, between the United States and Iraq.
- (f) The Government of Iraq will, in accordance with the arrangements used to provide facilities and other assistance for experts of United States missions presently operating in Iraq under existing agreements, make available Iraqi dinars for use in covering the expenses of such personnel incurred in Iraq in the course of carrying out the purpose of this agreement.
- (g) Each Government will take appropriate measures, consistent with security, to keep the public informed of operations under this agreement.

I have the honour to propose that, if these understandings are acceptable to the Government of Iraq, this Note and your Note in reply constitute an understanding between our two Governments, effective on the date of your reply, to remain in force until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it, except that the provisions of Paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 (c) shall remain in force until otherwise agreed by the two Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

His Excellency

Fadhil Al-Jamali,

Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of Iraq.

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No. 500/1120/1120/Kha
Baghdad, 21st April, 1954.

GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
PRIVATE BUREAU.

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Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency of the receipt of your Excellency's Note No. 677 dated 21st April, 1954, in reply to the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 21st March, 1953, in which the Government of Iraq requested military assistance from the Government of the United States. I am pleased to inform you that the Government of Iraq decided with gratitude and appreciation to accept this assistance in accordance with the provisions of your Excellency's Note referred to above.

I have the honour to renew to your Excellency the assurances of my most respectful consideration.

FADHIL JAMALI.

His Excellency Burton Y. Berry,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States, Baghdad.

VQ 1015/26

No. 11

REPORT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARSHAD AL UMARI

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received May 10)

(No. 102. Confidential)

Bagdad,

May 5, 1954.

Sir,

In amplification of my telegram No. 297 of the 30th of April, which reported the formation of a Government by Sayid Arshad al Umari, I have the honour to give below a brief account of the circumstances which led to the formation of this Government and its prospects.

2. In my despatch No. 87 of the 21st of April, I reported that Dr. Muhammad Fadhil al Jamali had submitted his resignation to the King. Ever since December Dr. Jamali's Government had been in difficulties with the Chamber of Deputies, where it was under continuous and virulent attack from the few deputies of the Istiqlal Party and various independents. More important, the support pledged to them by the majority party, the Constitutional Union Party, was only forthcoming when the last ditch—the vote—was reached. And until they reached this ditch, Ministers found themselves obliged in person to counter every attack while members of the Constitutional Union Party remained mute, and in some cases maliciously gleeful, spectators. The independent deputies who were disposed to help the Government looked to the Palace for a lead but received none. The strain of parliamentary duties on the individual ministers impeded their administrative performance and the Government as a whole found itself caught between the upper millstone of unyielding conservatism in Parliament and the nether stone of popular expectation of social reform, promised in the Government's programme. It was therefore no surprise to me that, when the Chamber of Deputies reconvened on the 19th of April, Dr. Jamali soon found himself regretting his decision to stay on for a second spell as Prime Minister. At the same time, as Mr. Hooper pointed out in his despatch No. 86 of the 14th of April, Dr. Jamali's personal credit with political leaders and with the public was slowly but surely running out. His resignation was not therefore unexpected.

3. When Dr. Jamali had submitted his resignation, the Palace summoned the leading politicians for consultations. So far as is known, all save the leaders of

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the Constitutional Union Party advised dissolution. Nevertheless the task of forming a new Government was first offered to Nuri al Said, as leader of the majority party in the present Chamber. Nuri Pasha immediately invited Dr. Jamali, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban (former Head of the Royal Diwan and deputy Prime Minister in Dr. Jamali's second Government) and Ali Muntaz (Dr. Jamali's Finance Minister) to join him. None proved eager to do so. From this Nuri Pasha concluded that not only were these three in league against him but that, because they were "palace men," the offer of the Premiership by the Palace was not seriously intended. He also felt that since all the other party leaders had advised dissolution and the Palace had not strongly demurred, any Government formed by him would be represented by his opponents as having been constituted against the will of the people. Doubtful of the firm Palace backing which alone could ensure success in such circumstances, he gave up. From that moment the dissolution of the Chamber was a certainty.

4. The selection of some neutral figure to preside over a Government pledged to elections would even in normal circumstances present some difficulty, but conditions are at present not normal. The floods in Central and Southern Iraq, which entailed the displacement of tens of thousands of people, present a problem both of rehabilitation and of security which cannot wait upon elections. It was therefore necessary to select a Prime Minister of some administrative capacity and some strength of character. The choice fell on Arshad al Umari. Along with the Royal Irada appointing him a further Irada was issued dissolving the present Chamber and calling for new elections within the constitutional period of four months. This Irada, a translation of which is enclosed^(*), stresses the need for reform, which was the main plank of the Speech from the Throne composed by the Jamali Government, and also exposes the weakness of that Government by stating that it had been impossible to implement reform without co-operation between the Government and Parliament.

5. The first act of the new Government was, on the 3rd of May, to proclaim elections fixing polling for the 9th of June. The Elections will be held under the electoral ordinance No. 6 of 1952 issued by the Government of General Nur-ud-din Mahmud, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 1 of the 3rd of January, 1953. This ordinance replaced the two-stage system, under which previous Iraqi elections had been held, by a one-stage system. It was submitted to the last Parliament but was never ratified by it, though it received a first reading and was referred to committee. Even before the date for the elections had been fixed, Senator Salih Jabr, leader of the Popular Socialist Party, requested the Prime Minister to postpone them until the end of the constitutional period of four months, and to modify the Ordinance. This the Prime Minister under strong pressure from his Minister of the Interior has refused. He maintained that a postponement would be contrary to the mandate given to him to hold elections forthwith and that similar postponements by the Government of Mustafa al Umari in 1952 had, by allowing tensions to build up, caused the riots of November of that year. On the subject of amendment of the ordinance, the Prime Minister said that it was unprecedented for a Government to issue an ordinance amending a previous ordinance which had been submitted to the Chamber, and moreover such an act might cast doubt on the validity of legislation passed by the out-going Chamber which had been elected under the ordinance.

6. Whether Arshad al Umari combines the qualities required by the present situation is questionable. He is elderly and he made his name as Lord Mayor of Bagdad. His somewhat autocratic temperament is better suited to the paternalism of municipal administration than to leading a team of ministers. Though of the "old guard," he is not identified with any party. He has or had administrative ability but, as even his children will tell one, he is no politician and his previous tenure of the office of Prime Minister was unhappy. He had in the past the reputation of interfering in the work of his ministers and already the Minister of the Interior is complaining that he telephones him every quarter of an hour to inquire about internal security. His administrative qualities will on the present occasion probably not be very severely tested as he is determined to give up office as soon after the elections as possible in order to escape the Bagdad summer.

7. Arshad Pasha's Cabinet is largely composed of nonentities, though there are certainly two exceptions in what are at the moment the two most important ministries, those of the Interior and Public Works. Indeed the team of Prime

(*) Not printed.

Minister and Minister of the Interior is a formidable one from the point of view of politicians who wish to cause trouble. Both enjoy the reputation of not hesitating to meet disorders with force. I am sure they will not hesitate to do so again. The Minister of the Interior, Said Qazzaz, who held the same post in Dr. Jamali's Government, is an able administrator. He has agreed to remain in office on condition the elections are freely conducted, that the Government resign when they are over and that none of the present ministers present themselves for election. This last condition as well as the Prime Minister's apparent intention to modify the present Development Board law, forfeited the Prime Minister the participation of Dr. Nadim al Pachachi who had agreed to serve as Minister of Development. The Minister of the Interior told my Oriental Counsellor yesterday that he had already had to turn down a request by the Palace that he help one of the prospective candidates from the Mosul area. Whether, however, he will be able to (or indeed wish to) follow this admirable line of conduct I permit myself to doubt. Orientals--and this goes for the Palace as well as everyone else--live on the basis of "swapping" loyalties and favours and I expect that, whether he likes it or no, Said Qazzaz will be obliged to succumb to pressure from above, albeit in a lesser degree and more discreetly than others. Indeed when I asked the Prime Minister what he thought would be the outcome of the elections, he replied that it depended upon the Palace. The importance of the Minister of Public Works in the present circumstances lies in the need to restore communications in Central Iraq in the shortest possible time after the floods have subsided and in particular before polling day; and in Fakhri al Fakhri, an engineer and former chief engineer to the Bagdad Municipality the Prime Minister has found a good man and one in whom he already has confidence. General Sami Fattah, the former head of the Air Force, may also as Minister for Social Affairs bring some energy into the problem of flood relief.

8. A great deal of interest attaches to the question whether all the political parties will take part in the present elections or whether, as in those of January 1953, the Popular Socialist Party, the Independence (Istiqlal) Party and the National Democratic Party will boycott them. The leaders of all three have already complained on various scores. The Independence Party and the National Democratic Party have objected to the person of the Prime Minister, who, they allege, is not neutral. It is taken for granted however that they are at bottom frightened of the strong combination of Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior in the event that it may suit their book to cause disorders. The objections of Salih Jabr, head of the Popular Socialist Party, have been alluded to in paragraph 5 above. They stem from the fact that after eighteen months in the wilderness his party is deficient in organisation and it will need more than the seven-week period before the polls to put it into shape. The United Popular Front which participated in the last election with moderate success is expected to take part again, though it too has tended to disintegrate in the past few months. Members of the Constitutional Union Party are reported to be disappointed that they were not called to power on the basis of the existing Chamber and are angry at the choice of Prime Minister. Nuri Pasha himself has taken very hard the shabby treatment which he considers the Palace gave him by offering him the premiership and then persuading others not to work with him. Nevertheless when he addressed members of his party on the 2nd of May, he exhorted them to fight the election remembering always that the Hashimite monarch was the great stabilising feature of Iraq. He made pointed references to the unstable conditions in Egypt and Syria. His address is in the circumstances a measure of his statesmanship.

9. The Minister of the Interior is most anxious that all parties should take part in the elections but he regards the complaints put forward by the Popular Socialist Party, Independence Party and the National Democrats as preparing the ground for their possible withdrawal. He thinks it most likely that the Independence Party when they see that the elections are really going to be free, will find some excuse for withdrawing because they will be badly shown up at the polls. It is indeed precisely for this reason that he wants them to participate. The only people who are not going to be allowed to succeed are any suspected Communists or peace partisans who may try to stand as independents but any action against such people is being put off until the last moment. At present only the Constitutional Union Party is on record as determined to fight the elections but no party has as yet stated that it will not do so.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Ankara and Washington, to the Head of the British Middle East Office and to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

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No. 12

REVIEW OF THE COURSE OF THE GENERAL ELECTION CONDUCTED BY SAYID ARSHAD AL UMARI

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received June 21)

(No. 129. Confidential)

Bagdad,

June 16, 1954.

Sir,

In my despatch No. 102 of the 15th of May I gave an account of the circumstances which led King Faisal to dissolve the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies and to entrust to Sayid Arshad al Umari the formation of a Government to conduct a general election. I have the honour in the present despatch to review the course of this election and estimate the significance of its results.

2. The electoral campaign lasting from the 31st of May to the 9th of June was remarkable for two things, the one depressingly familiar, the other novel and, from a British point of view, disquieting. When the Government of Arshad al Umari took office, it announced that the elections would take place in complete freedom. They did not. True, neither physical violence nor threats were exerted by the Government against the individual elector. Nor did the central Government appear to bow to pressure from the party leaders. Her Majesty's Consul in Kirkuk has reported that in the North there appeared to be signs of a compact between the major parties and the Government for the distribution of seats. Viewed from Bagdad, however, this belief appears unfounded and where compacts have occurred it must have been on a local basis, arranged by the Mutasarrif to avoid danger to public security. Indeed there is evidence that local Governors in various places, either from their own political convictions or with an eye to future promotion, exerted moral pressure in favour of certain candidates. But the main source of interference was undoubtedly the Palace. The Minister of the Interior inadvertently admitted to my Oriental Counsellor the intervention of the Crown Prince in at least one area and there is first hand testimony of his interference in others. The means of pressure open to the Palace derive from the permanence of its influence on affairs as compared with the more direct but nevertheless ephemeral power of any given Prime Minister or Minister of the Interior. They are exercised variously by suggestions conveyed through Palace officials, or by persons known to be in the Crown Prince's confidence or by the Minister of the Interior to the local officials and the candidates themselves.

3. There are those among the moderate and thinking elements in Iraq who maintain that the survival of a feudal system and the low level of education render the individual elector incapable of assessing the country's requirements or even his own immediate interest. They argue that for some years to come elections must be rigged by Palace or Government, in certain areas at any rate, if stable and progressive government is to be assured. There is much truth in this. Nevertheless, admitting the need for intervention in elections, the condition should surely be that it followed a settled policy of selecting men whose loyalty and clear-sightedness rendered their presence in Parliament necessary to the well-being of the State. Regrettably, in the present instance this has not been always the case. The Crown Prince is a man of likes and dislikes and he has intervened in many instances on behalf of the illiterate, the unpopular and the reactionary who have happened to be his favourites. He has in so doing exposed the Throne to justified criticism. This in my view cannot but do disservice to the stability of the régime. In an indirect and strange way it does disservice also to ourselves. For it is popularly believed that the Crown Prince takes his cue from us and, as the leader of the National

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Democratic Party recently told the correspondent of *The Times*, since it is impolitic openly to attack the Crown Prince for his interference, the accusations are most profitably directed at this Embassy and the British in general.

4. The second feature of the present election has been the emergence—whether temporary or permanent remains to be seen—of something resembling a European political party having an active committee, a set of slogans and a publicity machine backed either by funds or by enthusiastic supporters prepared to give of their time to further the party cause. On the 12th of May the leaders of the National Democratic Party and the Istiqlal (Independence) Party announced the formation of a National Front. If I have said above that this development, which in other circumstances might have been a happy augury for the development of Iraqi democracy on modern party lines, is disquieting from our point of view, it is because the new Front, besides embracing the two extreme parties of Right and Left, includes the Partisans of Peace, members of the banned Communist Party and other Left-wing sympathisers. Its policy is thus fundamentally inimical to Her Majesty's Government and the West. Kamil Chadirchi, leader of the National Democratic Party, has described his policy as being, in internal affairs, that of the progressive wing of the British Labour Party and, in foreign affairs, that of Mr. Nehru. Plausible though this may sound, there is no doubt that many followers of the Front, if not Kamil Chadirchi himself, would go very much further. The slogan "You want peace, then vote for the National Front," which was painted on the walls in Bagdad, has an ominous and familiar ring. In my despatch No. 110 of the 19th of May I have dealt at greater length with this phenomenon.

5. In former Iraqi elections parties have counted for little. Prospective candidates relied on the influence of their families and friends, their personal renown, the help of the administration and the favours which they had in the past bestowed or might in the future render to their more influential constituents. It would be untrue to say that this was changed on the present occasion. Even Samuel Pepys in 1678 did at least visit Harwich before becoming Burgess of that township. Majid Mustafa, a former Minister of Social Affairs, did not so much as go to Sulaimania—indeed so vocal was the opposition that he feared to—but he continues to represent the constituency. Nevertheless, the impact of the National Front was undoubtedly great. Where its candidates stood, it monopolised the Press, it dominated the streets with its banners and painted signs, it was in everybody's mouth. The other parties showed themselves pitifully inadequate to cope with the situation. Agglomerations of individuals, they had no machine to answer the Front's publicity and they had not the Front's party discipline. It is generally conceded that, if it holds together, the Front cannot fail to increase its strength in succeeding elections.

6. In the period immediately preceeding the elections there were minor disturbances in Sulaimania and in Najaf, in both of which the National Front's candidates were vocal if not strong. In the former a policeman was killed. There is little doubt that disturbances would have been greater had not the Minister of the Interior always acted with firmness and speed. In Bagdad he banned political meetings when they threatened to get out of hand and the fear of him almost certainly kept the National Front within bounds. They complained but they did not act. Polling itself passed off in relative calm. There were irregularities in two areas but they were of no political significance and elections were postponed to a date not yet fixed. For 10 seats a second ballot was necessary on the 14th or 15th of June because candidates who obtained the majority vote, did not have the 40 per cent. of votes cast which under the electoral ordinance is necessary for any candidate to succeed. The results as at present known are:—

Constitutional Union Party	54 seats
Popular Socialist Party	21 seats
<i>National Front</i>				
National Democratic Party	4	} 10 seats
Independence Party	2	
Supporters	4	
United Popular Front	3 seats
Independent Members	44 seats

The Constitutional Union Party claimed in fact a greater number of seats but they were found to have included in their list several successful deputies, who, like the

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present Minister of Finance, hotly denied that they were party members. Despite the express wish of the Minister of the Interior five of the Ministers in the present Government sought election and naturally succeeded.

7. The Constitutional Union Party, though losing a few seats they held in the previous Parliament, remain numerically by far the strongest party. They can count on at least 15 supporters among the Independents. The United Popular Front, never strong or coherent, has been almost eclipsed and there is little doubt that many of its adherents in Bagdad and Mosul and elsewhere gave their votes to the National Front. The Popular Socialist Party with a modest 21 seats did not do so well as it had hoped at the outset of the electoral campaign. Undoubtedly a period of 18 months without a member in the Chamber and without powers of patronage had weakened the allegiance of many of its members. The cleavage between the town and the more conservative countryside is evident in the fact that nearly all the National Front members represent constituencies in Bagdad or Mosul. Their strength in the capital is likely to represent a permanent source of trouble and their supporters may well attempt to intimidate the Government and the Chamber.

8. In assessing the significance of these results, one must remember that constitutionally it was unnecessary to hold an election at this time. The mandate of the previous Chamber was four years, of which only 18 months had expired. It contained in the Constitutional Union Party a workable majority. The reasons for dissolution were purely political. In Iraq the premiership is not as in the United Kingdom quasi-automatically the right of the leader of the majority party. It is the gift of the Crown. In April it was generally believed that Nuri al Said no longer enjoyed the full confidence of the Palace. He is undoubtedly a figure of controversy and the Palace had reason to be annoyed with him and his party for the very tepid support they had given to Dr. Jamali's Government. Indeed reluctance to appoint Nuri al Said, together perhaps with the hope (urged by Dr. Jamali) that by bringing the Popular Socialist Party back into the Chamber it would be possible to arrest its drift permanently into the Opposition camp, can alone explain the Palace's decision to pass over Nuri's claims to the premiership and to proceed to elections of which both he and his party disapproved.

9. It would not appear, however, that the elections have really solved the political problem. The Constitutional Union Party has emerged in such a strong position that it cannot be overlooked again. The independent members, many of whom represent a Palace *bloc*, will not be able to dominate Parliament save in alliance with the Constitutional Union Party. It is the situation of January to March, 1954, all over again but worse. In the last Parliament there were only some 10 to 12 vocal critics of the Constitutional Union Party or Palace Governments. Now there will be some 20 from the National Front and its independent sympathisers. The struggle for the soul of the Popular Socialist Party has been transferred from outside the Chamber to inside. For it is likely that, left to itself, the Popular Socialist Party being so heavily outnumbered by the Constitutional Union Party will tend to side with the opponents of the Government, making a group of some forty voices. Against this it is true the Constitutional Union Party and the Palace could always muster some 95 votes but only about 35-40 of them would be articulate, the rest being tribal Shaikhs. There will thus be more and more vocal criticism of any Government which the King may appoint.

10. In these circumstances the need for a strong Prime Minister is undeniable. Dr. Jamali whose prestige barely survived the last Chamber could hardly hope to survive this one and, when I saw the Crown Prince on the 14th of June, he was obviously fully reconciled to the appointment of Nuri Pasha as Prime Minister. He would apparently like to see Nuri heading a Government which would unite all the elements in Parliament opposed to Communism, including the Popular Socialist Party. The obstacles to such a plan are obvious. But in any case its consideration must clearly await the return of Nuri al Said, who is still convalescing in London after a severe operation. It seems likely, therefore, that the present Prime Minister will have to carry on at any rate nominally for a month or two. In practice he may go abroad and leave an acting Prime Minister in charge. Meanwhile he is in process of reshuffling his Ministry. In particular, and most unfortunately, he has had to find a new Minister of the Interior as Said Qazzaz's first act after the election was to resign.

11. If the present Government remains, the question of calling Parliament will arise. This has to be done before the 29th of August but climatically it would be obviously best to call it immediately and then recess it, so that the constitution may be honoured and members receive their salaries. The objection to this course is that, if the Chamber convenes, the election of a President is necessary and this is always a strong party issue which might well prejudice from the outset the Crown Prince's idea of an anti-Communist front, unless both Nuri Pasha and Salih Jabr were squared. The Chamber may thus also wait on Nuri's return.

12. Whatever the outcome of these short-term considerations, it appears inevitable that eventually a Government will have to be formed of which the major elements will be drawn from the Independents and the Constitutional Union Party. The task of the new Parliament, as defined by the Royal Irada which dissolved the last, will be to collaborate with the Government to enact reform legislation. The new Chamber, however, is dominated by the Conservative Constitutional Union Party and independent landowners, precisely the same elements who blocked almost every attempt at reform in the last Chamber. An improvement could only come about by vigorous and sustained pressure on Parliament by Palace and Government. The Crown Prince is, I think, now personally convinced of the need for reform, but he is not a strong character and is easily influenced by his old friends who can hardly be described as forward-looking men. Nuri himself too is quite unimpressed by progressive thought. Nor, regrettably, can the Opposition be expected to play a constructive role in encouraging or provoking the Government to social reforms. On past showing the members of the National Front, at any rate, will carry to the point of fractiousness the maxim that it is the duty of the Opposition to oppose and will continuously and consciously press for more than the Government can or will concede. The point may well be reached where the members of the Front will walk out either of their own volition to mark their dissatisfaction or as a result of some manoeuvre by the majority parties to extrude them in order that debates may be more orderly and business less obstructed. Either of these developments is likely to be attended by a risk to internal security in the Front's strongholds, Bagdad and Mosul and, possibly, the reimposition of martial law.

13. I conclude therefore that there will be an uneasy period of weak Government lasting for a month or so until the Crown Prince has been able to consult Nuri al Said. A new Government will then be formed in which the Constitutional Union Party and Independent members of Parliament will be more or less equally represented, with possibly (though not very likely) the addition of some members of the Popular Socialist Party. The parliamentary life of this Government will be very stormy and, unless the Palace gives a strong lead, I cannot see that it will do much either to improve the administration, which, as Lord Salter has said, is vitally necessary to the success of the country's development, or to enact social legislation such as will encourage social stability. Without the fruits of development and a visible social programme, I cannot help feeling that the Crown Prince's proposed anti-Communist *bloc* (if it is ever achieved) will eventually prove incapable of preventing the further build-up of explosive forces in the country.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Ankara, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Tehran, British Middle East Office, Washington, Bahrain, Basra, Kirkuk, and Mosul.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

VQ 1016/7

No. 13

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND
SENATOR NURI SAID ON JUNE 25, 1954

Mr. Eden to Mr. Hooper (Bagdad)

(No. 116. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *June 25, 1954.*

Sir John Troutbeck reported in his telegram No. 370 of the 15th of June that the Crown Prince of Iraq had suggested that I might care to sound Nuri Said on his plans to form a strong coalition government from all anti-Communist elements.

2. The Minister of State accordingly asked Nuri Said to call on the 24th of June. He said that his recent operation had been a success. He had, however, been found to be suffering from anaemia and was having a series of injections. They would be completed in a few days, and he then proposed to go to Austria for three weeks or so. Then he would return here and would go back to Iraq some time in September at the earliest. The doctors had told him that he must not risk the Iraqi climate at all during the very hot weather.

3. He spent a considerable time in bemoaning the actions of the Palace. He said that he was completely loyal to them and would do whatever they said. He only wished to serve them and Iraq. On the other hand he could not understand why the recent dissolution had taken place. His party had had a clear majority and could have done anything. The trouble was that the Crown Prince seemed incapable of giving his support to any Government for longer than six months, and one of the keys to the situation was this weakness of purpose in the Palace. He said that he had the impression that they were now expecting him to come along and pull them out of their difficulties. It was a great pity they had not asked him to do that when he had eighty supporters. Now he had only fifty-five. Mr. Lloyd got the impression that some of this was really said to be passed on.

4. Nuri Pasha then spoke about the political situation following the elections. He said that he could rely on sixteen of the Independents. That gave him a strength of seventy-one. There were about sixteen other Independents who would not side with the destructive elements but would bargain for positions and on behalf of the

local interests, &c. There were fourteen Independents at least who would side with the destructive elements. Mr. Lloyd asked in which category he would put Jamali. He said he would put Jamali in the second category. No one trusted him in Iraq, but he was a useful man. He talked a lot but Nuri would certainly make use of him.

5. Mr. Lloyd asked him whether it was true that he had dissolved his party. Nuri Pasha did not quite understand what Mr. Lloyd meant by the word "dissolved," but he used some phrase like "sending them home." Mr. Lloyd asked what he thought of the idea that his party and Saleh Jabr's party and the right-minded Independents should all form up into a new party with a strong Government. Nuri said that would be artificial, and so far as Saleh Jabr was concerned, although there was no difference in principle between his supporters, and Nuri's, Saleh Jabr was very unpopular not only for the things he had said about external politics, but also for some very damaging speeches he had made on internal matters. He did not see why he, Nuri, should have to carry Saleh Jabr's unpopularity. He was rather confused about all this, and later in the conversation he did lead Mr. Lloyd to think that he considered it possible if the new electoral law was passed to form a new kind of common front party.

6. Nuri Pasha explained at considerable length the new electoral law. Mr. Lloyd gathered it is designed to prevent splinter parties. Nuri made no further remarks against Saleh Jabr, but Mr. Lloyd got the impression that he wanted to play the hand without him and to form a Government of his own supporters plus as many Independents as could be collected together, with a guarantee of support for a definite period from the Palace. There was no conversation at all about the part which Nuri Pasha himself would play in any Administration.

7. The next topic discussed was the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Nuri Pasha spoke at length about the 1948 Treaty, how against his advice Saleh Jabr had insisted on signing it in England. He believed the treaty would

have gone through perfectly satisfactorily if only Saleh Jabr had taken it back to Bagdad before signature and discussed it with various people there.

8. Nuri Pasha said that a committee had reported giving three alternative plans for dealing with the treaty problem. He reeled out a list of names of Iraqis who had served on it and said that a copy of the report had been given to Her Majesty's Ambassador. He felt we should look at that report again but he kept repeating that an agreement in the spirit of the 1948 one would ultimately be supported. The bulk of the people in Iraq knew quite well that it was in their own interest to maintain their friendship with the British.

9. Mr. Lloyd tried to draw Nuri Pasha in a little more detail as to the kind of arrangement he favoured himself when

drawing up that report, but he professed not to be able to remember the details. As regards the timing of talks about the treaty, Nuri Pasha said that we should not raise the topic with the present weak Government or, indeed, until there was a strong Government backed by the Palace. A weak Government was always bound to give way to anti-British feeling in order to try to curry favour. Only a strong Government could stand up to the ignorant opposition of the anti-British minority. His strong advice, therefore, was to wait and see until there was a Government in Iraq worth negotiating with.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

VQ 1051/4

No. 14

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND THE
IRAQI MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON JUNE 25, 1954

Mr. Eden to Mr. Hooper (Bagdad)

(No. 117. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *June 25, 1954.*

Dr. Jamali, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited the Minister of State on the 23rd of June. He said he was on his way to New York for a medical examination and expected to return in a fortnight. He wished to discuss two topics with Mr. Lloyd on this visit—Iraq and Syria.

2. On the internal political situation in Iraq, he said that the Government had been very surprised at the strength of communism and its associates during the recent elections. Although the results of the elections had been fairly satisfactory, it was quite obvious that the Communists had penetrated into many important spheres and were a serious danger. It was true that they had only won ten seats, to which should be added the seven or eight independents who supported them, but their Parliamentary strength did not reflect their real strength. He had come to the conclusion that it was necessary—

(a) to form a common front of those who were opposed to communism consisting of Nuri's supporters, Saleh Jabr's supporters, and the well-

intentioned independents. He had heard that morning that Nuri had dissolved his party. He hoped that Saleh Jabr would do the same. Then a strong Cabinet should be formed which in turn would form a new political front or party;

(b) this new party must have a programme of social development. The old-fashioned Right-wing landowners must be made to realise that they were handing the country over to communism if they did not permit reasonable developments in the field of social services, education, &c. Britain, Sweden and Denmark must be a pattern for Iraq;

(c) above all, the new party must tackle seriously propaganda and publicity. He had tried to build up a Government propaganda machine and a sound press whilst he was Prime Minister but nobody else was sufficiently conscious of this need.

Mr. Lloyd asked how Great Britain could help. Dr. Jamali said he wanted him to persuade Nuri of the importance of the above points.

3. Dr. Jamali raised again the idea of the Union of Iraq and Syria, and perhaps Jordan later on. He wanted the United Kingdom to intimate privately to one or two responsible people in Syria that we were not opposed to such a plan. He was very worried about the development of communism in Syria: the Government was most unsound and many Syrians were turning to the idea of federation or confederation with Iraq. He himself had in mind a confederation. He said that if we would say a word to the son of the President of Syria and also to the president of the People's Party, that would help them to make up their minds. Mr. Lloyd replied that of course we wanted a strong and stable Middle East, but if we were known to be favouring anything of the sort suggested by Dr. Jamali it would greatly strengthen the opposition to it. We were always being accused of intriguing in Syria in favour of Iraq. Dr. Jamali said that he realised that, because the Iraqis were always being accused of being British stooges; all he had in mind was some very private intimation.

4. Mr. Lloyd asked Dr. Jamali what prospects there were of any such intimation remaining private. He replied that if made to the two people whom he had mentioned he did not expect any publicity. Mr. Lloyd said he would think the matter over.

5. Dr. Jamali said that he was not very happy about Jordan. It was common knowledge that the Queen Mother and

other members of the Royal Family were being subsidised by King Saud. Disparaging remarks about the Queen Mother were being made in the streets. He said that King Saud was not the wise man that his father had been. Saud was very cross with Iraq for taking United States aid and was, Dr. Jamali thought, jealous.

6. With regard to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, Dr. Jamali said that if the common front he had spoken of was formed with a strong Government, and it was given a few months to present itself properly to the public, he thought there would be no difficulty about renewing our defence arrangements on a suitable basis. Mr. Lloyd did not pursue the matter except to ask whether he thought that any agreement which might be made in the Canal Zone would be regarded as a precedent for a new agreement in Iraq. Dr. Jamali said that he did not think so. He did not think that Iraqi opinion would be affected at all by the form of any new agreement with Egypt. He believed that the Egyptians would accept Turkey and Persia in the availability clause. He had pointed out very strongly to them that from Iraq's point of view it was most desirable that Turkey and Persia should be included.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Amman, Damascus and Jedda and to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

VQ 1015/46

No. 15

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND SENATOR NURI SAID ON JULY 15 AND 16, 1954

Mr. Eden to Mr. Hooper (Bagdad)

(No. 130. Secret) *Foreign Office.*
Sir, *July 20, 1954.*

With reference to my despatch No. 116 of the 25th of June, I write to inform you that Nuri Said called on the Minister of State at his own request on the 15th of July: he returned to continue the conversation on the following day.

2. He said that he had just been to Paris where he had had several days' conversation with the Crown Prince. Strong pressure had been put upon him to return to Iraq and form a Government and, despite

the advice of his doctors that he ought to spend another two months in England, he had felt obliged to agree to return to Bagdad at the end of this month. He expected to arrive on the 29th of July.

3. He said that the Crown Prince in the name of the King had given him more or less a free hand as to what he should do in the political sense on his return. It was his intention not to commit himself until he had found out whether he could command adequate support in the new Parliament. He would not regard a small majority

as sufficient to justify his forming a Government. The great need of Iraq was for political stability and any Administration he formed must have a prospect of permanence and must of course be assured of continuing support from the Palace. It was his view that the dissolution of the late Parliament had been an unconstitutional act; he had told the Crown Prince so. If he came to the conclusion that no adequate majority could be found in the new Parliament, he would consider putting to the Supreme Court the question whether the dissolution of the late Parliament had been constitutional. He had little doubt that they would find that it had not been. In that event he would demand the recall of the previous Parliament in which, of course, he had a much larger party following. Alternatively, he would not mind new elections.

4. The Minister of State asked Nuri Pasha a number of questions designed to find out whether he would try to base his support entirely on his own party and such independents as he could gather, or whether he would co-operate with other anti-Communist elements. Nuri said that he had no intention of forming a Government which contained "elements of weakness": by this he meant notably Saleh Jabr and his supporters. He said he was well aware that Her Majesty's Ambassador had been advocating co-operation between himself and Saleh Jabr. This had greatly increased Saleh Jabr's opinion of himself. Nuri was not prepared to collaborate with him unless he would publicly renounce the demagogic policies to which he had given his public support, and would undertake to support policies acceptable to himself. He had nothing personally against Saleh Jabr except that the latter had developed unreasonable ambitions and the habit of making irresponsible promises to win popular support. Saleh Jabr seemed to see himself as a sort of Zaghlul or Nahas, whereas in fact he had no political programme which would bear examination. When pressed by the Minister of State, Nuri Pasha said that he would naturally try to make the basis of any Government he formed as broad as possible and would take in anyone who would help constructively to carry out acceptable policies. This might include Saleh Jabr: but he doubted whether Saleh Jabr would subordinate himself sufficiently to work under him until it had been made clear who was the master.

5. When the Minister of State stressed the need for a widely-based Government designed to unite anti-Communist opinion, Nuri repeated that what Iraq needed was political stability and that he was not going to lend himself to policies which would result in breaking down the authority of the Sheikhs or to ill-considered schemes for land distribution. The schemes of the Opposition in this field were mostly borrowed from experience in other countries and were inapplicable to Iraq. For example, it might be sensible to break up great estates in countries where small farms could be economically operated and where there were facilities for co-operative effort amongst small land-holders. In Iraq there was no sense in such plans. It was quite impossible to create a class of small farmers who could look after themselves. The only result of distributing the Sheikhs' land amongst the tribes would be that they would be sold back again to the big land-owners and this would end in a vast system of corruption and bribery. It had happened in a number of cases with the new land which was being brought into cultivation by irrigation and distributed to small-holders. Nevertheless, Nuri Pasha agreed that any Government he formed must have a platform of social betterment and reform. He accepted the Minister of State's opinion that a programme of economic reform, building of schools, especially for technical studies, hospitals and dispensaries, was more important than political reform, and it was his intention to produce such a programme.

6. Turning to foreign affairs, Nuri Pasha said that, as we perhaps knew, it was the intention of Iraq to move closer to Pakistan in matters of defence. His idea was not to join the Turco-Pakistan Pact, but rather to form a separate grouping with Pakistan in which he hoped Her Majesty's Government would play a part: but any defence arrangement of this kind would need lines of communication to the Mediterranean as well as those in the Persian Gulf. He said that his intention was to negotiate a pact with Pakistan which would bear close relationship with the two parties' obligations under the United Nations and in particular with Article 51. Iraq would not undertake any obligation to go to the aid of Pakistan, but if Israel were to attack Iraq or her neighbours Pakistan would come to their aid (he made it clear that there would be no question of Pakistan supporting the Arab States in an aggression against Israel). Such an arrangement would be parallel to the

Tripartite Declaration in that it would ensure stability of the existing frontiers. Nuri Pasha said that this idea had already been discussed with the Pakistanis, who were ready to conclude such a pact provided that the United States saw no objection. The Iraq Government had put this question to the State Department, who had apparently replied that they would prefer to express their views to Pakistan direct: it seemed to him that the State Department were concerned about the implications of such a pact for Israel. Nuri Pasha said that the pact would be open to accession by any country interested in the peace of the area. The purpose of this would be to enable the United Kingdom to join at a later stage. This would, he thought, provide a means by which we could broach the question of revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He did not contemplate that the French or the United States Government should participate.

7. Nuri Pasha went on to say that a pact of this kind could be a preliminary to either of two alternative broader solutions. It might be that a system of regional defence could be drawn up based on the Arab League with the participation of Egypt. That would no doubt depend on the progress of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, and it would certainly require a change of attitude and policy on the part of the Arab League. However, he repeated several times that he was not interested in what Egypt did: they could join such a grouping if they wished, but if not, he was content to leave them aside. Iraq might even have to leave the Arab League. Nuri Pasha made it clear that he hardly expected Egypt "to behave well enough" to make this solution possible. The Egyptians were attacking Iraq for her relations with Pakistan, and appeared in their negotiations

with us to be firmly opposed to defence arrangements with the West. If this were so, the only policy was to isolate Egypt. In answer to the question by the Minister of State, he said that he had nothing against our efforts to reach an agreement with Egypt involving the withdrawal of British troops from Suez.

8. The alternative was to strengthen an Iraqi-Pakistan defence pact by associating with it Syria and the Lebanon. This would give the parties their lines of communication with the Mediterranean. It was time that Egyptian and Saudi Arabian intrigues in Syria and the Lebanon were put to an end, and he hoped the French Government could be induced to use their influence to bring Syria and the Lebanon into closer relationship with Iraq. He had spoken to M. Massigli about this. The ambassador had asked him whether Iraq intended to respect the sovereignty and independence of Syria. He had replied that he had no wish whatever to alter the political status and structure of Syria or to do anything which would arouse animosity among the French or Syrians themselves. What he wanted was closer co-operation over defence, trade, customs matters and communications. M. Massigli, he said, had been very pleased by this statement and had undertaken to consult his Government in the matter.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Ankara, Paris, Washington, to the Head of British Middle East Office, and to the Commonwealth Relations Office for the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

VQ 1051/7

No. 16

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND THE IRAQI MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON JULY 28, 1954

Mr. Eden to Mr. Hooper (Bagdad)

(No. 141. Confidential) Foreign Office,
Sir, August 4, 1954.

With reference to my despatch No. 117 of the 25th of June, I write to inform you that Dr. Jamali, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his way back from the United States to Iraq, called on the Minister of State on the 28th of July.

2. Dr. Jamali congratulated Her Majesty's Government on the Egyptian settlement. He thought the terms excellent from the points of view of both sides. Interest would now naturally increase in Iraq about the possibility of a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Hitherto the Iraqi Government had always put forward the view that

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until a settlement was reached with Egypt, it was no good talking about Iraq. Mr. Lloyd asked what kind of treaty he had in mind. He said that we should hand back the bases in name: arrangements could then be made to keep stores there and use them whenever we wanted. Mr. Lloyd said that in the case of Iraq there would be a closer defence arrangement than with Egypt. It was in the West's power to safeguard Iraq from attack owing to our capacity to use atom bombs on any Russian attack through the passes. Details must be carefully worked out. The first step might be private talks between military advisers of both Governments, but a meeting would have to be arranged on some other pretext. If the soldiers and airmen on both sides could agree, then there would not be much difficulty in providing a political framework. Dr. Jamali said that he thought private military talks first would be a good idea, but we must avoid the mistake which had been made over the Portsmouth Treaty: on that occasion the Iraqi public got the impression, in his view wrongly, that they had been confronted with a *fait accompli*.

3. Dr. Jamali again raised the question of Her Majesty's Government's attitude towards a federation or confederation between Iraq, Syria and, possibly later, Jordan. Mr. Lloyd said that we should welcome any arrangements for closer unity between the Arab States which were voluntarily entered into by the parties concerned. He said he had carefully considered Dr. Jamali's earlier request that we should start dropping hints to the son of the Syrian President and others that we were in favour of such a plan, but it would be quite impossible to conceal the fact that we were giving such hints: if it became public, nothing could harm the idea of federation more. It would at once be represented as a British imperialist device, and in addition it would provoke a violent French reaction. Dr. Jamali said that he quite understood the position, and thought there was a great deal to be said for it. Mr. Lloyd then spoke of Nuri Said's idea, recorded in paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 130 of the 20th of July, for an Iraqi-Pakistan defence pact associated with Syria to cover the lines of communication from the Mediterranean to Northern Iraq, and said that if that could be arranged, it seemed to him it would be a very good thing.

4. Dr. Jamali said that he and Nuri Said had been in touch with the Yemeni Minister

in London and had suggested to the Yemenis that a friendly settlement should be reached with Her Majesty's Government. Dr. Jamali said that he had now received a reply from the Imam which was to the following effect: the Yemenis did not wish to go on making protests; they wanted peace and security, and they wished all misunderstandings to be removed, but there was a group in Aden which was not impartial and which misled London. The British plan for federation did not conform with principles of friendship. The first problem was not that of frontier incidents but of better understanding. Mr. Lloyd told Dr. Jamali of the efforts which we had made to get better understanding last year. He said that he thought a prior condition was the clearing up of the frontier situation. Federation was in the interests of the peoples of the Aden Protectorate, and the Yemenis were being reactionary in trying to stop it. He added that he thought discussions between the Government of Aden and the Imam would be a good thing: alternatively, the Imam should indicate that he wanted a British Minister in Taiz. Dr. Jamali said that he understood that the Yemenis were offended because we had only sent a Chargé d'Affaires. Mr. Lloyd promised to let Dr. Jamali have a statement of our position; and Dr. Jamali undertook to use this to procure a better relationship. He said that at an Arab League meeting when he had proposed a federation between any Arab States wishing to federate, he had been mystified because the Yemeni delegate immediately said, "No federation on any account." He now understood from what Mr. Lloyd had said the reason for this statement.

5. Dr. Jamali said that the Arab-Asian group had decided to inscribe the Tunis and Moroccan questions on the Agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations. A deputation from Algeria had asked that Algeria should be inscribed also, but Dr. Jamali said he had taken the lead in having this turned down. Mr. Lloyd said that he thought it a mistake to inscribe these items again. The French had tackled Indo-China and had achieved a settlement there: they now had the problem of the European Defence Community and Germany. He thought M. Mendès-France would then bring forward new ideas about French North Africa, and the Arab States should give him time to develop these ideas before harassing him with a debate in the United Nations. Dr. Jamali said it had been

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impossible to restrain his colleagues: they had the impression that the United States would support them against the French. Mr. Lloyd commented that he did not believe that Dr. Jamali had tried to restrain his colleagues at all, at which Dr. Jamali laughed.

6. Dr. Jamali finally asked about Cyprus, and volunteered that he did not see why the Greeks should have Cyprus: it was much closer to the Arab States and Turkey and was vital for Middle East defence. When Mr. Lloyd said that he supposed from that remark that we could count on his

support in the United Nations, Dr. Jamali hedged with extreme rapidity.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Taiz, to the Head of the British Middle East Office, to the Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations, New York, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Tunis, Rabat and Algiers, and to the Colonial Office for the Governors of Aden and Cyprus.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

VQ 1015/59

No. 17

COMMENTS ON THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF SAYID NURI AL-SAID

Mr. Hooper to Mr. Eden. (Received August 16)

(No. 168. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *August 11, 1954.*

In my despatch No. 165 of the 4th of August I reported the formation of a new Iraqi Government by Sayid Nuri al-Said and forwarded a list of the new Cabinet. In my telegram No. 454 of the same date I reported also that the Parliament elected on the 9th of June had been dissolved and that fresh elections were to be held. I now have the honour to submit my comments on the new Government and on its policy statement which has been presented to the electors. A summary of this statement is contained in my telegram No. 456 of the 5th of August.

2. Nuri Said's Cabinet is likely to be more effective than its predecessors. Eight of the sixteen members belong to the Constitutional Union Party and no other party has representatives in the Cabinet; while the independent members are for the most part long-standing personal friends and supporters of Nuri Pasha. There should thus be closer co-operation between Ministers than was possible in Dr. Jamali's day. Also, the Ministers are generally of higher calibre than previously. It is noticeable that some of the more capable and younger of Nuri's supporters such as Nadim al Pachachi, the Minister of Economics, and Dhia Jaafar, Minister of Finance, are included, whilst some of the stalwarts of the "Old Gang" such as Sayid Taufiq Suweidi, are omitted. The presence in the Cabinet also of individuals such as Khalil Kenna, Minister of Education, and Abdul Wahhab Murjan, Minister of Agriculture, both of whom were prominent

in the Constitutional Union Party, should assist the Government by assuring adequate parliamentary support. It is unlikely that the policies of Nuri's Cabinet will be as obstructed by the Chamber of Deputies as were those of, for example, Dr. Jamali's first Cabinet. On the other hand, it may be that harmony between Parliament and Cabinet will be obtained at the price of shirking the vital issues of reform on which Dr. Jamali and his Ministers aroused the opposition of the vested interest, represented in the Majlis.

3. The policy statement of the new Government, now to be put to the people virtually as a referendum, is contained in a letter (see my telegram No. 456) addressed by the Prime Minister to His Majesty the King on the 3rd of August and published at the same time as the decree forming the Government. The section which deals with foreign policy is notable for its mention of the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and for the suggestion of alternative defence arrangements. This led to some speculation as to whether Nuri Pasha intended to abrogate the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty by unilateral action, and indeed to some categorical statements from apparently well-informed sources that he intended to do so. Unlikely though this was, I felt it advisable to call on him on the 8th of August when he assured me that there was no question of unilateral abrogation. The wording of the policy statement with regard to alternative defence arrangements, which speaks of "strengthening of relations with neighbouring States and improvement of

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co-operation between them and the Arab States to repel the Zionist danger," is compatible with the proposals for defence arrangements with Pakistan and other States which Nuri Pasha mentioned to the Minister of State when he was in London as recorded in your despatch No. 130 of the 20th of July.

4. The internal policy of the Government is less impressive except for its emphasis on firmness in dealing with subversive elements. Various references are made to internal reforms but these are in vague terms and are no doubt intended more for use during the forthcoming election campaign than for executive action. A possible exception is the proposal to distribute small holdings from Government lands, since Nuri may consider this a concession to the demands for land reform which will enable him to resist pressure for a more fundamental attack on the problem such as might harm the vested interests of the Sheikhs. That firmness is to be the keynote of the new Administration is indicated by Nuri's decision to dissolve his Constitutional Union Party and by the appeal issued at the same time as the policy statement calling on all patriots to work together against subversive elements. This aspect of Nuri's programme accords also with his view expressed to the Minister of State in London that the great need of Iraq is for internal stability and durable government. Nuri Pasha evidently does not intend to allow his Government to be at the mercy of a handful of demagogic and opportunist politicians seeking power by the use of mob violence. In Said Qazzaz he has found a Minister of Interior who is in no way loath to tackle such people, and whose complaint previously, at the time of the strike in Basrah last December, for example, was that his Prime Minister would not give him adequate backing to enable him to be really firm towards the Communists and their supporters.

5. Within a fortnight of his return from Europe, Nuri Pasha has completely transformed the political situation in Iraq. Despite his ill-health—he has ignored his doctor's advice and has been shuttling back and forth between Bagdad and the northern summer resort of Sersenk by train and helicopter during the hottest part of the year—he is by far the strongest personality in politics and at present the major source of power. The Palace in sending for him and asking him to take office have shown

their own weakness and the Crown Prince in particular has been humiliated by having to agree to the dismissal of the Chamber of Deputies which he had so recently packed. Saleh Jabr, thought of as Iraq's second politician, has been completely out-manoeuvred by Nuri Pasha's decision to dissolve the C.U.P. Either Saleh Jabr must dissolve his own party, in the interests of national unity against the extreme opposition, or it may be dissolved for him. In either count, his political influence and stature, which have been on the wane for some time, are bound to be greatly diminished. There is nothing to prevent Nuri Pasha ordering the dissolution of the remaining political parties, and it is widely believed that he will do this if the parties themselves do not take action voluntarily. Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party is divided in its attitude, some members wishing to co-operate with Nuri Pasha in the hopes of obtaining a share of power, while others are inclining to the firm opposition of the Independence Party. It is characteristic of Saleh Jabr's weakness that he has thought best at this juncture to go to Lebanon and to postpone the issue. The National Front who were so recently encouraged by their urban successes in the June elections and who were proposing to continue their co-operation in Parliament, rightly feel themselves vulnerable in the changing situation. Though they protest loudly against what has been done, there is little that they could themselves undertake if the Government is firm against the threat of violence.

6. A date for the elections has not yet been fixed but they are expected to take place in September. Nuri Pasha and his supporters are in a strong position, assured not only of considerable public backing, particularly in the rural areas, but also of Palace support and the effective control of the electoral machine during the elections. There is thus every prospect that the new Parliament will provide Nuri with a clear majority and that the new Government will be firmly established in the autumn.

7. From the short-term point of view this situation is favourable to British interests and we may be able in particular to make suitable defence arrangements with the new Government to supersede the existing treaty. The Government also has the knowledge and ability which should enable it to take an intelligent view of oil problems, several of the present Ministers having been concerned with the negotiation

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of the 1952 Agreement. From the long-term point of view, however, much will depend on the use which Nuri Pasha makes of the period of internal stability which he seeks to create. If it is used solely for the maintenance of the *status quo* and the prevention of any major reform then it is unlikely that more than a limited breathing space will have been obtained. Nuri Pasha's measures promise to postpone the

major internal problem of Iraq; they do not yet indicate a permanent solution.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Paris, Washington and the Head of the British Middle East Office in Fayid.

I have, &c.

R. W. J. HOOPER.

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No. 18

ANGLO-IRAQI TREATY

(No. 181. Intel. Secret)
Sir,

Foreign Office,
August 18, 1954.

My Intel No. 5.

The conclusion of Heads of Agreement on the Suez Canal Base has revived interest in the future of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, due to expire in 1957.

New Iraqi Government

2. On August 4 Nuri Said formed a new Government consisting of eight members of his own party and eight Right-wing Independents. The same day a Royal Decree was published dissolving Parliament and announcing fresh elections. The new Government should be stronger than its predecessors, and if, as is likely, the elections give Nuri a substantial majority, conditions should be more stable in the autumn.

3. Nuri has stated publicly that his Government's aim is the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and co-operation between Iraq and other States in conformity with the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Since Nuri has said on several occasions that he considers the 1930 treaty out of date, this reference should not cause surprise.

4. Privately Nuri has told us that he has in mind an arrangement for the air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba roughly similar to that agreed at the time of the Portsmouth Treaty, viz.:—

- (a) British maintenance staff;
- (b) R.A.F. Squadrons to use the bases when invited by the Iraqi Government to do so;
- (c) transit facilities.

He also explained recently to the Minister of State his idea of an Iraqi-Pakistan pact in which he hoped Her Majesty's Government would play a part, and in connection with which he thought the question of treaty revision might be broached.

Her Majesty's Government's Intentions

5. Under any new arrangements the two bases will doubtless have to be transferred to Iraqi control. We may have to give up the right to station R.A.F. squadrons permanently in Iraq, though in that case we should hope that they might be admitted for long training periods. We should in any case hope to reach agreement on the following points:—

- (a) facilities for regular visits by British squadrons to the air bases;
- (b) provision for British technicians to maintain the bases;
- (c) facilities for prestocking supplies and equipment;
- (d) transit rights for R.A.F. aircraft in peacetime;
- (e) joint planning in peacetime;
- (f) the wide range of facilities that an ally would normally expect in wartime.

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6. As a first step we should like to hold secret military talks to establish our joint operating requirements and to reach agreement on the military aspects of the problems involved. Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to tell Nuri that we should welcome such talks, though of course their timing must depend on the Iraqi elections.

7. In answer to enquiries, we are saying that we are always willing to consider any proposals designed to replace the provisions of the present treaty or bring them up to date.

8. Paragraphs 4 to 6 are for your own information; the rest may be freely used.

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No. 19

NEED FOR A DURABLE AND STABLE GOVERNMENT STRESSED BY HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR IN AN INTERVIEW ON SEPTEMBER 1 WITH THE CROWN PRINCE

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received September 8)

(No. 190. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *September 3, 1954.*

On my return to Bagdad from leave on the 28th of August I was shown your despatch No. 137 of the 28th of July in which you requested me to speak to His Majesty the King or to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince about the need for stability in Iraq and for durable government. I have the honour to report that in the absence of the King in Sersank, I spoke to the Crown Prince on the 1st of September.

2. I said I assumed Nuri would win the elections and continue as Prime Minister. The Crown Prince confirmed this and said he thought Nuri would then make some changes in the Government. I then said that I hoped the Government would continue in office for a longish period as continual changes of Government, such as had been the rule for so long, could only lead to instability. The Crown Prince said he hoped this would be so but he could never be sure that Nuri would not at any moment say he was tired and insist on giving up office. He hoped that Nuri would put some strong men into his Government so that he could take a rest if necessary from time to time and take leave without there being a change of Government.

3. The Government itself has meanwhile provided further evidence of its firmness and of its determination to maintain internal stability. Mr. Hooper reported in paragraph 5 of his despatch No. 177 of the 18th of August that the Ministry of the Interior were taking firm measures to

ensure that the elections proceeded without disorder. This firmness has been even more evident since the return of Said Qazzaz on the 24th of August. A further eighteen newspapers and journals were suspended for one year by decision of the Council of Ministers on the 30th of August. On the 1st of September three ordinances were made public, which the King had approved on the 22nd of August. The first Ordinance, No. 16 of 1954, amends the Law Supplemental to the Bagdad Penal Code No. 51 of 1938 and makes liable to the penalties of this law not only Communists, anarchists and Zionists, as previously, but also "those who serve the purposes of these doctrines under any guise, such as [membership of] the Partisans of Peace, the Democratic Youth and the like." The second Ordinance, No. 17 of 1954, is supplemental to the Iraq Nationality Law of 1924 and stipulates that at the proposal of the Minister of the Interior the Council of Ministers may deprive of his nationality any Iraqi convicted under the Law Supplemental to the Bagdad Penal Code mentioned above. The ordinance further provides that the Minister of the Interior may intern any such person and may detain him "until he is deported." Ordinance No. 18 of 1954 deals with public associations and provides that any association which departs from the bases and principles declared at the time of its establishment and adopts a course of action prejudicial to public security may be closed by decision of the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of the Minister of the Interior. These three ordinances are clearly meant as a threat to the extreme Opposition: Ordinance No. 18,

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for example, is a warning to the Bar Association, where elections held on the 27th of August produced a Communist-dominated committee under the presidency of Abdul Wahhab Mahmud, a leading Peace Partisan. To emphasise the cautionary nature of these measures, the ordinances are accompanied by a notification from the Minister of the Interior inviting those who have already been convicted of crimes under the Supplemental Law to the Penal Code to recant. Any person who wishes to avail himself of this opportunity and to retain his Iraqi nationality and to be a good citizen, must report to the nearest police station within one month and certify in writing that he now abandons the doctrine for which he had previously been convicted.

4. Further drastic action followed on the 2nd of September when the Ministry of the Interior announced that the licence which had been issued to the National Democratic Party in 1946 was now withdrawn as the party had departed from the programme developed at that time and sought to mislead innocent people and to promote internal disorder. The Minister bases this action on Articles 4 and 10 of the Law of Associations adopted during the Mandate in 1922 and not on Ordinance No. 18 mentioned above. At the same time it is announced that the Council of Ministers has decided to suspend the organ of the National Democratic Party, the *Voice of the People*, for a period of one year. This newspaper, which has long been a thorn in the flesh of successive Governments, was protected against executive action as a party organ and the Government have only been able to suppress it by abolishing the party as well.

5. There is no doubt that these firm measures make little of the various guarantees of personal and civil liberties mentioned in the Iraq Constitution, though many articles of the Constitution contain the saving clause that their provisions apply subject to the appropriate laws. Said Qazzaz himself mentioned to a member of my staff on the day the three ordinances were published that he knew that in the United Kingdom the Communist threat could be met without repressive measures and that the Communist Party itself could be allowed to continue its legal existence; he was certain, however, that in Iraq the situation was different and one must make

short shift of one's enemies if they were not to do the same with you.

6. I have been back in Bagdad less than a week after a couple of months' absence. But even this short period has been enough to show how complete is the transformation of the internal political scene. It has seemed to me that ever since Nuri Said resigned the Premiership in the summer of 1951 the situation has slowly deteriorated. One Government succeeded another every few months, and each seemed to be more futile than the last. Dr. Jamali's attempt at a Government of earnest young reformers quickly succumbed to reactionary obstruction. Meanwhile, factional opposition, taking its tune from Communist propaganda, came more and more into the open until it seemed only too likely that we should shortly be faced with something in the nature of revolution.

7. The change to-day is remarkable. Not a mouse appears to be stirring. Nuri Said, old, tired and sick though he is, has within a period of weeks dispersed his opponents and terrified potential malefactors into silence. He has even done so without imposing martial law. Of course his methods are not such as would appeal to nineteenth century Liberals, and no doubt the cry will soon go up that Iraq has become a Fascist State. Nevertheless, I am quite convinced that a strong Government is essential in Iraq, and I have made no secret of my view when discussing the situation with Iraqi visitors. But I have added the rider that strong Government is not enough by itself. Carrots are needed in addition to the whip, and one of these carrots must be the paying of taxes by the landlords. I asked the Crown Prince whether it was Nuri's intention to force the landowners to pay, but he replied that while Nuri talked airily of reforms, he never got down to saying what particular reforms he intended to introduce.

8. The most alarming feature in Iraq to-day seems to me that stability still depends on one man—Nuri Said. He cannot last forever, but no one of his calibre has appeared on the scene during my term of office, and there seems no one else capable even of maintaining order. The Communists and their friends are quiet for the moment but, if Nuri were to disappear, there is no doubt that they would quickly raise their heads again.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Bahrain, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Jedda, Paris, Washington, Ankara, the Head of the British Middle East Office and

to Her Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

VQ 1015/71

No. 20

REPORT ON THE IRAQI ELECTIONS HELD ON SEPTEMBER 12, 1954

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden (Received September 21)

(No. 200. Unclassified)

Sir,

Bagdad,

September 17, 1954.

The final results of the Iraqi elections were known on the 13th of September. Polling on the 12th of September took place without incident in the few constituencies where Deputies had not been returned unopposed. As I reported in my despatch No. 194 of the 10th of September, 113 of the 135 Deputies had been returned unopposed by that date. Further withdrawals took place on polling day itself and the final results presented few surprises. The new Chamber contains an overwhelming majority for Nuri Pasha and includes 52 Deputies who were formerly in the Constitutional Union Party. 14 Deputies were previously associated with Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party which boycotted the elections. Two candidates of the Independence Party were elected, the leader Mohammed Mahdi Kubba, and Sayid Abdul Muhsin al Doori. Other candidates put forward by the Independence Party, notably in Mosul, withdrew in advance of the elections in protest against Government interference. On the 16th of September the Independence Party announced that they would not participate in the new Chamber as the elections had not been free. Sayid Mohammed Mahdi Kubba accordingly resigned from Parliament but Sayid Muhsin al Doori preferred to resign from his party and remains in the Chamber. Although there are some half-dozen Deputies in the Chamber whose previous record shows them to be firmly opposed to Nuri Pasha and his policies there is no formal opposition. The first demonstration of the Government's great majority came on the 16th of September when Sayid Abdul Wahab Murjan, formerly a prominent member of the Constitutional Union Party, and at present Minister of Agriculture, was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies when 105 of the 112 Deputies present voted in his favour.

2. His Majesty the King formally opened Parliament on the 16th of September for a one-day meeting to hear the Speech from the Throne and to elect officers. A translation of the text⁽¹⁾ of His Majesty's speech is enclosed with this despatch. It will be seen that it contains little that is new apart from a recent decision of the Development Board to allot 5,000,000 dinars to various municipal undertakings. For the rest His Majesty merely endorsed the policy statement which the Prime Minister put forward at the time of forming the present Government as set out in Mr. Hooper's telegram No. 456 of the 5th of August. Subsequently after the meeting of Parliament and the election of officers a Royal Decree was issued adjourning Parliament until the 30th of November. The next ordinary session of Parliament, which will have the budget for this year and next year to approve, is expected to meet as usual on the 1st of December.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch, and its enclosure, to the Head of the British Middle East Office in Fayid.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

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No. 21

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND THE
IRAQI PRIME MINISTER ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1954

Middle East Defence

Mr. Eden to Sir John Troutbeck (Bagdad)

(No. 176. Secret) Foreign Office,
September 24, 1954.

Sir,
When Nuri Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister, came to see the Minister of State on September 20 he told Mr. Lloyd his ideas on Middle East defence.

2. Nuri Said said that the Egyptians for domestic reasons were unwilling for the next two years or so to consider his ideas for a regional pact. He had told them that he could not wait so long, but would arrange things so that they could come in afterwards if they desired. Nuri thought therefore that the first thing to try for now was a pact of five Powers—Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Persia and the United Kingdom. He was particularly keen to have Syria in for geographical reasons and because Iraq's lines of communication lay through Syria. As soon as the Syrian elections were over, he would approach them. If Syria would not come in, then he thought that we should try for a pact between the other four countries, with the possible addition of Pakistan. If Persia would not come into this alternative grouping, then he thought the simplest thing was to go for a pact between Iraq, Pakistan and the United Kingdom.

3. Nuri said he had in mind some sort of arrangements rather like N.A.T.O. Mr. Lloyd asked whether it was his idea that this agreement should replace the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty: Nuri replied "yes." Mr. Lloyd asked him what length of agreement he was thinking of. After discussing the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Turco-Pakistan Pact, Nuri said that he thought that a pact for ten years, renewable for five-yearly periods, might meet the case. He was thinking of an agreement in the spirit of the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty which he would like to put through the Iraqi Parliament in February or March 1955 at the latest.

4. Mr. Lloyd asked what was to be the basis of co-operation between the United Kingdom and Iraq. Nuri said that so far as the army was concerned, there was no problem. We should be allowed to store what we wanted, where we wanted, subject to arrangements for provision of accom-

modation and guards. With regard to the R.A.F., that was more important to Iraq and he wanted complete co-operation with the Royal Iraqi Air Force. Mr. Lloyd asked whether he meant integration of part of the R.A.F. with the R.I.A.F.? Nuri said "not quite that," but he foresaw, for example, a British squadron and an Iraqi squadron living side by side at Habbaniya, and the same thing at other Iraqi airfields, with our people really training the Iraqis, and with joint arrangements for supplies.

5. Mr. Lloyd asked who would be responsible for the technical efficiency of the airfields. Nuri evaded the question of responsibility but said that they would, of course, be maintained to our standards. Mr. Lloyd suggested that all this needed a certain amount of technical consideration and that Nuri might take the opportunity of discussing the matter with the Chief of Air Staff.

6. Mr. Lloyd asked whether, under Nuri's plan, we would have the right to maintain our squadrons at Iraqi airfields. He said we would have just the same rights as we had with our N.A.T.O. allies, or as the United States Air Force had in the United Kingdom. He did not want detailed agreements: he wanted it to be a matter of co-operation between the two Governments.

7. As regards the Assyrians at the bases, Nuri volunteered that he proposed to brigade the Assyrians as part of the Iraqi Army and leave them where they were. Mr. Lloyd did not pursue this question or that of the Assyrian technicians.

8. Throughout the foregoing conversation, Mr. Lloyd asked questions and did not comment on Nuri's ideas, which in some cases were far from clear.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Cairo, Ankara, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Tehran, Tel Aviv, to the Head of the B.M.E.O. and to the Commonwealth Relations Office for the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN

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No. 22

SITUATION CREATED BY THE IRAQI ELECTIONS OF
SEPTEMBER 1954

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received September 29)

(No. 206. Confidential) Bagdad,
September 24, 1954.

Sir,
In my despatch No. 200 of September 17, I had the honour to report the results of the Iraqi elections, voting for which took place in some few constituencies on September 12. I now wish to offer the following comments on the situation created by these elections.

2. As I reported in my despatch under reference the new Chamber of Deputies contains an absolute majority for the Prime Minister. Perhaps half a dozen of the Deputies have a record of opposition and there are in addition one or two individuals known for their independent views. Essentially, however, the new Chamber is an Assembly chosen by Nuri Pasha for the purpose of complying with his wishes and it is therefore composed in the main of his own supporters. With regard to the actual conduct of the elections the Government sought to avoid opposition at any cost and did not hesitate to take all necessary administrative measures to this end including the detention of candidates and the manipulation of voting figures where necessary. It is only fair to add, that though the Government interference in the election was vigorous, the electorate itself was apathetic and comparatively little resentment was apparent.

3. Since the elections the Government has continued its policy of internal firmness. The three ordinances referred to in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 190 of September 3 have been followed by a further ordinance, No. 19 of 1954, repealing the Law of Associations of 1922. This ordinance, a translation of which follows by separate letter, withdraws permission from all existing associations, except those whose existence is guaranteed by a separate law, and requires each association wishing to continue its activities to seek fresh permission from the Ministry of the Interior. Such permission will only be given to associations which are held by the Minister to be suitable. No association is to be permitted which is either "contrary to public order and morality" or which "aims at changing the established form of Government" or "seeks to cause dissension

among the people." It is also provided in the ordinance that no political association shall be authorised if the aims which it professes in its Articles of Association are already served by an existing association. In consequence of this ordinance the two remaining political parties in Iraq, the Popular Socialist Party and the Independence Party are considered dissolved. It is interesting that the date of the ordinance is August 28 although its publication was delayed until September 23. The Government have no doubt taken this action at the present time in view of the continued opposition to them from the Independence Party whose journal, the *Liwa al Istiqlal*, now also suspended, recently published exaggerated accounts of a minor disturbance which occurred in Sulaimania on September 13 when a candidate who had not been elected organised a protest demonstration. Nuri probably also thought that the time had come to give the *coup de grace* to Saleh Jabr.

4. Although the Government are thus confident of their strength and continue to provide evidence of their determination to eliminate any real opposition, the position is not a healthy one. As I have previously commented, the position of strength now created rests solely on the personality of the Prime Minister and if he should be removed from the scene the whole structure might collapse. The rest of the Cabinet with the exception of Said Qazzaz, the Minister of the Interior, have no real strength or force of character and some have an unsavoury reputation. This situation is unlikely to be materially changed if, as is expected, Nuri reshuffles his Government when he returns to Bagdad. He usually prefers mediocrities who will carry out his instructions. Parliamentary government in Iraq has never been much respected, but the present Chamber is even more discredited than its predecessors. Government interference in the elections was more blatant and the ensuing character of the Assembly as a repository of vested interests is more apparent. The Government programme, which the electorate is

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now held to have endorsed, contains some vague references to reform, but the nature of the new Parliament is not such as to create the belief that any serious reform is intended. This is the more dangerous as the prestige of the monarchy is inevitably affected by its close association with what is held, even by those who welcome the change, to be unmitigated reaction.

5. Things had got to such a pass before Nuri returned to power that strong measures were essential unless the country was to fall into chaos. It may also well be true, as many assert, that oriental countries are happier under strong, authoritarian government than under a form of parliamentary democracy which does not work. Nevertheless I cannot help feeling that Nuri was unwise to have so completely disregarded even the normal proprieties in running the elections. He must too have alienated more influential people than was necessary. As for the extremists, he has

reduced them to silence, but not extinguished them. All these elements will now bide their time and, though calm and even some measure of contentment may well continue for a period, I would not care to prophesy what will happen when that period comes to an end. A particular danger for ourselves is that any act done by this Government and this Parliament is likely to be repudiated as illegal and unconstitutional at some later date. So even if we get a new treaty arrangement before Nuri goes out of office again, we should be unwise to count on its holding.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Ankara and Washington, to the Head of the British Middle East Office and to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

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No. 23

MILITARY AID TO IRAQ

(1)

Sir John Troutbeck to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received November 6)

(No. 701. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)

Bagdad,
November 6, 1954.

When I took Shuckburgh to see Nuri yesterday I raised with him the question of loan of six Centurion tanks, on which my military attaché had been in correspondence with the War Office. Nuri broadened the discussion into general one of Iraqi rearmament. He said that he had no money to pay for new tanks, or indeed for any other military equipment to carry out phased programme whether for army or air force. It was all he could do to meet the ordinary needs of the present forces. He could only go forward with the programme of expansion if financed from outside. He estimated that total sum involved at some £70 millions, spread over a number of years, and hoped that the greater part of this would be met by American aid.

2. This, he continued, raised a further problem. His impression was that America wanted to provide the necessary equipment themselves and not by off-shore purchases. They had, for example, told the Iraqi Chief of General Staff during his recent visit to the United States that they could supply tanks without difficulty, and unquestionably the same applied to aircraft. They were already supplying Turkey and Pakistan, and the question for decision now was whether Iraq should be included for rearmament purposes in that group or should remain linked with the British forces in the Middle East with Jordan. The answer depended on the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government. If Her Majesty's Government could assist Iraq financially (as, he alleged, had been hinted by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff during his conversation with him in London) or persuade the United States Government to use method of off-shore purchases, Iraq could remain in the Middle East group. If, on the other hand, the United States Government insisted on supplying their own material he would have to accept that. If neither method was acceptable he would have to give up his programme of expansion. It was now for Her Majesty's Government, in consultation with the United States Government, to decide what

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they wanted of Iraq. All he could say himself was that the Iraqi Government could not pay. If the Western Powers needed her in their plans of defence they must somehow provide the finance. It would be of great benefit to Her Majesty's Government to be forthcoming as the provision of tanks and other equipment would make it far easier for him to get Iraqi forces and public opinion to accept the continued presence of British squadrons in Iraqi bases.

3. I said I must obviously submit a problem of such magnitude to London, but that I could make two comments at once. I was sure that Her Majesty's Government could not themselves assist Iraq financially over her rearmament programme, and I was quite confident that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had meant no such thing during the conversations in London. Secondly, before he thought seriously of entering the Turkey-Pakistan zone of rearmament he should consider very seriously the question of supply line. I thought it would be very profitable for him to discuss all these matters with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff during his forthcoming visit.

4. Nuri is the most brilliant beggar I have ever met, and it is never easy to know how far he is serious and how far he is "trying it on." But this is by no means the first time he has said that he cannot rearm without help from the West. I do not believe he wants to go over to American armaments, but he evidently feels that he has an opportunity of squeezing both us and America and forcing us to pay the maximum price for building up the Iraqi forces into a more solid link in Western Defence. It seems to me that we must thrash this whole question out with America and get a clearer indication of how far they intend to go:—

- (a) in their total aid to Iraq over the next few years, and
- (b) in off-shore purchases.

The Iraqis are past masters at playing us and America off against each other. That is the first thing we must both avoid.

V 1193/107

(2)

From Sir Anthony Eden

(No. 5691. Secret)
(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office,
November 18, 1954.

Bagdad telegram No. 701 to me [of November 6]: Military assistance for Iraq. Our comments are as follows:—

- (a) Iraqi oil revenues are at present in the region of £50 millions a year and will tend to increase; we therefore find it difficult to believe that they cannot afford to expand their armed forces. The C.I.G.S. made no such suggestion to Nuri in London as the latter alleges (paragraph 2 of Bagdad telegram under reference).
- (b) The distribution of current United States aid as between off-shore purchases from the United Kingdom and direct supply from the United States is about to be agreed between the Americans and ourselves. (See Annex II to Wing Commander Wallace's letter No. 185 of September 24 and Bagdad telegram No. 635, repeated to B.J.S.M.)
- (c) Any proposals for the increase of United Kingdom and United States aid to Iraq would have to be considered in the light, *inter alia*, of Nuri's progress with Middle East defence schemes and the facilities which Iraq may be able to offer the United Kingdom in any revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.
- (d) Nuri's suggestion that there are in the Middle East rival groups of States under United Kingdom and United States patronage, both bidding for Iraqi adherence, is unrealistic.
- (e) It remains important that, as provided in the Memorandum of Understanding of February 26 last, Iraq's forces should be equipped with British types of arms so that a single supply channel may serve them and our own forces in war.

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2. We wish to instruct Her Majesty's Ambassador to reply on the above lines (omitting reference to the Memorandum of Understanding). For this to be effective it is, however, essential that the United States Government should instruct their Embassy at Bagdad to make it known to the Iraqi Government that they share these views, and that United Kingdom and United States policies in this matter coincide and do not compete.

3. Please approach the United States Government accordingly. You should inform them of Nuri's remarks and of Sir John Troutbeck's comments, with which I agree, and should endeavour to obtain their co-operation in our proposed rejoinder as indicated in paragraph 2 above. You should also try to ascertain the United States Government's intentions about future military aid allocations for Iraq.

K 1193/121

(3)

Sir Roger Makins to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received December 10)

(No. 2663. Secret)

Washington,

(Telegraphic)

December 9, 1954.

My telegram No. 2505: Military assistance for Iraq.

State Department are now authorising the United States Ambassador in Bagdad to speak to the Iraqi Government on the lines of paragraph 2 below. The five points were given to us in writing, but we were asked to regard the paper as a record of conversation and not as a formal document.

2. Begins

- (i) We also believe the Iraqis are in a position to maintain their armed forces at current levels and possibly make some expansion from their own resources. However, any considerable expansion would probably be at the expense of the development programme.
- (ii) Nuri could be informed we are working out general agreement with the United Kingdom on the distribution of United States aid as between direct supply and off-shore procurement. However, it would be useful to add that this distribution will be determined in the light of Iraq's needs and that every effort will be made to avoid logistic complications.
- (iii) We have already indicated to the Iraqis that the extent of our aid will depend largely upon progress in Iraqi adherence to the Turkey-Pakistan Pact. It would possibly be useful to reiterate that point. As it would be in our interest for the British to obtain facilities in Iraq under any new treaty arrangement, it would seem to be helpful generally for us to let the Iraqis know that there will be a greater disposition on our part to help them if such facilities, available for defence of the free world, are made available.
- (iv) It would definitely be helpful to dispel Nuri's notions about "rival" groups.
- (v) General Meyers told the Iraqis in May that we recognised the desirability of not changing Iraqi equipment over to United States types and of not altering Iraqi war equipment tables. This could be repeated to the Iraqis with the addition that it would seem proper for Iraq to continue in the main to use United Kingdom type of arms.

V 1193/121

(4)

From Sir Anthony Eden

(No. 1052. Secret)

Foreign Office,

(Telegraphic)

December 24, 1954.

Washington telegram No. 2663 to me [of December 10: Military Assistance for Iraq].

Please now reply to Nuri as indicated in my telegram No. 5691 to Washington [of November 18] indicating that your remarks supplement those of the C.I.G.S. reported in your telegram No. 35 Saving [of November 24]. You may also, with

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regard to the financial question, make use at your discretion of the following paragraphs.

2. I agree with the view expressed in your telegram No. 38 Saving [of November 24] that we should not urge Nuri to divert to rearmament what has been set aside for development. It is, however, our view, bearing in mind the C.I.G.S.'s point that quality and readiness for war are far more important than size in the development of Iraqi armed forces, that sufficient funds could be made available by alternative methods.

3. Nuri's statement that Iraq is spending 50 per cent. of her ordinary revenue on defence is not borne out by the budget figures given in your despatch No. 107 [of June 19, 1953], which show the proportion as about 35 per cent. It may be true that Nuri cannot at present do more for defence by increasing taxes: but we would expect revenue from taxes, other than those paid by the oil companies, to increase as the development programme results in increased economic activity.

4. We wonder in any case whether the Iraqi Government could not draw on the Development Board's revenues to a substantial extent without affecting the progress of development in Iraq. The Board started the year 1953-54 with a cash balance of ID.20 millions. During that year its income was ID.35 millions, whereas its outgoings in expenditure on actual development and in loans to municipal and other institutions totalled ID.26 millions, giving a surplus on the year's workings of ID.9 millions, and a cash balance on March 31, 1954, of ID.29 millions. Since the increase of oil revenues will increase the Board's income in the coming years, it would seem that this balance could be drawn on without ill effect. If you see no objection you should question Nuri on this.

V 1193/3

(5)

Mr. Hooper to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received January 5)

(No. 10. Secret)

Bagdad,

(Telegraphic)

January 5, 1955.

Your telegram No. 1052.

I spoke to the Prime Minister on the lines indicated on January 4. The United States Ambassador, who did not receive instructions till December 28, is also speaking to him on the lines foreshadowed in Washington telegram No. 2663 to the Foreign Office.

2. Nuri Pasha reiterated that Iraq was already doing all that could be expected of her and could not expend more on defence than she was doing at present. In any case, with a *bloc* of [group undecypherable] million facing another *bloc* of the same size, anything Iraq could do was a drop in the ocean. In these days of nuclear warfare the small countries without industrial resources could not afford heavy armaments. Such armaments as they did order were usually obsolete before they arrived. He instanced Venoms ordered by Iraq. If the Western Powers wanted Iraq to do more, they must pay. If they did not wish to do so directly, he was quite willing to devote more money to defence in the budget if the West would make it up by way of economic aid. When I made point (c) in your telegram No. 5691 to Washington, Nuri Pasha retorted that Turkey, Pakistan and Persia had received aid in advance of conclusion of a defence arrangement: why not Iraq?

3. On reflection, and after consulting Lord Salter in confidence, I did not press the argument in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 1052. It is true that the Development Board has substantial cash balance, but this is because a number of projects are still at comparatively inexpensive stage of planning and have not yet reached the point at which heavy capital expenditure will be incurred on construction. The cash balance will disappear very quickly when they get going. Conceivably a point may one day be reached when the resources available for development are fully employed, and it may then be advisable, in order to prevent inflation, to "mop up" surplus oil royalties and general revenues by armament purchases; but this is unlikely for several years.

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4. There are obvious fallacies in Nuri Pasha's argument, but it seems most unlikely that he will modify his attitude as long as he believes that there is any prospect of unlimited free arms from the United States. In particular, he will continue to stall on the question of tanks until the Americans either make it clear that there will be no free tanks at all, or agree to supply Centurions on off-shore purchase.

VQ 1203/12

No. 24

VISIT OF CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES TO IRAQ

Sir John Troutbeck to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received December 9)

(No. 240. Confidential)

Bagdad.

Sir,

December 7, 1954.

I have the honour to report that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.), Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., and the Commander-in-Chief Middle East Land Forces, General Sir Charles Keightley, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., visited Iraq during the third week of November 1954.

2. The C.I.G.S. and the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C.) arrived in Bagdad by air in the afternoon of the 22nd of November, after lunch at Habbaniya with the Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Iraq, Air Vice-Marshal H. H. Brookes, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C. The C.I.G.S., the C-in-C. and the Military Assistant to the C.I.G.S., Lieutenant-Colonel H. Van Straubenzee, D.S.O., O.B.E., were accommodated in the Residence and my military attaché accommodated the A.D.C. to the C.I.G.S., Captain the Viscount Melgund. The same evening a small cocktail party was held at the Residence in honour of the visitors.

3. On the 23rd of November I held a meeting at the Embassy with the C.I.G.S. and the C-in-C. which was also attended by senior members of my staff and Brigadier Lushington, the Senior British Adviser to the Iraqi Chief of the General Staff. Later that morning I took the C.I.G.S. and the C-in-C. to call on the Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defence, General Nuri-al-Said, and the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Rafiq Arif. On the evening of the same day we called on the Crown Prince together. Later that evening the Acting Minister of Defence gave a small dinner party for the C.I.G.S. and the C-in-C., at which my military attaché and I were also present.

4. On the morning of the 24th of November, the C.I.G.S. left for Pakistan. The C-in-C. left at the same time for Northern Iraq as a guest of the Chief of the General Staff; he visited the oil installations at Kirkuk and drove to the Persian frontier via the Ruwanduz gorge.

5. The C-in-C. returned to Bagdad in the late morning of the 26th of November, visited my American colleague and was later received by His Majesty King Faisal. He left for Fayid in the early morning of the 27th of November.

6. Discussions held during the visit were confined to various aspects of defence and American military aid. The more important points have been already communicated to you in my Saving telegrams, Nos. 35, 36, 37 and 38, of the 24th of November.

7. The visitors were well received by the Iraqi authorities who always appreciate visits by high-ranking British officers. This visit was particularly timely in view of the important problems now facing us in respect of the defence of the Middle East.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Sir John Sterndale Bennett at the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

VQ 1015/82

No. 25

KING FAISAL'S SPEECH FROM THE THRONE

Sir John Troutbeck to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received December 13)

(No. 242. Confidential)

Bagdad.

Sir,

December 8, 1954.

I have the honour to report that His Majesty King Faisal opened the fifteenth ordinary session of the Iraqi Parliament on the 1st of December and delivered the Speech from the Throne prepared by the Government of General Nuri Said. An English translation of this speech is enclosed.⁽¹⁾

2. The main principles of Nuri Pasha's policy are contained in his letter to the King, published on the 4th of August (reported in the Bagdad telegram No. 456 of the 4th of August and despatch No. 168 of the 11th of August), and the speech opened with a repetition of those principles. One of them is the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and that too is mentioned again. This is the first time, so far as I am aware, that the termination of the treaty has been mentioned in so many words in a Speech from the Throne, though it was implied in the speech of the 1st of December, 1951 (my despatch No. 197 of the 3rd of December 1951) and has, as stated above, been the explicit policy of the present Government since the 4th of August this year.

3. Thereafter the Gracious Speech reviews the external policy of the Government. The two fundamental principles of that policy, the United Nations Charter and the Arab League Covenant, are reaffirmed. There is likewise no change in the attitude of the Government to the Palestine question. The only new element in this section of the speech is the welcome extended to the Anglo-Egyptian settlement.

4. On internal policy likewise, little is new. The drive against Communism continues and I am reporting separately measures to call up into the army civil servants and students dismissed for alleged Communist sympathies. The usual platitudes cover the strengthening of the Judicature, the expansion of health services, the improvement of education, the industrialisation of date growing, the construction of grain silos in Mosul, Basra and Hilla (mentioned in Speeches from the Throne since 1951!). The improvement of the administrative machine is another hardy perennial but particular emphasis is laid on improving the police force and its equipment. This is the continuing preoccupation of the Minister of the Interior, who as a member of Dr. Jamali's Government, inserted a similar passage into the Speech from the Throne of December 1953 and has given effect to it to the extent of engaging a British police expert to help in the task. The customary allusion to the expansion and modernisation of the army is expanded by mention of United States military aid and the extension of armaments factories in co-operation with other Arab States.

5. The section on finance also introduces a new element, the revision of the Iraqi Tariff Law, which has been undertaken by an American expert. A settlement has also been finally made of the land disputes in Muntafik and Amara Liwas, by ordinances Nos. 27 and 28 published on the 18th of November. These items have been mentioned in the Speeches from the Throne since 1950. The settlements are on more conservative lines than those proposed by Dr. Jamali's Government.

6. The promised revision of the Tobacco Monopoly Law has not pleased the cultivators, not because they are content with the present law but because they are convinced that the new law, too, will be unfairly applied.

7. In the field of communications an extension of railway lines—a simple matter—to the Government oil refinery at Daura and the bitumen plant at Qayara is announced. Both these projects are part of the development programme. The survey for the railway between Nasiriya and Kut is complete and the portion from Kut to Bagdad contemplated. This line, if ever built, would link south-eastern Iraq with both Bagdad and Basra, but it must wait upon the completion of the Tharthar project as it would run through land liable to serious flood. The

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

allusion to the purchase of four-engined transport aircraft and the training of crews is to the contract signed for three Vickers Viscount aircraft for Iraqi Airways.

8. This Speech from the Throne is typical of what the younger western-educated Iraqis have called the "policy of improvisation" which has characterised almost all Iraqi Governments. It is empiric and, in dealing with facts as it finds them, does not measure them by the yard-stick of any political or social system. Gone are such concepts as those included by Dr. Jamali in last year's speech: "Our policy is based on two pillars, the first a policy of reconstruction and development to make the fullest use of Iraq's resources, material and human, in order to increase production and the national income. . . . Second, a fair distribution of the benefits of that policy." Gone, too, is the conscious social policy which ensued from those two principles. Instead, the approach is entirely piecemeal. Nevertheless, the social side of the present Government's programme is far greater than in any of Nuri Pasha's previous Governments and new projects are contemplated and old ones continued for the improvement of the conditions of the poorer classes. A conservative and cautious plan is thus laid for the expenditure of Iraq's increasing revenue on measures of welfare. Whether any of them will mature or whether, exactly like Dr. Jamali's more idealistic projects, they will come to naught, is a matter of speculation.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Amman, Tel Aviv, Jedda and Tehran and to the Head of British Middle East Office, Nicosia, Cyprus.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

VQ 1015/83

No. 26

SIR JOHN TROUTBECK'S REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ DURING HIS MISSION

Sir John Troutbeck to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received December 20)

(No. 245. Confidential) *Bagdad.*
Sir, *December 9, 1954.*

On the conclusion of my appointment as Her Majesty's Ambassador in Iraq, I have the honour to submit a report on the general developments in the country during the period of my mission.

2. As an introduction it may be useful to consider briefly what Iraq consists of, who the Iraqis are, and what has happened to them since we delivered them from Turkish rule in the First World War.

3. Iraq was carved out of the three Turkish Vilayets of Basra, Bagdad and Mosul. The inclusion of the Mosul Vilayet caused some difficulty as in the first place its exploitation had already been promised to the French by secret agreement, and, secondly, the Turks, knowing its richness in oil, were loath to give it up and, indeed, were only with difficulty restrained from going to war again in order to keep it. The dispute with Turkey was not settled for several years and has never been wholly

forgotten by the Iraqis, who still suspect the Turks of irredentist designs and for that reason are wary of concluding any close defensive arrangement with them even to meet what they recognise to be the common threat of Soviet aggression.

4. The importance of Iraq is due not to any innate worth in her population, which is indeed backward and ignorant even by Arab standards, but to her geographical situation and to the vast reserves of oil beneath her soil. A distinguished member of the Indian Political Service went so far as to write a book⁽¹⁾ some years ago to prove that, thanks to oil and aviation, Iraq had now become a main centre of world power. Even if that be an exaggeration, it is the fact that Iraq holds a key position in modern strategic thinking and that her oil is held to be essential for the needs of the Western world in peace-time even if it should prove impossible to retain in war.

5. The Iraqis like to regard themselves as Arabs, but it is as well to remember that the

⁽¹⁾ "Wells of Power." by Olaf Caroe.

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population is exceedingly mixed and has little unity either in race or in religion. Quite apart from such small minorities as the Christian sects, the Yezidis, the Turcomans, the Sabeans and the few thousand Jews who still remain, there is a very large minority in the shape of the Kurds. They are of different stock, they are hill-folk as opposed to the Arabs, who are people of the plain, they speak their own language and they have an inherent dislike of the ruling Arab. In time of trouble their loyalty could not be wholly guaranteed—an important fact when it is remembered that they occupy the north-eastern frontier districts. Then the so-called Arabs are of very mixed origin resulting from the age-long invasions by the desert Arabs, Persians, Turks and others. This is less important than the fact that they are bitterly divided in their religious allegiance. The majority are Shias, but it is the Sunni minority that still holds most of the big jobs whether in Government, administration or army. In Turkish days the Shias were of no account. One of the most interesting developments during my time in Iraq has been the increasing pressure by the Shias to have a representation more in accord with their numbers. This has naturally increased the tension between the two sects. Nor is religion the only cause of divided sympathies. Little love is lost between the town effendis and the rural population. There have been occasions in Iraq's short history when the tribes have been roused to revolt and even invade Bagdad.

6. Such, briefly, is the country which we invaded and liberated from the Turks in the 1914 war. And here we come to the first crucial feature in Iraq's history. The Iraqis can look back to no war of liberation, to no heroic resistance against their Turkish over-lords, beyond the fact that there were a handful of Iraqis in Faisal's army which drove to Damascus with Lawrence. They owe their freedom solely to the force of British arms. They have since then never ceased trying to restore their self-esteem by attacking their deliverers, sometimes physically and incessantly in their press and public speeches. Their heroes are those who have at one time or another revolted against the British or gone out into the streets to challenge the "British puppets" who have since been in power.

7. When we had finally decided not to restore Iraq to Turkish rule but to build her up as an independent country, the question of her civil government naturally arose. As

there were few Iraqis at the time capable of setting up a new State, we had to take the matter in hand ourselves and administer the country through British officials. At the same time we were careful to set up a framework for the future indigenous government. For this we decided upon a system approximating to our own, that is to say a constitutional monarchy with a Cabinet system and two Houses of Parliament, the one elected and the other nominated by the Crown. The only part of the system that can be said to have been a success is the monarchy. We made a happy choice in King Faisal I. Though he died young, he yet left such a mark that the Crown is still to-day the strongest element of stability in the country, though, owing to a number of factors, it plays less of a rôle than it could and should do. Among these are the weakness and vacillation of the Crown Prince, the youth and inexperience of the King, the lack of an adequate public relations organisation and, above all, the desire not to identify the monarchy in any way with the "imperialist oppressors" to whom it owes its existence. As for the Governments, they have seldom lasted longer than a few months, while the significance of Parliament can be judged by the fact that, out of its 135 present members, over 120 were returned unopposed.

8. If the Iraqis showed singularly little inclination to resist the Turks, they quickly learnt the tricks and catchwords of nationalism when Turkish rule was replaced by British. From the earliest days it became the ambition of the vocal members of the population to get rid of British control. It is one of the tragedies of Iraq that the British administration, sniped at by Iraqi nationalists in front and by the British press and Parliament from behind, was too short-lived to leave a more permanent impression. There is not the smallest doubt that Iraq achieved her independence too soon. During the years that followed her recognition as an independent State in 1932, the country was governed almost by a system of *coups d'état* culminating in the Rashid Ali revolt of 1941. For a few brief years our control was then to some extent restored, but this clearly could not survive the war. It was no longer in tune with the spirit of the age, and we have steadily been giving up our responsibilities ever since. The result, as Iraqis are the first to admit, has been a steady decline in the standard of administration. So to-day we have a country with all the material means for

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progress at its disposal but with an administration so rotten and chaotic that it is more than doubtful whether it can take advantage of them. The fact is that Iraq, after being for four centuries a backwater of the Ottoman Empire, needed a long period of solid and honest administration to start the country going. The British administration disappeared before new roots had time to establish themselves.

9. When I arrived in Bagdad in 1951, the country had been restored to a state of order and comparative prosperity after a number of lean years which had witnessed the disastrous Palestine war, the Portsmouth Treaty riots and a period of severe economic distress. Nuri Said was enjoying his eleventh term as Prime Minister and continued to hold that office for a further year and more. It was during that period that he effected what could be a turning-point in Iraq's history—the signing of an agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company which assured to the Iraq Government a large and steady revenue sufficient to transform the whole economy. It is of interest to note that just as Iraq won her freedom without any effort on her own part, so also she derives her new wealth from the efforts of the hated imperialists. No country can owe more to imperialism than does Iraq.

10. Already in 1950 a Development Board had been set up to prepare and carry out plans for the development of the country. It was the hope that by this arrangement development would be taken out of politics. So although the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance were made *ex-officio* members of the Board, provision was made for an independent vice-chairman and six "permanent" members of whom three were to have expert knowledge. One of the expert posts was given to a British subject, who was made secretary-general, and another to an American. The vice-chairmanship was given to Arshad al Umari, a man of strong if wayward personality, who had made his name as Lord Mayor of Bagdad and had also held a number of Government posts, including that of Prime Minister. A high-powered mission from the International Bank was invited to visit Iraq in 1951 and prepare a programme which could form the basis for the board's activities. It was first laid down that the whole of the oil revenues should be put at the disposal of the Board, but this was subsequently reduced to 70 per cent. Arshad al Umari devoted

immense energy to getting the Board to work and Sir Edington Miller the Secretary-General, succeeded almost single-handed in organising the administrative side. But Arshad was too erratic and quarrelsome to be acceptable for long and, as time went on, he made so many enemies that the Government became determined to remove him. Instead of asking him to resign they hit upon the plan of modifying the constitution of the Board in such a way that he would refuse to work under it. The plot succeeded, but the result was extreme confusion. Under the new arrangement the new post of Minister of Development was created to take over the former executive functions of the Board. The post of Secretary-General was abolished and the technical staff transferred to the Ministry. The Board has therefore continued to plan without benefit of planners, while the execution is entrusted to a Minister with no administrative staff worthy of the name. Moreover, no less than six different Ministers have held the post since it was created, thus removing any hope there might have been of continuity of policy. The imperfection of the arrangement became so obvious that early in 1954 the Iraq Government invited Lord Salter to come out and study the whole problem. He paid a short visit to Bagdad in the spring and is now back. A new five-year programme was promised in the King's Speech at the opening of Parliament in November, and Lord Salter has been asked to complete his recommendations before the end of this year. They will no doubt cover not only the programme itself but the administration necessary to carry it out.

11. In spite of so much hesitation and delay, a good deal of solid development work has been put in hand. Foreign consultants and contractors are engaged on preparing and executing major works. But both the Ministry and the Board lack any administrative basis, no one is thinking out the long-term social and economic effects of the new development, and there is a lack of balance in the existing programme which has been chopped and changed continually since the International Bank produced its report three years ago. It is to be hoped that as a result of Lord Salter's recommendations both the programme and the administration will be placed on a more solid basis. But one must cross one's fingers. It is a sad reflection that when Nuri formed his twelfth government in the summer of 1954 he appointed a nonentity

without any qualifications to be Minister of Development. Yet it was Nuri who in the face of angry opposition had some years earlier forced through Parliament the ratification of the agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company upon which the whole programme rests.

12. Nuri resigned in the summer of 1952 after holding the premiership for the longest single period in Iraq's history. His resignation was followed by two years of political confusion and unrest, demonstrating the essential need in Iraq for a strong hand at the top and the feebleness of all other political leaders. It showed, too, that discontent is always only just below the surface and that if any dynamic revolutionary leader were to appear he would have plenty of human material at his disposal. Within a few months of Nuri's resignation Bagdad was at the mercy of the mob, the new Government having thrown in its hand at the first sign of trouble. Order was only restored by the intervention of the army and the Chief of General Staff was appointed Prime Minister. His Government, like most Iraqi Governments, lasted but a few months and then gave place to a Government which was designed to be of fitting dignity to inaugurate the new reign of King Faisal II. No less than four ex-Prime Ministers were included in the Cabinet. If this Government had dignity it had little else and the rumblings of discontent once again grew threatening as stagnation persisted. The only achievement was in the military sphere, where Nuri Said, as Minister of Defence, was active in improving conditions in the army.

13. The Crown Prince, who despite the King's accession still maintained all the influence he had previously exercised as Regent, felt apparently that some drastic experiment was required. Once again the Government was changed and this time it was not merely a reshuffle from one set of elderly politicians to another. The new Prime Minister who took office in the autumn of 1953 was Dr. Fadhil Jamali, a Western-educated and comparatively young man and a Shia. He filled his Cabinet with zealous young reformers who in contrast to their elders had, like himself, been educated in Western universities. It was the first attempt in Iraq at a new deal. The new Ministers entered on their task with a will. Cabinet meetings were held three times a week and lasted far into the night. The word "reform" was on all their lips. Unfortunately it never got much further.

As the detailed plans came to be formulated, the land-owners who constituted as always a solid and silent phalanx in Parliament became seriously disquieted. These young men were actually proposing that land should be taxed. They were even drafting laws for that purpose. It was no use their protesting that the tax would be a very small one. A principle was at stake. Nobody was more indignant or more contemptuous of the reformers than Nuri himself on whose goodwill the continued existence of Dr. Fadhil Jamali's Government rested. As the weeks passed it became more and more clear that Dr. Jamali could never get his reforms through the Parliament. The walls of the Ancient East were not going to crumble before a trumpet blast from the London School of Economics, at any rate when sounded on so apologetic a note. Dr. Jamali made one despairing effort by reshuffling his Cabinet, but all to no purpose. He had lost any authority he had ever possessed. Agitators were whipping up discontent in the colleges, the factories and the countryside. He was not the man to deal with such a situation, and in any case his attention was now distracted by the worst floods that have been known in Iraq in living memory. He saw eventually that he was beaten and resigned.

14. As a deadlock had been reached between Government and Parliament, it was now decided that new elections must be held. A caretaker Government was formed under Arshad al Umari to conduct them. The moment they were over and without even waiting for the new Parliament to meet, Arshad left the country and handed in his resignation. His short term of office had produced no improvement in the internal situation. Indeed, he had devoted most of his energies to wreaking vengeance on all who had ever opposed him in the course of his tempestuous career. Only one course now remained open to the Palace. For some time the Crown Prince had tried to carry on without Nuri and relations between the two had deteriorated. The Emir now had to eat humble pie and recall him to power from a sick bed. The old man who was in London recovering from a serious operation, defied his doctors and returned to Bagdad in the heat of the summer when he was duly appointed Prime Minister for the twelfth time. The internal situation was transformed overnight. The agitators went to earth. The new Parliament was dissolved after having met for a single day, and fresh elections were ordered.

Nuri was taking no chances and all but a handful of the new members were returned unopposed. The political parties were abolished, the opposition newspapers suppressed and draconian decrees issued to curb Communist and indeed any other objectionable activity.

15. It is too early to predict what the outcome will be. All that can be said is that far too much rests upon Nuri's shoulders. There is little doubt that without him at the helm the situation would again quickly deteriorate. Also he must have made many enemies, not only among the extremists who will never be content until they have swept away the whole régime, Crown and all, but also among those politicians whose parties he has abolished and whose services he will not use. Reform, too, has now been dangled before the people and it is questionable if it can be put indefinitely into cold storage. There is no sign that Nuri believes in reform. He believes rather in paternal government, the strong hand distributing gifts of welfare, which can be paid for not by taxing the rich but rather by extracting further revenues from the oil companies. I would not say dogmatically that this is *not* the right way to govern Iraq, but an essential element in it is the strong hand. There is no strong hand in sight but Nuri's and he is getting on in years. Turbulent days may therefore lie ahead and it would be foolish to expect that Iraq's future will be one of unruffled progress. It has indeed still to be proved whether the Iraqis have the moral qualities to make anything of the material gifts which Western enterprise has placed at their disposal.

16. It is unnecessary to relate in any detail the incursions of the various Iraqi Governments into foreign affairs during the past four years. Not that they have neglected foreign policy. On the contrary they are apt to give it far too much attention when they would do better to concentrate upon improving the internal conditions of the country. Nuri is never so happy as when he is journeying to some foreign capital and evolving some new plan of higher strategy. Dr. Jamali mounts the rostrum at the United Nations and imagines that his words command attention. The Crown Prince seems to look little beyond the interest of the Hashemite House, seeking at one moment to confirm its position in Jordan and at another to restore to it the Syrian throne which was once King Faisal I's. None of this activity has shewn

any appreciable result. Nevertheless it is tempting to search in it for some design, some thread of continuity.

17. It seems to me that there are certain innate urges—of emotion rather than reason and therefore all the more powerful—which no Iraqi politician, whatever his personal beliefs, can ignore. The first of these is the idea of Arab unity. I am well aware that this raises a cynical smile among many old Middle Easterners. Nor would I dispute that the famous Arab Awakening has turned out to be more like the beginning than the end of a nightmare. Nevertheless I believe that the conception of Arab unity is an emotion to be reckoned with. It seems to me a far more real thing, for example, than the conception of European unity of which so much is heard to-day. Though the Arabs live in a state of permanent friction, yet they usually support each other in any dispute between an Arab State and a Western Power. Attempts to detach Iraq from the Arab world have always failed hitherto.

18. One can see this groping for Arab unity in many aspects of Iraqi foreign policy. Obvious examples are the conception of the Fertile Crescent and the repeated complaint that the Western Powers for their own imperialist purposes carved up the natural unit of the Arab world into separate and artificial States. It is the sense of Arab unity that inspires the Iraqis to take the lead in pillorying the French over their North African policy and to cast longing eyes at Kuwait and Khuzistan. They were intriguing in Kuwait long before the oil was found there.

19. Another emotion of importance is the appeal of Islam. This, too, cannot be ignored despite the fact that Islam is losing its hold upon the more educated Iraqis. The average Iraqi feels himself a Moslem much more than the average Englishman feels himself a Christian. Islam is an undoubted factor in political life.

20. Then again the Iraqis feel themselves to be a part of the general oriental upsurge against the West. Though they owe everything they have—their freedom and their wealth—to the imperialists and have no shame in pocketing free gifts from the Americans in the shape of economic and military aid, nevertheless their emotions are all on the other side. They like to regard "imperialism" as the enemy of enemies, and by "imperialism" they mean the Western Powers. Their attitude is well illustrated at every meeting of the United

Nations when questions of trust and colonial territories come up for discussion.

21. These three emotions of Arabism, Islam and anti-imperialism meet in concentrated fanaticism on the question of Israel, which largely dominates Iraqi thinking on foreign affairs. The existence of the question flows from British policy during the first world war when we decided to support the creation in Palestine of a national home for the Jews. The fact that Palestine had for centuries been almost wholly inhabited by Arabs was not at the time regarded as a special inconvenience. We were indeed very free and easy in our plans for the disposal of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres provided, for example, for an enclave round Smyrna to be handed over to Greece. The plans for Anatolia came to nought owing to the determination of the Turks led by Mustafa Kemal to resist them by force. But there was no grey wolf in the Arab world, which was at the time in any case completely dominated by the Western Powers. So the Jewish national home was duly set up and in course of time developed into an independent Jewish State, from which the great majority of the native Arabs were excluded. This result was, I believe, inevitable whether or no the United States Government had intervened so forcibly to bring it about. The story has left a bitterness in the Arab world which it has proved quite impossible to exorcize.

22. The Iraqis are not neighbours of Israel nor are they burdened with more than a few thousand Arab refugees. Nevertheless their feelings on the question are no less acute than those of Israel's neighbours. They have bundled all but a few thousand of their local Jewish population out of the country, in every crisis they have always taken the most intransigent line, and the Palestine question still remains a festering sore in Iraqi relations with the West. The Iraqis share the general Arab belief that throughout they have been duped and tricked by the Western Powers owing to Jewish influence above all, though far from exclusively, in the United States. All our efforts to make them see reason have fallen therefore on deaf ears. Frankly, they do not trust us. In any case they are not very reasonable people. We are now, I understand, considering the possibility of making a new effort to solve the problem. On past form the Iraqis are unlikely to be helpful.

23. It is these same emotions that make it so difficult to establish any effective

system of defence for the Middle East. Iraqis in positions of responsibility readily recognise the Soviet menace and admit that neutrality is no answer and again that Iraq cannot possibly meet the danger either alone or in combination with other eastern States. They realise that their only hope of safety lies in close defensive arrangements with the Western Powers, and above all with Great Britain. But to put such reasoning into practice is a very different matter. The Iraqis may have grumbled when the Egyptian Government rejected the Western proposals for a Middle East Defence Organisation without troubling to consult them; but they took the matter no further and the scheme was eventually dropped. Similarly they have toyed with the idea of acceding to the Turkish-Pakistani Pact, which would at least bring nearer some plan of co-operation with Turkey, but they have not yet felt able to face the opposition it would arouse. Then they never tire of proclaiming that the Anglo-Iraqi treaty is out of date and will be neither renewed nor replaced by a new bilateral agreement. No Iraqi is more convinced than Nuri of the vital necessity of close co-operation with Great Britain. Yet to-day, though he has scattered all his opponents, packed Parliament in the most shameless elections ever held even in Iraq, and suppressed all but a few newspapers, he dare not come out with proposals for a new straight agreement with ourselves. He has to go searching round for a camouflage so that any defence arrangement with Great Britain can be represented as merely an incidental part of an agreement with other oriental States. So time runs on and Iraq and the Middle East remain a dangerous gap in the defence system of the Western world.

24. Meanwhile a ceaseless battle is being waged between the Communist and the Western Powers for the soul of the oriental world. In the Middle East Iraq holds something of a key position, and it would be a major triumph for the Soviet bloc if it could detach her from the allegiance to the West which is still maintained partly by force of habit and partly by the Anglo-Iraqi treaty and American aid. The Soviet Government has so far shown no sign of trying to force the pace. The Soviet Legation, for example, has throughout my time been in charge of a chargé d'affaires and has never shown great activity except recently in commercial matters. At the same time, despite the banning of the

Communist party sympathy with communism has undoubtedly been capturing the urban population of Iraq and even infected the religious centres and spread into the country districts, particularly in Kurdistan. It is fed from many sources—the traditional resistance to Western imperialism, chronic indignation at the corruption and selfishness of the ruling classes, the hard living conditions of the poor, the lack of opportunity for the young men who pour out of the colleges year by year, and lastly the ideological gap left by the lessening influence of Islam. As a result, though there are few Communists in the strict sense of the word, the mass of the intelligentsia at least give a ready ear to Communist propaganda. Much of the press, till Nuri suppressed it this year, echoed the Communist line on international subjects. The various Iraqi Governments which have held office during the last four years have been aware of the danger. Some have shrugged their shoulders and not even attempted to tackle it. Dr. Jamali vainly believed that he could exorcise it by reforms and patriotic appeals. Nuri takes the opposite line and believes that strong government is the answer. So it may be so long as the government remains strong. But when he is not Prime Minister, the government is weak. The most disturbing feature of my period of service here has been the steady growth of Communist sentiment from the time that Nuri relinquished the premiership in the summer of 1952 till he resumed power a couple of years later. It could not fail to remind one of the irresistible attraction that Nazi Germany had for the Iraqis as her strength developed.

25. The reply of the Western Powers is hampered by three factors, the ingrained suspicion of "imperialism," anger at the creation of Israel which is regarded as its worst manifestation, and the internecine rivalries of the Western Powers. The first two factors paralyse our propaganda among the townsfolk.

26. Neither we nor the Americans are inactive. The pity is that we find it so difficult to pull together. The intervention of the Truman administration in the Palestine problem had the natural result of reducing American popularity in the Arab States to zero. When the Republicans took office, they felt it essential to remedy this state of affairs, which was dangerous not only to the particular interests of the United States but to the whole Western position in

the cold war. They seem to have become convinced that the British were outdated in their whole approach to the Middle East and that it was time for the New World to intervene. Nor did American business feel disposed to leave what might prove a highly profitable field to British enterprise.

27. In Iraq American intervention has been remarkable. Its first manifestation was through economic aid. Large numbers of American advisers, paid by the United States Government, were offered and accepted in every field. Scholarships were offered in American universities to large numbers of Iraqi students, and Iraqis in all walks of life were given free visits to the United States. The American member of the Development Board, backed by Point IV experts and a go-getting firm of consultants, showed such enterprise and activity that American influence is now predominant in the board. All this was later followed by an offer of military aid free of cost or political "strings" which was readily accepted.

28. When such matters are discussed in Washington or London it is not difficult to find formulas laying down general principles of co-operation and agreeing that the efforts of the two countries should be complementary and worked out according to a joint plan. The difficulty arises when it comes to putting these admirable principles into practice. No Englishman living in Iraq can remain unmoved as he sees a horde of highly paid American experts sweeping into a country whose traditional ties are with ourselves and hears them denigrating all that Britain has done here in the past and is attempting to do at the present. It would be wrong to conceal the fact that there is much bitterness and alarm in the local British community. They have no belief in American altruism, and see in Point IV merely a design to capture markets. There is also a big question mark as to the significance of American military aid. Is it really meant to be complementary to British activity in the same field, or is the aim to push us out of the field altogether or at least reduce us to a minor rôle? If that is in fact the aim, we believe that on military grounds alone it would be a major error.

29. It is not easy to find a clear answer to the problem. There is, I think, no doubt that—our relative positions in the world being what they now are—we must accept, and accept with a good grace, an increase of American influence in this part of the

world. On the social and economic side we and the Americans have a common interest in raising the standards in this backward country. We should clearly welcome any American successes in this field rather than adopt a dog-in-the-manger attitude. Similarly, there is a common interest in raising Iraq's capacity to play her full part in the defence of the Middle East. At the same time we can legitimately do our best to defend our own position, which could so easily be undermined if a country of America's abounding energy and wealth entered the field in competition with us. We can also feel legitimate doubts as to whether the Americans are going about matters in the right way. If they were wittingly or unwittingly to destroy our traditional hold in Iraq, could they take our place? It seems very doubtful. The Iraqis, while dazzled by American wealth, do not take very kindly to American manners and methods, and they resent the American record in Palestine even more than our own. It is money from America that enables Israel to survive. Again, there is nothing stable about American aid. It can be stopped by Congress from year to year. The United States Government, too, have always been careful to accept no responsibility in Iraq. There is therefore a serious danger that the Americans may end by destroying the British bulwark and leaving nothing but a vacuum for communism to fill. The whole question bristles with difficulties. We have given the United States Government every encouragement to shoulder their responsibilities as the dominant Western Power and play a major rôle in the Middle East. Where they have done so, the result has not always been fortunate, whether in Palestine, Persia, Saudi Arabia or Egypt. One can only hope that in Iraq things may go better. Nothing is of greater importance, especially to-day when it is one of the obvious aims of Soviet policy to drive a wedge between the United States and ourselves.

30. I come finally to our own position, and here I find myself in difficulty, for nothing is so perplexing as the contrast between the apparently genuine warmth which one meets in all individual contacts and the unending flow of venom which pours out from the Iraqi press, or at least did pour out until Nuri closed down most of the papers a short time ago. The answer perhaps is that the Iraqis cannot get Britain out of their system. They will remember individual Englishmen who have served here with the keenest affection and esteem.

They seem to feel at home in British company. I myself have met with nothing but courtesy and kindness from all the Iraqis I have known, both in Bagdad and throughout the country. In the country districts an Englishman can always be sure of a welcome from every class. The upper classes for their part appear to derive comfort from the belief that no matter what they do or leave undone, Britain will always see them through. Iraqi officials can at times show remarkable friendship and understanding. Nothing, for example, was too much trouble for the local authorities in Basra when the staff of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was being evacuated from Abadan.

31. It is right, too, to emphasise that we still enjoy many advantages. In times of trouble it is to us that the Iraq Government will instinctively turn for guidance and help. While the King will not enter the gates of this embassy for fear of creating a precedent, nevertheless the Royal Family has closer ties with the United Kingdom than it has with any other country save possibly Jordan. The senior officers in the armed forces have mostly been trained in British institutions and have a keen respect for British ways. English is the predominant foreign language, even though it is badly taught. There are many British officials still working in the country, for example, in the Port of Basra, in the railways, in academic positions. Though Iraqi oil is shared with Americans, French and others, the operating company is British, as also are most of the company's non-Iraqi employees. The British commercial community is by far the strongest and most solidly established. Exports to Iraq from the United Kingdom far exceed those from any other country. Great numbers of Iraqi students go to the United Kingdom for their training and education. Looked at through foreign eyes the ramifications of British influence in Iraq must be imposing indeed.

32. At the same time there is an instinctive revolt against what is felt to be Iraq's continuing dependence upon Great Britain. There is hardly an Iraqi who is not firmly convinced that no decision is taken by his Government, even down to the appointment of an official, without the approval of Her Majesty's Ambassador. This is keenly resented, though it does not prevent candidates at elections from coming to the embassy to enlist our support. Another source of resentment is the

continued presence of our forces on Iraqi soil. Iraqis do not feel that they are yet properly independent and the Syrians and others are constantly there to remind them of their dependence if they appear likely to behave in an independent fashion. This they blame on the British. The argument that we ourselves have American bases on British soil carries no conviction. That, the Iraqis argue, is an equal partnership: this is not. It does not seem to have occurred to them how much our position has, in fact, weakened in recent years. For a time we did control Iraq. That control has long passed away. Later we were the only foreign power that counted. Now we have rivals. In the spiritual field there is the lure of communism. In the economic field we have fierce competitors, particularly the Americans and the Germans and also the French. In the political and military fields the American attitude is not wholly reassuring. If one looks ahead it may too not be fantastic to see other Powers which will one day seek to dominate Iraq politically. There is Turkey. There is also India, whose representatives here are almost embarrassingly active.

33. It is clear that we shall need all our resources and energy to maintain our position. British firms must be on their toes to capture contracts and markets and not be daunted by the inevitable frustrations. That this is realised now at

home is shown by the visit of the trade mission last year and by the trade fair which has just been held with such success in Bagdad. We must try to persuade the Iraq Government to employ British advisers and see that those who come here are of the highest quality. The engagement of Lord Salter to advise the Development Board was of good augury here. Since then a British official has been sent out to advise on the reorganisation of the police, and we are hoping to provide more military advisers. We must be quick to supply the military equipment that the Iraqis wish to have and ensure that it is up to standard. We must find some workable arrangement which, without outraging Iraqi susceptibilities, will enable us to give effective support to Iraq in the event of war. We must not allow a false economy to hamstring the efforts of the British Council. In fact, in every sphere a major effort is called for. Our prestige still stands high. Even though we cannot hope to restore our former exclusive position in Iraq, there should be a great future for us. I only trust that we shall be able to work it out in harmony with our American allies.

34. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

VQ 1011/1

No. 27

PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN IRAQ DURING 1954

Mr. Hooper to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received January 3, 1955)

(No. 261. Restricted)

Bagdad,

December 30, 1954.

Sir,
In accordance with the Marquess of Salisbury's circular despatch No. 078 (L 6/6) of the 9th of September, 1953, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a summary of events of importance in Iraq during the year 1954.

2. In his despatch No. 245 (1012/105/54) of the 9th of December (copied only to the British Middle East Office), Sir John Troutbeck submitted a comprehensive review of general developments in this country during the period of his mission. Any political review which I might now submit would only be a repetition of that despatch and in accordance with the instructions from his Excellency referred to in his letter to Mr. Shuckburgh of the 10th of December, I am sending a chronological record only.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Tehran and Ankara, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Head of the British Middle East Office, Her Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra, Kirkuk and Mosul, and the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq.

I have, &c.

R. W. J. HOOPER.

Enclosure

PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN IRAQ DURING 1954

January

- 7 Iraqi Prime Minister (Dr. Jamali) leaves Bagdad for Arab League Security Meeting in Cairo with draft on Arab Federation.
- 7 Ministers of Economics and Social Affairs resign on issue of martial law in Basra.
- 8 Annual meeting of Popular Socialist Party who demand fresh elections.
- 9 Visit of British M.P.s under the aegis of Mr. Bustani.
- 28 Martial law lifted in Basra.

February

- 10 Contract for Dokan Dam awarded to French firm.
- (about) 26 (Anglo-United States Memorandum of Understanding on United States military aid signed in Washington.)
- 28 Arrival of King Hussein of Jordan (departing March 6).

March

- 2 King Faisal opens Basra Industrial Fair.
- 8 Dr. Jamali forms his second Government.
- 12 King Faisal leaves for state visit to Pakistan.
- 13 Iraqi Parliament adjourned for 30 days to enable the Minister of Finance to work on a budget.
- 13 Nuri Pasha al Said's visit to Pakistan and India (returning April 1).
- 20 Lord Salter takes up his appointment as adviser with the Iraq Development Board.
- 25 Flooding in southern and central Iraq (until about April 15).
- 25 Arab League Meeting cancelled.

April

- 2 (Turkish-Pakistani Pact signed.)
- 2 and 3 Royal Air Force air lift to Bagdad for relief of flood victims. Loss of one Valetta aircraft.
- 15 Resignation of Minister of Development (Abdul Karim al Uzri) accepted.
- 19 Reassembly of Parliament.
- 21 Prime Minister (Dr. Jamali) submits his resignation.
- 21 Letters exchanged between Iraq Government and United States Embassy accepting United States military aid.
- 29 Dr. Jamali's resignation accepted. Arshad al Umari appointed Prime Minister.
- 29 13th Parliament dissolved.

May

- 12 National Front Pact embracing National Democratic Party, Independence Party, Peace Partisans and "fellow travellers."
- 13 Arrival of preliminary United States mission in connection with military aid (General Meyers).
- 21 Frontier incident on Iraqi-Kuwait border. One Iraqi killed and 2 taken prisoner.
- 22 Termination of contract of the last British Director-General of an Iraqi Government Department (Mr. F. S. Hardy—Director-General of Irrigation).

June

- 9 Elections for 14th Parliament.
- 14 Minister of Interior (Said Qazzaz) resigns and is replaced by Fakhri Tabaqchali.
- 16 Minister of Agriculture resigns.
- 20 Demonstrations in Bagdad and police open fire.
- 20 Iraqi Chief of the General Staff leaves on visit to United States (returning by way of United Kingdom and Germany).
- 21 Ratification of Iraqi-Jordan Trade Agreement.

July

- 12-15 (Crown Prince sees Nuri Pasha in Paris.)
- 18 Crown Prince returns to Bagdad.
- 26 14th Parliament meets and is prorogued to November 30.
- 27 Demonstrations in Hillah and Sulaimania.

August

- 3 Arshad al Umari resigns. Nuri al Said appointed Prime Minister.
- 3 14th Parliament dissolved.
- 4 Prime Minister publishes letter to King Faisal on policy of his Government including firm suppression of Communism and termination of Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.
- 15 Visit of Major Salah Salem.
- 17 Popular Socialist Party dissolved by its Vice-President (Taufiq Wahbi).
- 21 President of Popular Socialist Party (Salih Jabr) returns and expels members responsible for the dissolution of party.
- 23 United Popular Front Party voluntarily suspends activity.
- 28 Visit of Lebanese Prime Minister.
- 30 18 newspapers suspended.

September

- 1 Publication of Ordinances 16, 17, and 18 of October 22 amending, respectively, the Bagdad Penal Code to include "fellow travellers," authorising the Ministry of the Interior to withdraw Iraqi nationality from Communists and authorising the Ministry to close down political parties and other societies departing from their terms of reference or provoking disorder.
- 2 Licence of National Democratic Party withdrawn and suspension of its newspaper *Saut al Ahali*.
- 12 Elections to the 15th Parliament.
- 13 Demonstrations in Sulaimania.

September
(contd.)

- 14 Prime Minister visits Egypt.
- 16 15th Parliament meets.
- 16 Resignation of 2 Bagdad deputies.
- 20 (Iraqi Prime Minister leaves Egypt for United Kingdom.)
- 22 Ordinance 19 (dated August 29) issued suspending all political parties and other societies and laying down rules for the formation of associations.

October

- 1 Independence Party announces that it will not apply for a licence to resume activity.
- 7 National Democratic Party applies for a licence to resume activity under Ordinance 19.
- 13 (Prime Minister proceeds from United Kingdom to Turkey for conference with the Turkish Prime Minister.)
- (about) 19 Iraqi Prime Minister returns to Bagdad.
- 25 British Trade Fair opened in Bagdad by King Faisal. (Closure November 8.)
- 25 National Democratic Party refused licence on the grounds of misleading public opinion.
- 26 Ahmad Mukhtar Baban appointed Deputy Prime Minister.
- 26 Anglo-Iraqi Economic talks (end October 30).
- 28 Meeting of Mutasarrifs in Bagdad for instruction concerning education and welfare by Prime Minister.

November

- 5 Iraqi army autumn manoeuvres.
- 6 Visit of Royal Air Force Canberras on Middle East training flight.
- 6 Publication of Ordinance 22 amending Reserve Service Law to allow for the call-up or dismissal of officials and students.
- 16 Ordinance No. 24 on the Press compelling all newspapers to re-register.
- 16 Ordinance No. 25 on public meetings and demonstrations.
- 16 Visit of Turkish professional delegation. (Delegation left on November 30.)
- 19 Visit of King Faisal to Jordan and the Lebanon.
- 22-24 Visit of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
- 27 First call-up of 120 dismissed officials and students under Ordinance 22.

December

- 1 15th Parliament meets in ordinary session.
- 8 Iraqi Government turn back 3 Burmese Spitfires purchased from Israel.
- 9 (Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement in Cairo that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty should be allowed to expire and would be replaced by an agreement on the Anglo-Egyptian model.)
- 15 Iraqi Prime Minister's statement in the Chamber that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty would be terminated before its expiry.
- 17 Ordinance No. 24 on the Press becomes effective. Only 6 Arabic-language newspapers permitted in Bagdad.
- 18 Her Majesty's Ambassador leaves.
- 18 Indian Trade Mission arrives.
- 19 First shipment of American Military Aid arrives at Basra.
- 25 Council of Ministers rejects appeal of National Democratic Party against suppression by Minister of the Interior.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

No. 28

VQ 1012/1

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN IRAQ

Mr. Hooper to Mr. Eden. (Received July 19)

(No. 148. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
July 7, 1954.
 Sir,

With reference to Sir John Troutbeck's
 despatch No. 123 of July 7, 1953, I have the
 honour to transmit to you herewith a report
 on leading personalities in Iraq in July 1954.
 I have, &c.

R. W. J. HOOPER.

Enclosure

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Leading Personalities in Iraq

ROYAL FAMILY

1. King Faisal II.
2. Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir.
3. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir.
4. Hussein Nasir.

OTHER PERSONALITIES

1. Abbas Ali Ghalib.
2. Abbas Mahdi.
3. Abdul Amir Allawi, Dr.
4. Abdul Amir al Uzri.
5. Abdul Ghani al Dalli.
6. Abdul Hadi Chalabi.
7. Abdul Hadi Dhahir.
8. Abdul Hadi Pachachi, Dr.
9. Abdul Ilah Hafidh.
10. Abdul Jabbar al-Chelabi.
11. Abdul Jabbar Fahmi.
12. Abdul Jabbar Jommard, Dr.
13. Abdul Karim al Uzri.
14. Abdul Mahdi (Sayid).
15. Abdul Majid Abbas.
16. Abdul Majid Allawi, C.B.E.
17. Abdul Majid Mahmud.
18. Abdul Majid Qassab.
19. Abdul Mutalib Amin al Hashimi.
20. Abdul Qadir Gailani.
21. Abdul Rahman Jaudat.
22. Abdul Rasul al Khalisi.
23. Abdul Razzaq al Dhahir.
24. Abdul Wahhab Mahmud.
25. Abdul Wahhab Murjan.
26. Abdullah Bakr.
27. Abdullah Damluji.
28. Abdullah Qassab.
29. Ahmad al Ajil.
30. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.
31. Ahmad al Rawi, K.B.E.
32. Akram Mushtaq.
33. Ali Haidar Sulaiman.
34. Ali Jawdat al'Ayyubi.
35. Ali Khalid al Hejazi, C.B.E.

36. Ali Mahmud Sheikh Ali.
37. Ali Muntaz al Daftari.
38. Ali al Saffi, Dr.
39. Ali al Sharqi.
40. Arkan Abadi.
41. Arshed al Umari, K.B.E.
42. Ata Amin.
43. Baba Ali Sheikh Mahmud.
44. Baba ud Din Nuri.
45. Darwish al Haidari.
46. Daud al Haidari.
47. Dhia Ja'far.
48. Faiq Samarra'i.
49. Fakhri Jamel al Fakhri.
50. Fakhri Tabaqchali.
51. Ghazi Muhammad Fadhil Daghestani, C.V.O.
52. Hashim Jawad.
53. Hussain Makki Khammas.
54. Hassan Sami Tatar.
55. Hassan al Talabani.
56. Hassib al Rubaii.
57. Hikmat Sulaiman.
58. Husamuddin Jumaa.
59. Hussain Jamil.
60. Ibrahim Akif al Alusi.
61. Ismail Safwat.
62. Jalal Baban.
63. Jamal Baban.
64. Jamal Umar Nadhmi.
65. Jamil Abdul Wahhab.
66. Jamil Madfai.
67. Jamil al Urfali.
68. Kamil Chadirchi.
69. Khalil Ismail.
70. Khalil Kanna.
71. Mahmud I Sheikh Said: Sheikh.
72. Majid Mustafa.
73. Mar Shimon.
74. Mudhafar Ahmad.
75. Muhammad Ali Chelabi.
76. Muhammad Ali Mahmud.
77. Muhammad Fadhil Jamali.
78. Muhammad Hassan Kubba.
79. Muhammad Hassan Salman, Dr.
80. Muhammad Hussain Hadid.
81. Muhammad Hussain al Kashif al Ghita.
82. Muhammad Mahdi al Jawahiri.
83. Muhammad Mahdi Kubba.
84. Muhammad Ridha Shabibi.
85. Muhammad Said Qazzaz.
86. Muhammad al Sadr (Sayid).
87. Muhammad Shafiq al'Ani.
88. Muhammad Siddiq Shenshal.
89. Muhammad Salim al Radhi.
90. Mulla Mustafa.
91. Musa Shabandar.
92. Mustafa al Umari.
93. Muzahim Amin al Pachachi.
94. Nadhif Shawi.
95. Nadim Shakir al Pachachi.
96. Naji al Asil, Dr.
97. Naji Shaukat.

98. Najib al Rawi.
99. Najib al Rubaii.
100. Nasrat al Farisi.
101. Nuri al Qadhi.
102. Nuri Sa'id.
103. Nuruddin Mahmud.
104. Rafail Petros Butti.
105. Rafiq 'Arif al Qaimaqchi, M.A., D.S.O.
106. Rashid Ali al Gailani.
107. Rauf al Bahrani.
108. Rauf al Chadirchi.
109. Rayih al Atiyah, Hajj.
110. Sa'ad Umar.
111. Sadiq al Bassam.
112. Saleh Haidar.
113. Saleh Jabr, K.B.E.
114. Saleh Saib al Jobburi.
115. Saleh Zakki Tawfiq.
116. Sami Fattah.
117. Sami Shawkat.
118. Shakir Maher.
119. Shakir al Wadi, M.V.O.
120. Shawkat al Zahawi, Dr.
121. Taha al Hashemi.
122. Tahsin Qadri, K.C.V.O.
123. Tariq al Askari.
124. Tawfiq al Mukhtar.
125. Tawfiq al Naib.
126. Tawfiq Suweidi.
127. Tawfiq Wahbi Ma'ruf, C.B.E.
128. Umar Nadhmi.
129. Yahya Qassim.
130. Yusuf Abdullah al Gailani (Saiyid).
131. Wajih Yunis.

Leading Personalities in Iraq

The Royal Family

1. King Faisal II

Born in Bagdad on 2nd May, 1935, the son of King Ghazi and a sister of the Amir Abdul Ilah. He succeeded to the throne on the death of his father on 3rd April, 1939.

During the Rashid Ali rebellion in May 1941 he and his mother were at first confined at Qasr Zuhur on the outskirts of Bagdad but were removed to the summer palace at Pir Mum just before the collapse and flight of the rebel Government.

The King spent his summer holidays in Egypt in 1943 and 1944 and in England in 1946, where he attended the Victory Celebrations and was the guest of the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace.

His early education was directed by an English governess who was succeeded by an English tutor in 1946. In 1947 he went to Sandroyd Preparatory School and entered Harrow, his father's old school, in May 1949. He spent the summer holidays of 1948 and the Easter holidays of 1950 in Iraq. In 1950 he was given a notably warm welcome by the people and the opportunity was taken for him to visit a number of important provincial centres. He came to Iraq in the autumn of 1950 with his mother and returned to Harrow seven weeks after her death in December 1950.

The King did not return to Iraq again until December 1951, when he spent the winter holidays in Bagdad. He suffered most of the time from asthma, to which he has a tendency, and was unable to take part in public life. Returned to Harrow for the Easter term 1952. Visited the United States in August 1952. Returned to Iraq in October 1952. Visited Kuwait in April 1953 and acceded to the Throne in May 1953. Appointed a G.C.V.O. in 1952.

He is intelligent and well-mannered and is very popular in Iraq. His health appears to be improving, though his popularity has declined somewhat since the unreasonably high hopes which accompanied his accession have not been realised. Politically he is still very much in the hands of his uncle, the Crown Prince.

2. Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir

Born in the Hejaz in 1912, the only son of the late King Ali, ex-King of the Hejaz. He came to Bagdad with his father in 1926 after Ibn Saud had expelled the latter from the Hejaz. He was educated privately and at Victoria College, Alexandria. He became Regent on the death of his cousin King Ghazi in April 1939 and remained Regent until the Accession of King Faisal II in May 1953.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941 which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he endeavoured to resist the Prime Minister's demands for the appointment of new Ministers, but fled to Diwaniyah to escape the threats to his life made by four army officers Salah-ud-din Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Fahm Said and Mahmud Salman. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Amir then returned to the capital.

During the night of 1st April the four army officers already mentioned occupied Bagdad with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Amir was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled to Habbaniya on 2nd April and flown to Basra. On instructions from Bagdad, the Officer Commanding, Iraq Army, at Basra attempted to arrest the Amir, who took refuge on board one of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of rallying support for his cause in the south had been lost. On 16th April he was flown to Jerusalem, together with Ali Jaudat and Jamil Madfai, who had meanwhile joined him at Basra. During the hostilities in May, the Amir remained in Palestine. He returned to Bagdad on 1st June, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's regime and was welcomed by a large gathering of officials, notables and well-wishers.

In November 1943 he was declared Heir to the Throne under the provisions of an amendment to the Organic Law passed in October.

In December 1943 he paid an extensive visit to the United Kingdom at the invitation of His Majesty's Government. For three days he was a guest of Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. During 1944 the Amir toured extensively within the country and paid particular attention to the army manoeuvres which he constantly attended. In June he visited Alexandria, returning early in July, and in September he again visited Transjordan and Egypt. He paid a second brief visit to Transjordan in February 1945.

In May 1945 he left on an official visit to the United States, returning via Canada and Great Britain. In London he was twice received by the King, met the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and attended the Victory Thanksgiving Service. He also visited the occupied area of Germany. He returned via France and Italy, whence he proceeded on an official visit to the President of the Turkish Republic before returning to Iraq in September.

The Amir visited London in the summer of both 1946 and 1947. In 1946 he attended the Victory Celebrations on 8th June, and in 1947 he paid official visits to France and Belgium as well as to London. He and Nuri Pasha held informal discussions with the Foreign Office in September 1947 about the Iraq Government's desire to replace the 1930 Treaty. He was therefore to some extent committed personally

to the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty and was placed in a difficult position by the demonstrations against it in Bagdad in January 1948. He did not extricate himself from this position with undiminished credit.

In 1948 he took a personal part in the unsuccessful attempts to unify the war effort of the Arab States against Israel and paid a number of visits to the Iraq Army in Palestine. He paid a State Visit to the Shah of Persia in June 1949 and visited England later in the summer.

He again visited England in the summer of 1950 when his sister became seriously ill and had to enter hospital. He returned to England in the autumn to arrange for the Queen Mother's journey to Iraq. In the last few months of the year he was preoccupied with his sister's declining health. Shortly before her death he flew with his mother and sisters to the Hejaz where they visited Mecca. He returned to Iraq the same day. He accompanied the King to England in February 1951 and returned after six weeks. He again left the country at the end of May for a short visit to Amman. Left for London in July 1951 and returned to Iraq in September. While in London he had been examined for suspected appendicitis, and a successful operation was performed in London in November 1951, the Amir returning to Bagdad in December. He paid an official visit to Kuwait in March 1952, and an unofficial one to Bahrain in April. In May he paid an official visit to Spain and returned to Iraq towards the end of the month. He visited Amman for a few days in June in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Jordan Government to accept a Hashimite as member of the Jordan Council of State. He returned to Bagdad angry and disillusioned. Between July and October 1952 he visited the United Kingdom and the United States with King Faisal. Visited Kuwait with the King in April 1953. Head of the Iraqi Delegation to the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth, June 1953.

The Amir is an intelligent man with an excellent memory. He has a shy charm of manner and his natural judgment is good. But his will is abnormally weak and he can seldom withstand either his own passions or the pressure of others. He has tried to take his duties seriously and has been genuinely anxious to hand over the monarchy unimpaired in strength and reputation to his nephew the King, but he is easily discouraged or intimidated. He is much influenced by his mother. His intense pride in the Hashimite Royal House and his concern to maintain its unity and prestige explain his deep anxiety over events in Jordan since the death of King Abdullah and provide the motive for his well-intentioned but generally ill-timed interventions in Amman since King Talal's illness precipitated the crisis in Jordan.

He is basically uninterested in affairs of State and does not identify himself with the progress and aspirations of his people, whose interests he seems to regard as distinct from those of the Royal Family. He feels more at home with Englishmen than with Iraqis and his recreations are those of the English. He maintains a large racing stable, supports a pack of hounds and breeds pheasants and spaniels. He is irresponsibly extravagant, and in 1945 spent over \$200,000 in the United States on jewellery. He is also believed to have invested heavily, at the cost of grave indebtedness, in speculative industrial enterprises in Bagdad.

His Regency was a troubled one and he has twice been forced to flee from Bagdad. These experiences impelled him to make a real effort to obtain the personal loyalty of the Army, in which he had some limited success. But these experiences also implanted in him a deep distrust of his people and a determination to keep in his own hands as

much power and patronage as possible. His fears caused him to interfere in details of Government policy and administration, particularly in the appointments of officials and the choice of Government candidates for Parliament. He would never allow a Prime Minister a completely free hand in the selection of his Ministers. At the same time his indulgence made him neglect the higher direction of policy. He seldom read State papers unless they had direct connexion with the position of the Hashimite House. None the less he kept Iraq on a steady course for fourteen years while tumultuous events were taking place elsewhere.

He has twice been married. First in 1936 to the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg of Cairo, whom he divorced in 1940, and secondly to another Egyptian lady Mile. Faiza Tarabulsi in November 1948, whom he divorced in 1950. Stories about his dissipations circulate. He speaks very good English.

He was made an Honorary Air Vice-Marshal in the Royal Air Force in 1952, was appointed Honorary G.C.M.G. in 1942 and Honorary G.C.V.O., with the award of the Royal Victorian Collar in 1943.

3. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir

Born at Istanbul 1900, he is the youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz and a half brother to the late Kings Ali of Hejaz and Faisal I of Iraq, and to King Abdullah of Jordan. His mother was a Turk.

He was educated at Istanbul. He served with the Sharifian forces during the first world war and won the good opinion of British officers. He was appointed an Honorary G.B.E. for his services.

He came to Iraq in 1922 and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. He acted as Regent for a short time during King Faisal's absence in 1924. From 1925 to 1928 he studied agriculture at Oxford and from 1928 to 1931 he lived in Cyprus where his father had retired after being driven from the Hejaz by Ibn Saud.

After the death of King Hussein in 1931 the Amir Zaid was appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in January 1932. He was transferred to Cairo in 1934, owing to the scandal caused by the marriage of his sister to Atta Amin (q.v.), but he refused to accept this appointment. At the end of 1934 he was engaged in litigation in Athens about properties which he claimed to have inherited in Greece. He was appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In 1937 he was recalled for enquiries into allegations that he had used his position to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He survived the enquiry and returned to Berlin. He was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and remained in Iraq until the summer of 1939 when he went to live at Istanbul.

In 1933 he had married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her previous husband. This *mesalliance* was the main reason for his not being made Regent on the death of King Ghazi in 1939.

He came to Bagdad in October 1941 to meet the Amir Abdullah who paid a state visit to Iraq in that year. In June 1942 he returned to Turkey, which remained his home until he was appointed the first Iraqi Ambassador in London in 1946.

In 1943, 1945, 1946, 1949, 1950 and 1951 he came to Iraq to act as Regent during the absences of the Amir Abdul Ilah.

The Amir Zaid is a friendly and well-mannered man. He is a shrewd observer who takes a detached and cynical view of Iraqi and Arab politics. Although he is lazy, dislikes responsibility, and is a heavy drinker, he would probably have made a more successful Regent than his cousin Abdul Ilah. He speaks English and Turkish in addition to Arabic. His wife has had some success as an artist, having held exhibitions of her paintings in London and in Paris, but she is seldom seen in Iraq.

4. Hussein Nasir

A cousin of the King and of the Regent, with the style of "Highness."

He was educated in Istanbul during the 1914-18 war. From 1935 to 1938 he was attached to the Iraqi Legation at Ankara and later held an appointment in the Royal Palace at Baghdad. Iraqi Consul in Jerusalem from 1946 to 1948.

He is married to a daughter of King Abdullah of Jordan, whose service he entered in 1948. He was appointed Jordan Minister at Ankara in December 1948.

A good humoured, genial and friendly man without much ability or personality.

Other Personalities

1. Abbas Ali Ghalib

Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Bagdad in 1908. Father was a Captain in the Turkish army before 1914. Brother, Hassan Ali Ghalib, is now Director, Royal Artillery. Abbas Ali Ghalib was a cadet at the Royal Military College, Bagdad, and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. After graduating, became a Royal Artillery Officer. He passed the Staff Colleges of Bagdad and Quetta. Was Senior Iraqi Liaison Officer in Palestine in 1948. Has been Director of General Staff, Ministry of Defence. Now, a Brigadier, commands the 1st Division.

A very capable and ambitious Staff Officer, has a pleasant manner, and speaks English well. Sympathetically inclined to the West and was a supporter of the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty. Accompanied the Chief of General Staff to the United States in 1954 after the Iraqi acceptance of American aid.

2. Abbas Mahdi

Shia. Born 1898. Served in the Head Post Office, the Iraqi Legation at Tehran and the Ministry of Education. Minister of Education 1932-33. Minister of Economics and Communications in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in 1934. Director-General of Tapu 1934. Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1937. Minister of Economics and Communications 1937-38, in the Cabinets of Hikmat Sulaiman and Jamil Madfai. Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Minister at Tehran 1943-45. Appointed first Iraqi Minister in Moscow in 1945. Was made senator in 1949, after his final return from Moscow. He played a prominent part in opposing the policy of Nuri Said's Government in the Senate in 1951 and again in 1952.

3. Abdul Amir Allawi, Dr.

Shia. Born 1911. Graduate of the Bagdad Medical College and was for many years at Great Ormond Street Children's Hospital. Entered the Medical Service of the Iraq Government in 1933 and was appointed Director of the Child Welfare Hospital in 1947. Has taken no part in political controversy, but was Minister of Health in September 1953. A close friend of Sayid Abdul Mahdi (q.v.). Married to a daughter of Abdul Hadi Chelabi (q.v.). Speaks good English.

4. Abdul Amir al Uzri

Born 1899 at Kadhimain of the well-known Shia landowning family. Brother of Abdul Karim al Uzri (q.v.). Educated Bagdad and United States. D.Sc. Michigan University. Appointed engineer in Directorate-General of Irrigation 1929 and rose to Assistant Director-General in 1941.

Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet of 1944. Minister of Supply for a

month in August 1944 and then returned to Communications and Works. Appointed Director-General of Irrigation 1946. He resigned this post in November 1950 on being appointed a member of the Development Board. Resigned from the Board in December 1952.

A rather weak personality, incompetent, unreliable, and said to be corrupt.

5. Abdul Ghani al Daffi

Shia of Suq al Shuyukh. Born about 1920. Educated at Naseriyah, Bagdad Law College and the London School of Economics (1945). Became a teacher at the Bagdad Law College in 1946 and in the same year was appointed by Saleh Jabr Assistant Master of Royal Ceremonies in the Palace. Became director-general of the Industrial Bank in September 1947, in which post he has shown himself to be a competent official. Assistant Director-General of Finance, September 1952. Visited Canada with Darwish al Haidari to buy wheat for the Iraq Government in the winter of 1952. Elected Deputy for Suq al Shuyukh, January 1953. In September 1953 was appointed Minister of Agriculture in Dr. Jamali's Government. Served in the same capacity in Dr. Jamali's second Government and the Cabinet formed by Arshad al Umari in April 1954, but resigned after a quarrel with Arshad in June 1954. In March 1954 he accompanied King Faisal on State visit to Pakistan. June 1954 re-elected for Suq al Shuyukh.

A founder member of the Ba'ath Club in 1949. Intelligent and, though critical of some aspects of Western policy, a believer in co-operation with the West. As a Minister appears to have been conscientious and hardworking, if a little pompous. He speaks excellent English and his wife, whom he married in 1950, also speaks a little.

6. Abdul Hadi Chalabi

Shia of Kadhimain. Born Bagdad 1895, the son of a wealthy landowner.

Deputy for Bagdad 1934 and again in 1935. Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Arshad al Umari 1946. Appointed Senator in June 1947 and elected First Vice-President of the Senate in February 1950, 1951 and January 1953. Re-elected First Vice-President of the Senate December 1953.

In politics he supports Saleh Jabr and Nuri Said, but he is more interested in business. He is probably the largest corn broker in the country and many agriculturalists are heavily indebted to him. He made big profits from the export of barley at the inflated prices ruling in Greece and Italy in 1947, and was attacked in the press for obtaining more than his share of export licences through Saleh Jabr who was then Prime Minister. His business record shows that he is unscrupulous and will not hesitate to evade his obligations if it suits him. He is on good terms with the Crown Prince, who has used him to further his designs on Syria.

He is good company in Arabic and Persian, but speaks very little English. He is a philanthropist. His wife appears in public.

7. Abdul Hadi Dhabir

Bagdad Shia, born about 1900, whose wealth derives mainly from property in the city of Bagdad. Interested in politics, but too rich to need to work. He twice entered Government service and twice resigned after two or three years. He has often been a Deputy and has intermittently practised as a lawyer. As Mutasarrif of Hilla from 1943 to 1944 he showed himself an experienced and honest but lazy administrator.

He has a clear mind, but though by nature affable and moderate, he has in recent years been under the

influence of his more energetic and fanatical younger brother Abdul Razzaq (q.v.).

He was Minister of Economics in Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet in 1946 and is a bitter opponent of Nuri Said and Saleh Jabr. He is a founder member of the United Popular Front and was elected to the Front's Political Committee in June 1951. Member of the Court of Cassation April 1953.

8. Dr. Abdul Hadi Pachachi

Sunni. Born in 1894. Son of a former Rais Belidriya of Bagdad and cousin of Muzahim al Pachachi (q.v.). Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul, he qualified as a doctor in France and entered Government service in 1933 as director of the Isolation Hospital.

He was Minister of Social Affairs in Arshad al Umari's Cabinet from June to November 1946, was appointed Mayor of Bagdad in 1948, and Director-General in the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1949. He has represented Iraq at the International Labour Organisation Conferences from 1951. Appointed Minister of Health under Arshad al Umari April 1954, but returned to his post as Director-General, Ministry of Social Affairs, in order to attend the I.L.O. Conference in Geneva in June.

Fat, genial and lazy but, nevertheless, accounted to be of some ability, he does not play a prominent part in politics. He is married to a White Russian wife and speaks fluent French and some English.

9. Abdul Ilah Hashid

Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of Mohammed Ali Fadhil who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris where he qualified as a dentist but also took a degree in political science.

Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and again in 1935. In 1935 and again from 1938 to 1940 he held foreign service appointments at Paris, Beirut and Bombay. In 1936 he was Director-General of Commerce and in 1941 Director-General of Revenue.

Held a number of ministerial appointments from 1942 onwards under Nuri Said. Arshad al Umari and Saleh Jabr. Appointed first Governor of the National Bank in 1949 and reappointed for a further term of three years in 1952. In July 1953 was a member of Iraqi Economic Delegation to United Kingdom.

Fat, with a passion for growing roses, he is friendly and co-operative, but not energetic. Has little knowledge of banking and is inclined to play for safety. He speaks French and English.

10. Abdul Jabbar al-Chelabi

Bagdad Shia, born about 1906. Graduated in agriculture at the University of California and in education at Columbia Teachers' College. He served first in the Ministry of Education, in which he became Director of Primary Education (and Acting Director-General) in 1943 and Chief Inspector in 1946. He left Education in 1946 to become Minister of Supply in Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet. When this Cabinet resigned he was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Communications and Works. He has also been a member of Iraqi delegations to the San Francisco and other conferences. Minister of Agriculture, July 1952. Member of the Development Board, December 1952.

He is a sincere nationalist but broad-minded and reasonable with a keen sense of humour. He is convinced of the need of Western assistance for Iraq, and is highly respected by his many British friends, who can always rely on his co-operation. He remains the most efficient and intelligent Iraqi member of the Development Board. One of Iraq's few honest and competent officials, he has no illusions about his countrymen and is subject to fits of depression. He drinks fairly heavily and is

inclined to be lazy. He speaks English very well. His wife, who speaks some English, appears in public.

During Mr. Dulles's visit to Bagdad in 1953 he spoke up strongly (and apparently much to their surprise) to members of Mr. Dulles's mission on the advantages to Iraq of the British connexion.

11. Abdul Jabbar Fahmi

Born 1905. Joined the Police in 1922 and rose fairly rapidly. Was Director of Police, Mosul, 1948, and Commandant of Police in Bagdad Liwa in 1952.

In 1953 appointed Mutasarrif of Bagdad and was active in this post during the severe flooding in 1954. Speaks fair English and returned from a visit to the United Kingdom in 1954 with favourable impressions of the relative efficiency of British administration. He is politically a trimmer, but inclines to Nuri Pasha's Party, being related by marriage to Mohammed Ali Mahmud (q.v.). He was an efficient policeman and is a good Mutasarrif. Helpful but, unlike many of his countrymen, discreet.

12. Abdul Jabbar Jomard, Dr.

Born about 1907 in Mosul. A journalist and newspaper owner. Deputy for Mosul 1948, he resigned with other members of the Opposition in 1950.

Elected again in January 1953 as a member of the United Popular Front but resigned from the U.P.F. in October 1953 as he disagreed with the policy permitting members to serve in the Cabinet of Dr. Jamali—he himself was not invited to join it. In 1954 he was elected again for Mosul but as a member of the National Front. An effective speaker, Dr. Jomard is one of the main personalities of the Opposition. He does not speak English but studied in France.

13. Abdul Karim al Uzri

Kadhimain Shia, born in 1908; brother of Abdul Amir al Uzri (q.v.). Educated in Bagdad and at the London School of Economics, he has held a number of Government appointments. Secretary to the Ministry of Education, 1932. Assistant Secretary at the Royal Palace, 1934. Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 1936. Acting Director-General of Revenues, 1937. Director of Commerce, 1938. Resigned 1938. Director-General of Economics from 1939 until he resigned again in 1942 after being involved in a financial scandal.

Elected Deputy in 1943, and again in 1950, he is a member of the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce and of the Board of the National Bank. He joined the National Democratic Party on its foundation in 1946 but resigned about a year later. He has a profitable estate near Kadhimain and interests in a cement factory. He married into the large Rifai family of Najaf.

Minister of Finance under Tawfiq al Suweidi, February 1950.

Minister of Finance under Dr. Jamali September 1953 and in March 1954 was Minister of Development in Dr. Jamali's second Cabinet. During March also was elected as Deputy for Bagdad at a by-election. His resignation from the Cabinet was accepted in April. Re-elected for Bagdad in double harness with Nadim Pachachi (q.v.) in June 1954.

As a nationalist, he is highly critical of many aspects of British policy in Iraq and the Middle East generally; but he is Western in outlook, realises the value for Iraq of the British connexion, and is friendly and co-operative. He was an able Minister of Finance and was chiefly responsible for the passage through Parliament of the law establishing the Development Board. He has supported Saleh Jabr in the past but is not at present on very good terms

with him. He is anathema to Nuri Said, who regards him as the worst kind of Western-educated Iraqi youth and a trouble maker. The dislike is reciprocated and is really a contrast of two generations as well as of two creeds. Abdul Karim is a Socialist in outlook and it can be held to his credit that he resigned from Dr. Jamali's Cabinet because the reforms which he outlined as Minister of Finance were being obstructed. Not many Iraqi Ministers have done this. He speaks English well.

14. Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid)

Shia from the lower Gharraf (Muntafik). Born about 1894 of an influential family and owns a large estate.

Deputy in the Turkish Parliament and in most Iraqi Parliaments from 1927 onwards. He was a supporter of the late Yasin Pasha al Hashemi.

Minister of Education under Rashid Ali in 1933, Minister of Economics in the Governments of Taha al Hashimi and Nuri Said in 1941 and of Communications and Works under Nuri in 1942. Senator from 1941. Again Minister of Communications and Works under Tawfiq al Suweidi in 1950. He now strongly supports Saleh Jabr and is the main instrument of the latter's influence in the Muntafik. He is a founder member and a member of the present Central Committee of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party which, during the elections campaign of December 1952 and January 1953, split in two on the question of boycotting the elections and co-operation with the Government. He leads the extremist faction. An implacable opponent of Nuri Said. His influence over Saleh Jabr is considerable and is resented and feared by a large number of Saleh Jabr's followers.

In November 1950 he was accused of the attempted murder of Senator Khayyun al Ubaid but was released on bail after a week in prison. Although the case against him was subsequently stopped, he bitterly resented what he considered to be a deliberate act of hostility on Nuri's part. He has still not forgiven the insult and is one of the principal agents in keeping Nuri and Saleh Jabr apart.

A strong nationalist and fervent Shia, he is uneducated and xenophobic. He speaks no European language.

15. Abdul Majid Abbas

Born in 1910 at Gala'at Sikkar on the Gharraf. Shia of tribal origin. Educated at the Scots College, Safed, Palestine, the Friends' School, Brummana, the American University, Beirut, and Chicago University from 1934 to 1939 (where he studied economics), all at the expense of the Iraq Government. Professor at the Bagdad Law College from 1940 to 1949. Deputy for Amara in 1947 and for the Muntafik in 1948. Joined Nuri Pasha's Constitutional Union Party in 1949 and was for some time editor of the party newspaper. He submitted his resignation from the party in May 1951, but Nuri Pasha refused to accept it. Served with the Iraqi Delegation to United Nations in December 1950 and September 1951. Again elected as Deputy for the Muntafik in January 1953 and served as Minister of Communications and Works in both Dr. Jamali's Cabinets. Re-elected for the Muntafik in June 1954 and appointed Minister of Agriculture by Arshad al Umari. This appointment led to a dispute with the Central Committee of the Constitutional Union Party, who felt they should have been consulted before acceptance and considered him as having resigned from the party. A pleasant enough person but too ingratiating. Speaks good English and his wife, who appears in public, knows a little English. She is a Shia from the Lebanon of the Osseiran family.

16. Abdul Majid Allawi, C.B.E.

Born 1901. Shia of Bagdad. Graduate of the Bagdad Law College. Subsequently joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he held various appointments, including that of Legal adviser, until he was appointed Head of the Political Section. Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet of Hamdi Pachachi, 1944. After serving as Mutasarrif of Kerbela until 1948, he was an Administrative Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior until his appointment as Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Mustafa al Umari in July 1952. Resigned with Mustafa al Umari in November 1952. Appointed Director-General of Customs in February 1953. Appointed Executive Member, Development Board (July 1953), where he does not shine either technically or administratively. A dull, colourless Civil Servant, but a supporter of the British connexion. He speaks English and is intensely proud of his C.B.E.

17. Abdul Majid Mahmud

Shia. Born about 1909. Educated in the United States where he obtained a degree in Agriculture. Director of Education in the Muntafik in the early 1930's. Superintendent (Personnel) of Public Revenues. Inspector in the Income Tax Department in 1941. Held an appointment in the Ministry of Economics in 1942. Appointed Assistant Accountant-General in 1944. A member of the Iraqi delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1945. Has until recently been Director-General of the Agricultural Bank to which post he was appointed by Saleh Jabr. Visited England in 1950 in connexion with the purchase of a trawler for fishing in the Persian Gulf. Appointed Minister of Economics under Nuri Said in December 1950 and Acting Minister of Agriculture in April 1952. Defeated by Sadiq al Bassam in the elections of January 1953. Appointed to the Government Oil Board in February 1953. Appointed Minister of Finance under Arshad al Umari, April 1954. Elected Deputy for Muntafik, June 1954.

Abdul Majid Mahmud was Secretary of the Muthanna Club, most of the members of which were Western educated nationalists with leanings towards national socialism, and was a founder member of the Ba'ath Club, which contains many of the same individuals whose ideals are now those of democratic socialists. He played an active part in the Rashid Ali movement. He is much under the influence of Fadhil al Jamali.

To meet, he is a mild and friendly little man, who says that he has moved away from his earlier extreme nationalist ideas and believes in co-operation with the West. He was a member of the Committee appointed in 1951 to negotiate with the Iraq Petroleum Company and, in his capacity as Minister of Economics, signed the oil agreements in February 1952. It is doubtful whether he fully understood the complicated issues under discussion and was content to take his orders from Nuri Said. His wife speaks some English. He and his wife both go out of their way to be friendly to this Embassy. But in Iraqi politics he has rather fallen by the wayside. He feels that, having left his former extremist friends to join Nuri, he has now been forgotten by Nuri and he asserts himself by writing mildly nationalist articles for the press.

18. Abdul Majid Qassab

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1908. Educated at Bagdad and Beirut. Took a medical degree at Montpellier. A member of the Muthanna Club. Joined the Constitutional Bloc in 1947 and the Nationalist Bloc of Independent Deputies in 1952. He voted for the ratification of the agreement between the Iraq Government and the Iraq

Petroleum Company in 1952. Appointed Minister of Health in Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet in November 1952. During his few weeks in office he attempted to undo the work of his predecessors and antagonised most members of his Ministry. Was appointed Minister of Education in Jamali's first Cabinet in September 1953, when he and the Prime Minister insisted on reinstating in the schools and colleges students who had been expelled or imprisoned for Communist agitation. This measure, though liberal in its inspiration, led to an undoubted recrudescence of agitation among the students. Appointed Minister of Health in Jamali's second Cabinet (March 1954). Re-elected Deputy for Bagdad, June 1954. Unreliable and unbalanced. Was believed responsible for a murderous attack on Siddiq Shansal and others after the 1954 elections. He speaks French and some English.

19. Abdul Muttalib Amin al Hashimi

Born 1907 in Bagdad. Sunni Moslem. A regular army officer who was at Sandhurst and later attached to the Royal Corps of Signals. He has also been on courses in England. Passed the Iraqi Staff College in 1949 and was for a short time Director of Military Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence. Military Attaché at Damascus 1949-52. In November 1952 was Military Commander of Bagdad and made a good showing during and after the riots. Assistant Chief of General Staff 1953. In October 1953 was appointed to Planning Staff of Military Committee of the Arab League and was Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) and Major-General 1954. Retired and appointed Minister in Iraqi Foreign Service, February 1954. Appointed Minister to Indonesia, June 1954.

Intelligent and pleasant, Abdul Muttalib has figured in various highly complicated intrigues, notably concerning Syria, with the result that no one knows whether they can trust him. Speaks excellent English and is regarded as pro-British.

20. Abdul Qadir Gailani

Born in Bagdad in 1904 of the family of the Naqibs of Bagdad and a lineal descendant of Abdul Qadir Gailani who in the 11th century founded the Qadiriya Sect which spreads over North-West India and North and Central Africa. Elder brother of Yusuf Gailani (q.v.). Educated at Bagdad and studied at the London School of Economics. Entered the Foreign Service 1926, and served in London and Cairo, where he was in charge of the Legation several times between 1934 and 1940. Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 1940. He was closely associated with the rebel Government of Rashid Ali and after its collapse was interned in Rhodesia and later in Iraq. Released 1944. Reappointed to Foreign Service and sent as Chargé d'Affaires to Karachi, 1948. Transferred to Cairo, 1949, but was not appointed Minister because the Regent distrusts him for the part he played in 1941. In June 1951 he was appointed Counsellor in the Iraqi Foreign Service on special duty with the Arab League. Appointed Minister to Pakistan 1953.

He tries hard to be pleasant and has done his best to live down the past. He speaks good English. His Egyptian wife has little English, but speaks excellent French.

21. Abdul Rahman Jaudat

Born about 1910. His father was Sunni and his mother Shia; he himself is considered a Shia. Educated Bagdad Law College.

Served as Qaimmaqam in Najaf Suq al Shuyukh and Diwaniya. Appointed Mutasarrif in the Muntafik in 1946 and in Diwaniya in 1947.

Mutasarrif of Bagdad December 1949 and appointed Director-General of the Interior in June 1951. Minister of Health under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952. Minister of Communications and Works, December 1952, and of Agriculture, January and May 1953. Deputy for Hindiya, January 1953. Re-elected 1954.

A competent official and co-operative in his dealings with the British. He has not distinguished himself as a Minister. He is in poor health. He speaks some English.

22. Abdul Rasul al Khalisi

Shia of Kadhmain and a nephew of the Shia Mujtahid Muhammad al Khalisi. Born in 1910. Joined Government service in 1932, served as Administrative Inspector and was appointed Mutasarrif of Kerbela in September 1948. Transferred to Diyala in June 1950 and to Bagdad in June 1951. Appointed Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Communications and Works in Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet in November 1952. Elected Deputy for Kadhmain in January 1953. Re-elected for Kadhmain 1954. Unintelligent and a fervent Shia. He speaks no English.

23. Abdul Razzaq al Dhahir

Shia of Bagdad. Born about 1903. Younger brother of Abdul Hadi Dhahir (q.v.). He has travelled in Europe and speaks English fairly well. In 1942 he was attacked by a nervous disease which affected his brain, and he spent some time in a mental home in Beirut. Joined the Istiqlal Party when it was founded in 1946, but soon left it to join the late Sa'ad Saleh's Liberal Party, of which he continued to be a member until Sa'ad's death early in 1949. Deputy for Bagdad since 1948 and has been on Iraqi delegations to several inter-Parliamentary conferences. Minister of Economics in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949. He resigned with the opposition deputies in March 1950 and is a founder member of the United Popular Front. In June 1951 he was elected to the Front's Permanent Bureau. Arrested after the riots in November 1952. Announced in December 1953 his decision "to abandon politics temporarily."

Abdul Razzaq and his brother are well off, having property in Bagdad and lands in Abu Ghuraib. He is a self-opinionated and somewhat unbalanced man with a wide range of superficial knowledge. A political opponent of Nuri Pasha. He has published a book damning tribal feudalism in Iraq and three volumes of essays inveighing against British imperialism.

24. Abdul Wahhab Mahmud

Sunni of Basra. Born in 1909. Educated Basra and Bagdad, where he graduated in law in 1932. As a young man he held advanced Leftist opinions. Arrested by Jamil Madfai's Government in 1938 for attempting to raise the Diwaniya tribes against them. Released by Nuri Pasha after the military demonstration which removed the Madfai Government. Deputy 1939 to 1947. Minister of Finance in Suwaidi Cabinet of 1946. Member of the Liberal Party from 1946 to 1948, when the party suspended activity. Elected President of the Bar Association in 1950, 1951 and 1952. He was replaced as President in 1953 by Hussain Jamil (q.v.). He is one of the leading Iraqi fellow-travellers and played a prominent part in the agitation leading up to the riots in 1952. As a result he was detained for six weeks.

25. Abdul Wahhab Murjan

Born about 1910 of a rich Shia landowning family of Hilla. Educated at the Bagdad Law College, he

was appointed a judge about 1935 but soon resigned to practise as a lawyer.

In 1946 and 1947 he was leader in Hilla of Kamil Chaderchi's National Democratic Party but resigned in 1947 owing to his exclusion from the party's Higher Committee and to his being taken up by Saleh Jabr, who secured his election to the Chamber of Deputies in March 1947.

He was again elected Deputy for Hilla in the 1948 elections and was appointed Minister of Economics in June 1948 in Muzahim Pachachi's Government. Resigned on his election as President of the Chamber of Deputies in autumn 1948. Elected vice-President of Nuri Sa'id's Constitutional Union Party in December 1949. Became Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri Sa'id in September 1950 and was transferred to Finance in December 1950. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1951. Deputy for Hilla in January 1953. Minister of Communications and Works January and May 1953. Resigned after a quarrel with Sa'id Qazzaz in May 1953. Elected President of Chamber of Deputies in December 1953 and in March 1954 was a member of Regency Council during King's visit to Pakistan. Re-elected for Hilla in June 1954.

He is not very intelligent, but is pleasant, and owes most of his influence originally to Saleh Jabr's and recently to Nuri Sa'id's support. He has fallen foul of Saleh Jabr on two personal issues and may think in terms of setting himself up as a rival Shia leader. He knows a little English.

26. Abdullah Bakr

Born 1907. A Sunni from Mosul. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service at its inception and, after serving in various posts, was promoted to Minister Plenipotentiary in 1948. Chargé d'Affaires at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington in 1952. In the summer of 1953 was appointed Deputy Rais of the Royal Diwan and held that post until appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Dr. Jamali's Government in September 1953. Headed the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in autumn 1953. Appointed Rais of the Royal Diwan in March 1954 and accompanied King Faisal on his State visit to Pakistan that month.

A pleasant if rather quiet personality with a suave manner.

27. Abdullah Damluji

Sunni, born in Mosul in 1895, and formerly called Abdullah Sa'id Effendi. Studied medicine in Constantinople and served in the Turkish army, but transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud when the latter occupied Hasa in 1913.

As Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 he signed the Uqair Protocol, and in 1926 took part in the negotiations in London which led to the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. His influence with Ibn Saud afterwards waned and in 1928, after the failure of the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa, at which he was Ibn Saud's representative, he posted his resignation to Ibn Saud and came to Bagdad instead of returning to the Hejaz.

In Iraq he has been thrice Minister for Foreign Affairs (in 1930-31, 1934 and 1942), thrice Director-General of Health (1932-33, 1934-35 and 1941-42), and Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in 1937-38.

From 1942 onwards, he devoted himself mainly to business. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in 1947 and was elected Deputy for Mosul in the 1948 elections.

He was appointed Iraqi Ambassador in Tehran in February 1950. He spent most of his time in Bagdad however and eventually resigned from this post in May 1951. Minister of Education under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952.

Appears to have given up politics. He speaks English well.

28. Abdullah Qassab

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1900, the son of an 'Alim, Abbas Amin al Fetwa. Educated Bagdad, graduated from the Law College, 1928, and entered Government Service. Quimaqam Samarra 1936, Director of Tribal Affairs, Ministry of Interior, 1938. Mutasarrif of Diwaniya, 1941, Mosul, 1944, Director-General of the Date Association, 1947. Appointed Mayor of Bagdad, 1951. Returned to Date Association, March 1953. Represented Iraq at Arab/Italian Economic Conference held in Italy in September 1953.

Minister of Interior under Nuri Pasha, 1943 and again under Arshad al Umari in 1946.

A fairly capable administrator without marked political leanings. He is now a sick man.

29. Ahmad al Ajil

Sunni Sheikh of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Younger brother of Sfuq al Ajil (q.v.), he was born about 1923 and educated at Victoria College, Alexandria and in Mosul and Bagdad.

He went to London with his father Ajil in 1937 to attend the coronation of His Majesty King George VI. After Ajil's death in 1940 Ahmad set about undermining Sfuq's position in the tribe, disputed the inheritance with him, and in 1944 was suspected of being involved in an attempt to poison him with locust bait.

He became Deputy for Mosul in 1948 and in October of that year he was recognised by the Government as paramount Sheikh of the Shammar in Iraq instead of Mish'an al Faisal who had replaced Sfuq the previous June. He is now more popular than his rivals with the tribe, but constant intrigue amongst themselves has reduced the influence of all Shammar Sheikhs. Accompanied King Faisal II to America in 1952. Deputy for Tel Afar, January 1953, but because of Palace intervention was not re-elected in 1954.

Flashy, engaging and plausible, Ahmad is one of the very few English-speaking tribesmen. He is believed to be in touch with Ibn Saud.

30. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban

Born about 1895. Sunni from near Khaniqin. He is not a true Baban but takes the name from a marriage connexion with the late Jamil Bey Baban of Kifri. Educated Bagdad Law School and served as a judge for many years. Director-General of Supplies, 1942. Successively Minister of Social Affairs, Communications and Works and Justice under Nuri Sa'id, 1942-44. Minister of Justice under Hamdi Pachachi 1944. Minister of Social Affairs, 1946. Head of the Royal Diwan, 1946. He visited Europe in the summer of 1951. Took a prominent part in the conduct of the elections of January 1953. Minister of Justice under Jamil Madfai, January 1953. Head of the Royal Diwan again in April 1953. Deputy Prime Minister in Jamali's second Cabinet, March 1954, and appointed a Senator.

The advice he gives in the Palace is not always good and he is widely regarded as a sinister figure. He is not a strong personality and has made his way by being all things to all men. Under this friendly exterior is an intriguer. His personal morals are questionable. He speaks no English.

31. Ahmad al Rawi, K.B.E.

Born about 1896, the son of a Bagdad Sunni Alim. Brother of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraq Government and after reaching the rank of Commandant,

served in several liwas as a mutasarrif. In 1939 he was made an administrative inspector and soon afterwards was placed on pension.

After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government in 1941 he was recalled by Jamil Madfai and made Director-General of Police. He held this position successfully for four years of war and co-operated wholeheartedly with the British Forces. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for his war services in 1946.

Created Pasha by Amir Abdullah of Transjordan in 1943, he was appointed Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in 1945 and to the King of Transjordan in 1946. He returned to Iraq the same year to take up the post, first of Director-General, and later (1949) of Under-Secretary, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In this capacity he represented Iraq at several meetings of the Arab League Political Committee in 1948 and was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in the latter half of 1949. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Amman in January 1951. In May 1952 he was appointed Iraqi Minister at Karachi. Defeated in the elections of January 1953. Appointed Ambassador to Lebanon, 1953. Elected as Deputy in Dulaim June 1954. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs under Arshad al Umari July 1954.

A supporter of Iraq's British connexion, Ahmad Pasha is an intelligent and pleasant man. More politician than administrator, he is generally well-informed but does not carry the weight that his position and connexion would lead one to expect. He speaks English well.

32. Akram Mushtaq

Sunni, born Bagdad 1903. Gazetted officer in the Iraqi army, 1927. Passed Cranwell and appointed to the Royal Iraqi Air Force, 1930. Captain, 1932; Major, 1937; Lieutenant-Colonel, 1938; Commander of the Royal Iraqi Air Force 1937 to 1939. Relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director-General of Civil Aviation in 1939. He still holds this post. Member of the Iraqi delegation to the International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago in 1944.

He is an intelligent and likeable man and speaks English well, but he is an indifferent administrator and has little influence. He took an active part in Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* of 1936 and some people still hold this against him. A drug-taker, he tried to commit suicide in 1949, and was afterwards sent to Europe to be cured.

33. Ali Haidar Sulaiman

Born at Rowanduz 1905 of a well-known Kurdish family. Educated at Mosul and the American University, Beirut. He represented his university at the 1929 meeting of the International Students Union at Geneva.

Lecturer in Modern History at the Higher Teachers' Training College, 1930. Transferred to Ministry of Interior, 1933. Transferred to the Iraqi Foreign Service and served at Rome and Cairo between 1937 and 1939. He was interned after 1941 as a sympathiser with Rashid Ali (he is a brother-in-law of Yunis Sab'awi who was hanged for his part in the rebellion). Released in 1944 he became a partner of Ali Kemal in the New Bagdad scheme. In 1949 he was associated in business with Abdul Hadi Chelabi and is now director of the firm, Iraq Engineering Works.

Deputy for Rowanduz 1948. Resigned 1950. Re-elected 1953 and 1954. Minister of Social Affairs under Muzahim Pachachi, 1948. Minister of Communications and Works under Ali Jawdat, 1949-50. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951. Minister of Development in Dr. Jamali's first Government,

September 1953, and of Economics in his second Government, March 1954, when he also acted as Minister of Development for a time.

He supports Muzahim Pachachi and is opposed to Nuri Pasha. A sincere and intelligent nationalist with moderate reformist views. As a Minister he was industrious and painstaking but finds it difficult to delegate responsibility, partly for reasons of temperament but also because of lack of competent officials on whom to devolve work. His health is not robust and this is a continuous disability for him. Speaks good English. His wife appears in public, but does not know English.

34. Ali Jawdat al'Ayyubi

Sunni of humble Mosul origin, born 1886. Educated at Istanbul and commissioned in the Turkish army. In Turkish times he was a member of the Arab Nationalist society Al Abd al Iraqi. He fought against the British at Shuaibah but surrendered soon afterwards and was employed in 1915 to encourage Arab officer prisoners to join the Arab Revolt. Later he joined Faisal, and in 1920 was Faisal's Military Governor at Aleppo.

He returned to Iraq with King Faisal in 1921 and from then until 1923 he held various posts in the provincial administration. In 1922 he took an active part in agitation against the Mandate.

As Minister for Interior under Ja'far al Askari (1923-24) he voted for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. He was again a provincial Governor and later worked in the Ministry of Interior between 1924 and 1930, when he became Minister of Interior under Nuri Sa'id. He resigned from the Cabinet in September 1930 and also (in company with Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali) from the Chamber of Deputies in protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.

Private Secretary to the King 1933; Prime Minister 1934, he was forced to resign by an agitation against him throughout the country organised by Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali.

President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1935. Iraqi Minister in London, August 1935; Paris, December 1936-October 1937. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Sa'id 1939.

After the Rashid Ali *coup d'état* in April 1941 he joined the Regent at Basra and accompanied him to Jerusalem. After the collapse of the rebellion he returned to Bagdad and became Minister for Foreign Affairs under Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Iraqi Minister at Washington 1942-48. He joined Muzahim Pachachi's Government in the reshuffle of September 1948 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in December 1949 he succeeded, after two failures, in forming a Cabinet which resigned in February 1950. Deputy Prime Minister under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953.

He has always been a weak and vacillating character of small intelligence and he is now a semi-invalid. He is, however, well meaning and friendly, and he is respected for his Nationalist past. He is in close touch with the United States Embassy. He has become rich through acquiring Government land. His wife is a Syrian who speaks good English, his elder son is married to an American and his daughter is married to the son of Muzahim al Pachachi (q.v.). His sons are close friends of the King and the elder son Nizar is the agent for several British firms. Ali Jawdat speaks some English.

35. Ali Khalid al Hejazi, C.B.E.

Sunni, born about 1893 in Damascus. After serving in the Ottoman army he became an officer in the Kurdish gendarmerie at the end of the first world war and was awarded the B.E.M. and the M.C. for gallantry during campaigns in Kurdistan.

Appointed Inspector of Police, 1921; Assistant Commandant of Police, 1923; Commandant of Police in the Mobile Force, 1935; Commandant of Police Sulaimaniya, 1937. He was Commandant of Police Bagdad from after the Rashid Ali rebellion in 1941 until 1946 and did good work to stop looting after May 1941.

In 1946 he was appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services.

Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya 1947-48, he was one of the very few Arab officials to speak fluent Kurdish. Appointed Director-General of Police in May 1948, he did much to restore the police morale which had been shaken as a result of the disturbances of January 1948. A heavy drinker and a poor administrator, out tough and strict in discipline, he set about re-equipping the police, especially the mobile forces. He was loyal to the Regent and the British connexion.

In February 1950 in a fit of drunken resentment he made an abortive attempt to use his mobile forces against the Government. He was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentence was later reduced to three and a half years, and he was released in November 1950 by Nuri Said.

A courageous but stupid man who was more than normally corrupted by power, his thoughts may have been turned to the use of force by the example of the three successful Syrian *coups d'état* of 1949.

36. Ali Mahmud Sheikh Ali

Sunni, connected with the Ubaid tribe. Born Bagdad, 1902. Educated at the Bagdad Law College, he practised as a lawyer from 1923 to 1936. An extreme Nationalist, he was arrested both in 1924 and 1930 for violent agitation against Anglo-Iraqi treaties. He was twice elected Deputy.

Appointed judge in the Court of Appeal in 1936 and Minister of Justice under Hikmat Sulaiman in 1937. Mutasarrif of Basra, 1939, Director-General of Customs, 1940. Again Minister of Justice in Rashid Ali's rebel Cabinet, he fled to Persia after Rashid Ali's collapse but was later surrendered to the British military authorities and interned in Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq, tried and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in 1942. During his internment he embarked upon an immense history of Palestine, taking the story back to pre-Islamic times.

Released in 1949, he practised as a lawyer. It was proposed by Tawfik Suweidi to appoint him to the Court of Cassation in 1950. Appointed Director-General of Customs, July 1952. Minister of Finance under Mustafa al Umari for one week and then under Nuruddin Mahmud in November 1952. He drafted most of the ordinances issued by that Government aimed at lowering the cost of living of the lower classes. Appointed Vice-President, Court of Cassation, July 1953.

He is now on good terms with members of this Embassy.

37. Ali Muntaz al Daftari

Born 1901. Sunni of the Daftari family of Bagdad. Educated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Rose to be Director-General of Revenues by 1935, but had to leave Iraq after Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* which overthrew the Government of Yasin al Hashemi in 1936. Re-appointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri Sa'id in 1939.

Minister of Finance under Taha al Hashemi, 1941. Director of Rafidain Bank 1941. Again Minister of Finance under Nuri Sa'id in 1941 and 1943. Minister of Communications and Works under Tawfik Suweidi in 1946. Minister of Finance under Muzahim Pachachi in 1948 and under Ali Jawdat, December 1949 to February 1950. Resigned from the Chamber of Deputies in 1950.

Appointed a Member of the Development Board in November 1950 and tendered his resignation from the Board in June 1951. Minister of Finance under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953. Appointed Senator, April 1953. The most energetic Minister in that Cabinet, Ali Muntaz earned the respect of almost all Deputies for his conduct of affairs in the Chamber. Accompanied King Faisal on a State visit to Amman, August 1953. Minister of Finance in Jamali's second Government March 1954, he did not make much of a showing because of indifferent health and the short life of the Government.

He was a member of the Liberal Party formed in 1946, but resigned in 1948. His name has frequently been mentioned as a possible neutral Prime Minister. He gives an impression of sincerity and ability, but when in power finds difficulty in co-operating with his Cabinet colleagues. He has been involved in at least one financial scandal. He and his wife, who is the daughter of the late Yasin al Hashimi, speak very good English.

He is said to have been investing in land on a large scale. His financial reputation continues to be clouded, due, it is rumoured, to his having to find large sums to pay his wife's gambling debts.

38. Ali al Safi, Dr.

Born 1913. Shia of Najaf. Studied at Heidelberg, taking a Ph.D. in political economy, remaining in Germany during at least part of 1939-45 war, and is believed to have co-operated there with Rashid Ali al Gailani. He joined the Iraq Government service in 1948 as an instructor at the College of Engineering and became subsequently Assistant Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in the Ministry of Communications, where he failed to get on with the Director-General and was appointed Director of the semi-official National Leather Industry Company.

Was delegated by the Arab League, with two others, to try and dissuade the Federal German Government from paying reparations to Israel but is said to have succeeded only in making himself obnoxious to the German authorities.

Appointed Minister of Economics by Arshad al Umari in April 1954. Elected Deputy for Najaf in June 1954.

39. Ali al Sharqi

Shia from Najaf. Born about 1890. Originally a Mulla in Najaf and later Qadhi in Basra and elsewhere, he finally became Head of the Supreme Ja'fari Court. He was made a Senator in 1947 during Saleh Jabr's term of office. Minister without Portfolio in Ali Jawdat's Government of December 1949. Minister of State under Jamil Madfai, May 1953.

He is of no political importance but is very well informed.

40. Arkan Abadi

Shia, born in 1919. A tribesman of the Fetlah tribe of Diwaniyah. Educated at the London School of Economics. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1944. He accompanied Fadhil al-Jamali to the Palestine Conference in London in September 1946. Deputy for Diwaniyah in 1947 and 1948.

Resigned in 1950. Contested a by-election in 1950 but was defeated by Government action. Deputy for the Muntaziq in November 1950 and for Shamiya in January 1953. He was offered the portfolio of Agriculture by Nasrat al-Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953. Re-elected in 1954. He is a member of Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party and is bitterly opposed to Saleh Jabr. Spent the summer of 1953 in the United States on an American bursary. Was

Minister without Portfolio in charge of village and tribal affairs in Jamali's first Government (September 1953) and Minister of Social Affairs in Jamali's second Government (March 1954).

Arkan is not particularly bright—it is a current joke that it took him ten years to get his degree at the London School of Economics—but he has common sense and was a not unsuccessful Minister. He is always immaculate in a somewhat "Brooks Brothers" style.

He and his wife, who is the daughter of Jamil Madfai, speak excellent English.

41. Arshad al Umari, K.B.E.

Sunni, born in 1888 of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Educated in Turkey and employed as Municipal Engineer in Istanbul. He served on the Turkish staff in 1914-18 war.

A member of the first Iraqi Parliament, he later held several official appointments. Mayor of Bagdad from 1931 to 1933, and again from 1936 to 1944, with a short interruption in 1941 when he formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces after Rashid Ali's flight. He was a successful Mayor and can claim credit for much of such modernisation as Bagdad has achieved.

He represented Iraq at the Arab Unity Congress in Cairo in 1944 which resulted in the formation of the Arab League and in 1945 he led the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco. Minister of Economics and Communications under Ali Jawdat in 1934. Minister of Supply under Hamdi Pachachi in 1944. Appointed a Senator in June 1944. He was Prime Minister from June to November 1946, and aroused great opposition by his dictatorial methods. He played some part in the political intrigues which resulted in the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty and was Minister of Defence in the Government of Mohammed al Sadr which took over after the Portsmouth riots. Resigned his seat in the Senate in November 1950 on his appointment as Vice-Chairman of the Development Board. In this capacity his erratic nature and his tendency to concentrate all work in his own hands earned him much criticism, which his outspoken retaliation did nothing to assuage. On the other hand, there was probably no other Iraqi who would have applied so much energy to the work of the Board; but even his ebullient nature was finally overborne by the merciless criticism of his work in the Development Board. He threw in his hand in June 1953 and his resignation from the Board was accepted in July. As a sop he was reappointed to the Senate.

Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Development, April 1954. He was responsible for the elections of June 1954 and managed to quarrel with a number of his Ministers.

He is president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and has done a good deal to improve their finances. His daughter, Mme. Muntaz al Umari, is a leading figure in the Ladies' Committee of this society.

He has an attractive personality and a capacity for hard work which is rare in an Iraqi, but his rapid changes of opinion, his obstinacy and impatience of criticism make him unfit for politics. He speaks Turkish and some rather curious French. He was appointed Honorary K.B.E. for war services in 1946.

42. Ata Amin

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1898. Educated at the Bagdad Law School.

Assistant Private Secretary to King Faisal, 1921. Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service in 1925 and was appointed to the Iraqi Legation in London. Legal draftsman in the Ministry of Justice, 1927. Returned to the Foreign Service in 1928 and held appointments at Ankara, London, Rome, Paris and Berlin between

1932 and 1943. From 1940 to 1943 he was in charge of the Iraqi Legation in London. Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1943; Minister at Ankara, 1944; transferred to Paris, 1949. Director-General of Government Oil Board in July 1952.

He is married to a sister of the Amir Zaid. He speaks good English.

His appointment to the Oil Board caused some criticism as he had no qualifications for the job either in experience or personality.

43. Baba Ali Sheikh Mahmud

Kurd. Born about 1912, second son of the well-known Sheikh Mahmud (q.v.). He spent much of his childhood in Persia, when his father was engaged in various rebellions. Between 1928 and 1932 he was educated at the expense of the Iraq Government at Victoria College, Alexandria, where he was a class-mate of the Regent. Later he went to Columbia University.

He was appointed to a minor post in the railways in 1938, but soon resigned. His outspoken criticism of Iraqi administration in Kurdish areas led to his arrest and exile for a few months in 1943. A repetition of the offence in 1945 narrowly missed having the same result. He is still a strong critic of the Iraq Government's handling of Kurdish problems.

Minister of Economics under Arshad al Umari in 1946 and in the succeeding Government of Nuri Pasha. Deputy for Sulaimaniya, 1947; lost his seat in 1948.

Baba Ali speaks excellent English and possesses an attractive, though not very forceful, personality. He is interested in the improvement of agriculture in Kurdistan and particularly in the growing and marketing of tobacco. Since 1948 he has spent most of his time in Sulaimaniya and although not a member of his party, is Saleh Jabr's most influential supporter in Sulaimania. He visited America in 1950 and since then has been in close contact with the United States Embassy. His father finds his preoccupation with Iraqi politics and scientific agriculture strange and undignified and infinitely prefers his wild younger brother Shaikh Latif.

44. Baba ud Din Nuri

Kurd, born in Bagdad about 1897 of an Erbil family. His father was a well-known 'Alim. Educated in Bagdad, he joined the Turkish army in 1917 and the Iraqi army in 1921.

In 1924 he was First-Lieutenant Small Arms Instructor and in 1927 he was promoted Captain. Passed Iraqi Staff College, 1930; attended Staff College Camberley, 1935-36. On his return to Iraq he was deeply involved in Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'état* and was thereafter appointed to Operations Branch. Dismissed from the army by Taha al Hashimi in 1938, he became Assistant Traffic Director on the Iraqi State Railways.

In autumn 1941 he rejoined the army as Major-General and was appointed Assistant C.G.S., but was retired again in 1944. He was Acting Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya in 1944 and was elected Deputy for Sulaimaniya in 1947 and 1948. Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri Said during 1949. Appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in May 1951, and chargé d'affaires at Tehran. Ambassador there in 1953.

One of the most capable Staff Officers in the Iraqi army, he suffered twice for his connexion with Bekr Sidqi. He is an intelligent man and a fairly good administrator; but in spite of a frank and engaging demeanour he is not entirely honest or reliable. He is a Freemason and a connoisseur of mystic poetry, but he is also self-seeking. As Minister he was co-operative with the British, but he was widely censured for his continued connexions with a Lebanese firm

supplying the Government. He speaks Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Turkish and English well.

45. Darwish al Haidari

Born in Bagdad in 1907 of the Haidari family which originated from Erbil. Educated at the American University, Beirut, and at Texas University where he studied agriculture.

Entered Government service, 1930. Director of Rustamiya Experimental Farm, 1933 and of Abu Ghuraib Experimental Farm, 1940. Director of Grain in the Local Products Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, 1942. Transferred back to the Department of Agriculture after he had been accused of the illegal disposal of a quantity of grain.

He was on the Iraqi delegation to the Hot Springs Food Conference in 1943 and since becoming Director-General of Agriculture in 1946 he has represented Iraq at several international conferences of Food and Agricultural Organisation. Visited Canada in 1952 to buy wheat for Iraq Government.

Fat and jovial in appearance, he has a strong personality and much energy, initiative and determination, mainly directed towards furthering his own interests. He is a devout Moslem and a Xenophobe. He is a dictator in his department and his jealousy of any interference has made it difficult for British experts to co-operate with him. On account of his American training he is generally believed to be biased in favour of American machinery and ideas, but the United States Point IV officials in Iraq have found him equally difficult. A window dresser, and regarded by many as a barrier to progress. Was removed from his post by Arshad al Umari in May 1954 and appointed to a less important one in the Ministry of Development. He incontinently went on leave. Darwish is a keen farmer on his own and tries to put into practice some of the principles he has preached.

He and his wife, who is a sister of Yusuf and Abdul Qadir Gailani (q.v.) speak good English and French.

46. Daud al Haidari

Bagdad Sunni, born about 1885. Son of a one-time Sheikh al Islam, his family is of Kurdish origin from Erbil. Once an A.D.C. to Sultan Abdul Hamid, he spent the 1914-18 war in Constantinople and came to Bagdad in 1921.

Member for Erbil in the Constituent Assembly in 1924. Minister of Justice under Tawfiq Suweidi, 1929. Deputy for Erbil, 1930-34.

Iraqi Minister in Tehran, 1941-42. Minister of Justice under Nuri Said, 1942-43. Minister in London, 1943-45. Appointed Senator in 1945. Minister of Social Affairs in Mohammed al Sadr's Cabinet, January-June 1948.

He was an intermediary when the British Oil Development Company's concession was negotiated and has since been paid a retaining fee by the Basra and Mosul Petroleum Companies, who describe him as their legal adviser, but do not in fact consult him. He resigned from the Senate under a new interpretation of the Constitution in March 1949 rather than give up this fee.

Daud Pasha is a friend of the Crown Prince but is widely distrusted both politically and financially. He was involved in the agitation against the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, but by 1952 he had become a supporter of Saleh Jabr.

His two step-daughters are well known in Bagdad society. He speaks English fairly well and is well disposed towards the British, but his actions tend to be dictated by his financial embarrassments. A nice old man with a taste for horse-racing. He looks as though he had spent a fortune—as indeed he has.

47. Dhia Ja'far

Bagdad Shia, born in 1911. He studied mechanical engineering at Birmingham University, where he obtained a B.Sc. in 1934 and a Ph.D. in 1936, and then had twenty months' training with the Great Western Railway.

Appointed Assistant Mechanical Engineer in the Iraqi State Railways in 1937, he was subsequently promoted to be Mechanical Engineer. During the war he was Director-General of Engineering Supplies.

Deputy for Bagdad in 1947. He failed in the 1948 elections, but was later returned for Kerbala in a by-election.

Minister of Communications and Works under Saleh Jabr in 1947 and of Economics under Nuri Said in 1949 and under Tawfiq Suweidi in 1950. A founder-member and member of the Central Committee of Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party, December 1949. Minister of Economics under Nuri Said in September 1950. Transferred to Communications and Works in December 1950. He played a prominent part in the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1950 and 1951. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance in December 1951. Headed the Iraqi delegation which proceeded to London in June 1952 for discussions on Iraq's sterling balances and other financial matters. Elected Deputy for Bagdad January 1953. Re-elected 1954. Minister of Economics under Jamil Madfai in January and May 1953. Headed Iraqi economic delegation to London in July 1953. In March 1954 he visited India and Pakistan with Nuri Said to discuss Middle East defence and neutrality. Was a Member of Iraqi Parliamentary Delegation to United Kingdom in April 1954.

He is well educated and speaks excellent English. He was a successful Minister of Economics, and is a strong supporter of Nuri Said, having close connexions also with Saleh Jabr. He helped to save British property in 1941. The financial reputation of his family is doubtful.

He enjoys British company, but is exceptionally resentful against what he considers the unequal relationship between Britain and Iraq, and is consequently difficult to deal with officially. The I.P.C. regarded him as the main obstacle to an agreement on oil problems. He is extremely ambitious and has energy and ability, and must be reckoned with as a potential Prime Minister.

His wife, who is related to the Agha Khan, looks as though she would be more at home in Beirut than in Bagdad. She speaks some English.

48. Faiq Samarra'i

Sunni, born at Basra about 1904. Educated Bagdad Law College, 1928-32. Appointed a secretary in the Ministry of Justice, 1933; transferred to Tapu Department 1934; Superintendent of Labour, Ministry of Interior, 1935, and attended a Labour Conference at Geneva in 1936. After a further period in the Ministry of Justice, he became Director-General of Press and Propaganda in 1939. After a short period of service in the police and at the Ministry of Social Affairs, he became Director-General of Municipalities in 1940.

An extreme anti-foreign nationalist since his student days, he served a short sentence in 1930 for his part in the demonstrations against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He was an active supporter of Rashid Ali and was interned from 1941 to 1945 at Fao, where he caused much trouble to the authorities. He was a founder member of the Istiqlal Party in 1946, Secretary-General in 1947 and vice-president 1948-1949 and 1950. Deputy for Samarra 1948, he resigned with the opposition Deputies in March 1950, but was again elected in the by-elections of June 1950. In 1949 and early 1950 he travelled in Syria

and Lebanon for his party to make propaganda for Iraqi-Syrian union. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952 in protest against the manner in which they alleged Nuri Said was attempting to railroad the Oil Agreements through Parliament. Took a leading part in the agitation which led to the riots in 1952. He was interned for six weeks. In June 1954 was defeated in elections at Samarra but is convinced that it was as a result of fraud by the Government.

A grossly fat and unhealthy looking individual with a bad moral reputation, he is nevertheless intelligent, and a persuasive talker. His nationalist views are sincerely held, but are probably subject to modification if it suited his personal ambition. His attitude to Great Britain became slightly less hostile during 1949, possibly owing to the influence of Nuri Pasha who was in that year attempting to split the Istiqlal Party. He is not altogether trusted by his party colleagues. He speaks English.

49. Fakhri Jamil al Fakhri

Born in Mosul in 1910. Shia. Joined Government service in 1933 after studying abroad at Birmingham University. Chief Engineer to the Bagdad Municipality and subsequently served with the Development Board, where he was Director-General of the 2nd Technical Committee in charge of public works. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works by Arshad al Umari in April 1954 and in June 1954 became Lord Mayor of Bagdad.

Is not a politician. His general attitude to ourselves has always been friendly. His English is good.

50. Fakhri Tabaqchali

Sunni. Born about 1900.

Began his official career as a judge. Mutasarrif of Amara, 1945 and Basra, 1948. Appointed to the Court of Cassation in December 1949 and made President of the Tribal Court of Cassation in 1950. Lord Mayor of Bagdad, April 1953. Minister of Justice under Arshad al Umari, April 1954 and Acting Minister of the Interior (June 1954).

He is a protégé of the late Hamdi al Pachachi.

Pompous, a showman and said to be corrupt, he is unpopular with his subordinates. He speaks fair English.

51. Ghazi Muhammad Fadhil Daghestani, C.V.O.

Sunni born in Bagdad 1910. Son of Muhammad Pasha Daghestani, a Turkish General, and brother of the wives of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.) and Najib al Rawi (q.v.).

Attended the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and the Staff Colleges at Quetta and Bagdad. Originally an engineer, he later transferred to the artillery. Appointed Military Attaché in London in April 1952 and served as A.D.C. to the Duke of Gloucester at the accession of King Faisal II in May 1953. At present Director of Military Operations and Acting Deputy Chief of General Staff (Operations).

Ghazi Daghestani is the Turk first and foremost; he has no Arab blood in his veins and in foreign company is liable to refer to his compatriots as "these Arabs." He is sending his son and daughter to Eton and Heathfield respectively and his appearance and manner are in keeping. He is pro-British and both he and his attractive and wealthy wife speak excellent English and French in addition to Turkish and Arabic. An intelligent, high-principled aristocrat and an able officer, he might well take a prominent part in politics in the future. He quarrelled violently with the Regent over the despatch of Iraqi troops to Palestine in 1948 but his

family influence and his strength of character have enabled him to retain his position in the army and in society.

52. Hashim Jawad

Sunni, born Bagdad 1911, the son of a small official. He was educated at the American University, Beirut, and at London University, from which he graduated in Economics in 1936.

He was appointed Assistant Secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1936, joined the Iraqi foreign service in 1938 and was sent as Iraqi representative to the International Labour Organisation at Geneva. He returned to Iraq in 1941 and in 1942 became the first Acting Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs. He also acted as Secretary to a committee for the organisation of post-war affairs in Iraq. In his capacity of Director-General of Labour, he took part in the settlement of the Iraq Petroleum Company strike at Kirkuk in 1946. Later in the same year he was removed from his post by Arshad al Umari who regarded him as a fellow-traveller. In 1947 he was appointed to a position in the I.L.O. and has only paid short visits to Iraq since then.

A quiet and studious man with a clear head and a genuine interest in labour questions, he found the conditions in the Ministry of Social Affairs extremely frustrating. He is married to a Swiss and speaks excellent English.

53. Hussain Makki Khammas

Born 1899 in Bagdad. A Sunni Muslim. Officer in Ottoman Army and a regular officer in the Iraqi Army Engineers. Took a course at the Staff College, Quetta, and went on secondment to United Kingdom on various occasions. Director-General (Administration) and later Acting Chief of General Staff after the appointment of General Nuruddin Mahnud (q.v.) as Prime Minister. Minister of Defence in Dr. Jamali's Governments (September 1953 and March 1954) and again in Arshad al Umari's Government (April 1954). Appointed a Senator in March 1954.

Hussain Makki is elderly, tired and lacking in drive. He is not a good administrator. As Minister of Defence he is purely a figure-head and is fast losing the respect of many of his officers who are inclined to regard him as a benign buffoon.

He speaks English well, and in his personal relations with British officers he is friendly. He genuinely prefers the English way and methods to those of other foreign Powers.

54. Hassan Sami Tatar

Turcoman of Kirkuk, born about 1899. His education at the Constantinople Law School was interrupted by the first world war, in which he was taken prisoner by the British forces in Mesopotamia and spent two years in a prisoner-of-war camp in India.

Returning to Iraq after the armistice, he entered the newly founded Bagdad Law College and passed out at the head of the first batch of graduates. He was immediately appointed a judge in Bagdad and thereafter served in the Ministry of Justice and on the Court of Cassation until in February 1950 he became Minister of Justice under Tawfiq al Suweidi. Minister of Justice again under Nuri Said in September 1950. Elected Deputy for Khanaqin in February 1951. Appointed first Iraqi President of the Court of Cassation, July 1951.

He is a quiet man with no particular political affiliations. He speaks Arabic and Turkish.

55. Hassan al Talabani

Kurd, born about 1911 of a well-known family of Kirkuk. His ancestors were heads of a Sufi brotherhood. He graduated from the Bagdad Law College

in 1934 and joined the Ministry of Interior in 1935. He served as Qaimmaqam in various Kurdish districts and at Mandali. Appointed Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya early in 1947, transferred to Erbil later in the year, to Hilla in 1948, to Diyala early in 1950 and Dulaim in October 1950. A.H.Q., R.A.F., Habbaniya, found him very helpful. Re-transferred to Diyala, August 1952. Made Mutasarrif of Kut 1953 and Director-General of Guidance and Broadcasting June 1954 by Arshad al Umari.

He visited Europe and England in the summer of 1949.

He is intelligent, honest and capable. He is not a strong character, but as an administrator he makes up in some measure for his lack of strength by persistence and a good sense of diplomacy. He has not yet entered politics but will probably do so eventually. He is well liked by Saleh Jabr and Arshad al Umari. Personally he is good company. He speaks Kurdish and Arabic, some Turkish and good English.

56. Hassib al Rubaii

A Sunni Muslim born in Bagdad about 1906 of the influential Rubaii family; brother of Najib al Rubaii (q.v.), the General Officer Commanding, 3rd Cadre Division.

An infantry officer who passed through Sandhurst in 1925 and was subsequently attached to British army units in the United Kingdom. Passed the Staff College course, Camberley, in 1937. In September 1953 was appointed Deputy Chief of General Staff (Administration), an appointment which he still holds as a major-general.

A very well-educated Muslim, strongly religious and nationalistic in the best sense of the word. Quiet, pleasant but very shrewd. Very co-operative and friendly towards individual British officers. It is unlikely that he could compete with the rigours of an active command.

Dislikes discussing political matters. Speaks fluent English.

57. Hikmat Sulaiman

Sunni, born 1886. A member of the Committee of Union and Progress, he was Director of Education and Assistant Governor of Bagdad under the Turks, and was in Constantinople when the British forces occupied Bagdad in 1917.

Returning to Iraq in 1921 he became Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1923 and was Minister of Interior under Abdul Muhsin Sa'dun (1925-26) and again under Rashid Ali Gailani in 1933. He visited Turkey in 1935 and was much impressed with modern Turkish methods.

In 1936 he joined Bekr Sidqi in the *coup d'état* which over-threw Yasin al Hashimi's Government, and became Prime Minister. He resigned in 1937 after the murder of Bekr Sidqi. As Prime Minister he disappointed expectations.

Although apparently reconciled with Nuri Said in 1938, he was arrested and tried by court martial for treason under the latter's premiership in 1939. The death sentence passed on him was commuted to five years' imprisonment, and he was interned in Sulaimaniya. Released by Rashid Ali in April 1941, he was in Persia during Rashid Ali's rebellion.

When he returned to Iraq he devoted himself to farming and prospered. Unpopular with the Regent and Nuri Said, he took little part in politics until 1947, when he was involved in the intrigues which culminated in the fall of Saleh Jabr and the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. Since then he has often been reported to be making contact with discontented army officers and people of the Left, and is generally regarded as the "dark horse" of Iraqi politics; but this impression is probably coloured by his history and is an exaggeration of his present

influence. He had a heart attack in 1949 and is unlikely to play any great political part again though he frequently gives advice to Nuri Said. He was appointed a member of the Regency Council in April 1952 and in 1953 and 1954. Was the only member of the Regency Council in 1954 who opposed taking firm measures to deal with possible demonstrations against Iraqi acceptance of United States military aid, and, after this, used all his influence to further the candidature of Kamil Chadirehi (q.v.) in the elections of June 1954. This attitude, which implied support for the Communists with whom Chadirehi was allied, was not dictated by any liking for communism but partly from a sense of grievance at his own lack of political success (he undoubtedly thinks he might have been President of Iraq if the British had not imposed the Hashimite monarchy) and partly from a failure to understand the full impact of communism. He is a friend of Chadirehi's family and lives in the past—as well he might, since he is the youngest and last-surviving son of a great family—his eldest brother having been born in 1834! He shows considerable friendship to Her Majesty's Embassy despite his inability to converse in any language but Turkish and Arabic, but I suspect it of being a reinsurance policy.

His wife, a Daghestani, is a sister of the wife of Najib al Rawi (q.v.). She also is friendly but speaks Turkish only.

58. Husamuddin Juman

Born 1899. Sunni. Officer in the Turkish Army during the first World War. After the war entered the Police Department in Bagdad and was appointed Commandant of Police in 1932. Mutasarrif of Kirkuk in 1937, and later of Diwaniya. From 1939 to June 1941 he was Director-General of Police. Although he was much criticised for his behaviour during the Rashid Ali rebellion in May 1941 he was not punished and was appointed Mutasarrif of Mosul at the end of 1941. Between 1942 and December 1944 he held various appointments, including those of Director-General of Supplies and of Revenues. From December 1944 to 1946 he was Mayor of Bagdad, and was then transferred as Mutasarrif to Basra but resigned. Elected deputy for Diyala in 1948. Appointed Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Mustafa al Umari in July 1952. Just before the riots in November he became Acting Minister of the Interior. He resigned with Mustafa al Umari when the riots began. Elected Deputy for Diyala in January 1953. Minister of the Interior under Jamil Madfai in January 1953. A wealthy man, he is a close friend of Mustafa al Umari. In appearance he is impressive but in performance undistinguished, and he finds difficulty in co-operating with his colleagues. He speaks no English.

59. Hussain Jamil

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1906. A member of the Jamil family which has marriage connexions with the Suweidis. His father was a judge. Educated at Bagdad and graduated from the Law College in 1930.

From 1933 to 1946 he served as a judge in a number of provinces including Diyala, Diwaniya, Hilla and Bagdad.

He resigned from the Public Service in 1946 in order to become a founder member of the National Democratic Party; he went into private practice as a lawyer and acted as defence counsel in a number of cases concerned with political offences.

Deputy for Bagdad, 1948. He resigned with the opposition Deputies in March 1950. Minister of Justice in Ali Jawdat's Cabinet of December 1949 to February 1950. Arrested after the disorders in November 1952. Elected president of the Bar

Association, August 1953, and Secretary-General of the National Democratic Party in November 1953. Elected Deputy for Bagdad, unopposed, in June 1954.

Hussain is a convinced Democrat and a sincere reformer who is generally respected. He is a poor man and free from suspicion or corruption. He is less intransigent than most of the opposition leaders and is not always in agreement with the leader of his party. In the autumn of 1953 he quite gratuitously telegraphed an offer to defend Dr. Musaddiq in the Persian courts and he persists in regarding him (despite ample evidence to the contrary) as a great democrat and patriot. He dislikes Americans. He speaks some English and his wife, who appears in mixed society, is fairly fluent.

60. Ibrahim Akif al Alusi

Sunni, born Bagdad, 1894. Graduated from Istanbul Medical College in 1916 and served in Iraq under the Turks.

He later joined the Iraqi Health Service and rose to be Director-General of Public Health in 1939. He was also Secretary-General of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society for some time.

Minister of Education under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944-45. Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs in 1946; Minister in Damascus, December 1948; Minister in Ankara, February 1950; Ambassador there, 1953.

As Minister of Education he was incompetent and prejudiced, and it is generally considered that he was not a success in Damascus. Superficially friendly, he is a born intriguer.

61. Ismail Safwat

Sunni of Mosul, born 1894. In Turkish times he graduated from the Teachers' Training School, and was a teacher in 1914. He was conscripted and served as a warrant officer in Eastern Anatolia during the first world war. In 1919 he joined the Arab army at Deir el Zor and took part in Jamil Madfai's advance on Tel 'Afar in 1920. After the collapse of Faisal's régime in Syria he went to Turkey.

He came to Iraq in 1922 and joined the Iraqi army. He was on Bekr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'état* in 1936. From 1940 to 1943 he headed the Iraqi Military Mission to the Yemen. After his return to Iraq he held several brigade commands. Director of Military Operations, Ministry of Defence, 1944. Promoted Major-General, 1946.

In October 1947 he presided over the Arab League Military Committee which sat at Aley Lebanon. Appointed Deputy C.G.S. early in 1948, he was made Commander of the Irregular Arab Army of liberation on the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine in May 1948. He returned to Iraq and was appointed G.O.C., Second Division, Kirkuk, in 1949. In the autumn of 1950 he became Deputy Chief of the General Staff on the revival of that appointment. In June 1952 was appointed director-general of the Iraq State Railways. In the spring of 1953 he quarrelled with Abdul Wahab Murjan and went on leave.

He is a taciturn man with no sense of humour, but he has a reputation for efficiency and for being a good disciplinarian. He has been reported as interested in politics, and he is a close friend and supporter of Jamil Madfai and Ali Jawdat who are also both from Mosul.

As Director-General of the State Railways he has not proved a success and is said to show little interest in anything but giving jobs to his protégés. It is expected that he will not last much longer.

62. Jalal Baban

Kurd of the Baban family, born 1892. At first an extreme nationalist, he was deported in 1920 but

released in 1921. Appointed Qaimmaqam in 1923 and later promoted to be Mutasarrif, he served in the administration until 1932.

Minister of Economics and Communications under Naji Shaukat in 1932, of Defence under Rashid Ali in 1933, and of Education under Jamil Madfai in 1934. Director-General of Finance 1934-35 and 1936-37.

Minister of Communications and Works under Nuri Said 1939-40 and under Jamil Madfai in 1941. Minister of Finance under Nuri Said in 1943. Senator 1937-43.

Again appointed Minister of Communications and Works under Mohammed al Sadr in January 1948, he managed to retain his portfolio in the succeeding Governments of Muzahim al Pachachi and Nuri Said until November 1949. Deputy for Diyala in the 1948 elections. Resigned his seat on his appointment as a Member of the Development Board.

No man is better versed than Jalal in the art of government as practised in Iraq. Like his distant cousin Jamal Baban (q.v.), he has been the Kurd in many Governments, though neither he nor Jamal can speak Kurdish nor have any special interest in Kurdistan. An unusually competent but elusive Minister, he is undoubtedly corrupt, but except in 1938 has managed to avoid open scandal.

63. Jamal Baban

A Kurdish lawyer of the Baban family, born 1890. After serving for some time as a judge in Northern Iraq he became Deputy for Erbil in 1928.

Minister of Justice under Nuri Said 1930-32, under Jamil Madfai 1933-34, and under Ali Jawdat 1934-35. In 1935 he joined the party organised by Jamil Madfai to oppose Yasin al Hashimi.

Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri Said 1941-42 and of Justice under Saleh Jabr in 1947. Between his ministerial appointments he practised as a lawyer, and was often Deputy. Appointed Senator in July 1947. Minister of Justice under Mustafa al Umari July 1952. His lenient treatment of the Communists during the autumn of 1952 gravely weakened the Government's authority.

Like his relative Jalal Baban (q.v.), he has been almost a professional Kurdish Minister. As Minister under Saleh Jabr he was criticised for venality and for influencing judges. He was Acting Prime Minister during Saleh Jabr's absence in London for the signature of the Portsmouth Treaty, and his handling of the situation caused by the demonstration was inept: but in his defence it must be said that Saleh Jabr had kept him in the dark over the course of the negotiations. He resigned with two other Ministers before Saleh Jabr himself gave up hope, and has not been very active since. He is critical of the measures taken against Iraqi Jews in 1950 and 1951. He is a champion of the cause of the emancipation of women. An attractive but weak man.

64. Jamal Umar Nadhmi

Kurd, born in 1912. Son of Umar Nadhmi (q.v.). Studied at the American University of Beirut.

After serving in the Northern liwas and in Diyala he was appointed Mutasarrif of Basra in July 1949. Deputy for Rania, January 1953. Re-elected 1954.

Energetic and respected by the local officials and fond of social life. He has a good name for honesty. Intelligent but easily excited and violently anti-Jewish. He has no particular political affiliations but he is thought to have prospects as an Iraqi diplomatic representative abroad. He speaks excellent English. His wife is a daughter of Rauf al Kubaisi.

He was exceedingly helpful during the Abadan crisis and gave every possible help and facility to

our evacuees. Under a bumbling exterior conceals unexpected ability and enjoys respect.

65. Jamil Abdul Wahhab

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1910 of a middle-class family. Educated at Baghdad Law College and practised for a short time.

Joined Iraqi Government service in 1933, and was appointed Assistant Magistrate, Baghdad. He was later transferred to Baquba.

Deputy for Diyala in 1939 and Baghdad in 1943 and 1947. He lost his seat in 1948, but became Deputy for Mahmudiya in 1950. A member of the Central Committee of Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party from its foundation in 1949.

Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said 1946, and under Saleh Jabr 1947. Appointed Minister of Justice in Nuri's Cabinet in July 1951. Deputy for Baghdad, January 1953. Deputy for Kut, 1954.

His marriage in 1933 to a niece of Nuri Said is the main reason for his political advancement. In spite of this connexion, his attitude during the Rashid Ali rebellion was ambiguous. He is a personal friend of the Crown Prince and Shaker al Wadi, and in April 1949 was selected as Iraqi Minister at Cairo. The Egyptian Government, however, refused the agreement. He is reported to have engaged in doubtful land transactions in Hilla liwa and he is said to be dissolute, ambitious and untrustworthy. He speaks a little English.

66. Jamil Madfai

Sunni of Mosul, born about 1886. Educated Istanbul and gazetted an officer in the Turkish Army. He joined the Arab revolt and in 1920 was commanding the Sharifian forces at Deir el Zor. In that year he instigated the murder of the British Political Officer and entered Tel Afar, calling upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Sharif. He retired to Syria when British troops approached from Mosul.

Returned to Iraq in 1923 and served as Mutasarrif in several liwas.

Deputy from 1929 and President of the Chamber from 1932 to 1933; Senator from 1935 to 1945 and again from 1948 onwards. President of the Senate 1943, 1949, 1950 and 1951.

Minister of Interior under Nuri Pasha 1930; Prime Minister 1933 and again in 1934 with a different Cabinet. Minister of Defence under Ali Jaudat, August 1934; Prime Minister again for twelve days in March 1935, after which he was forced to resign by an agitation in the Middle Euphrates organised by Yasin Pasha al Hashimi. He refused an invitation to join the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman after the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'Etat* in 1936. He visited the Yemen in the winter of 1936-37 to obtain the Imam's adherence to the Iraqi-Saudi pact of Arab Brotherhood. Became Prime Minister again in August 1937 after the murder of Bekr Sidqi and Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation. He was forced to resign in December 1938 by a military demonstration organised in favour of Nuri Said. He accompanied the Regent on his flight to Palestine during the Rashid Ali rebellion in 1941 and after its collapse became Prime Minister for a short time. In 1943 at the suggestion of Nuri Pasha, he toured the Arab countries to canvass support for Arab unity. In 1948 after the riots against the Portsmouth Treaty he took the portfolio of Interior under Muhammad al Sadr for a few months. In 1949 he was sent by Nuri Said to various Arab capitals in an attempt to unify Arab policy towards Palestine. Accompanied the Regent on the latter's official visits to Spain in May 1952 and to Amman in May 1953. When disorders broke out in November 1952 and Mustafa al Umari's Government resigned, the Regent called on him to form

a Cabinet. He failed to do so but became Prime Minister after the elections in January 1953. He resigned when King Faisal II acceded to the throne and was reappointed in May 1953, resigning in September 1953. He refused to be a member of the Regency Council in 1954 because he would not accept Muhammad al Sadr as its chairman.

Jamil Madfai is said to have been energetic and resolute in his earlier years. He is popular in most political circles and his influence, which is generally used on the side of moderation, is still considerable, but he is an ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others and afraid of making enemies. He is unlikely to take any further political part except as a figurehead, but he is said to have influenced Nuri Said against Saleh Jabr. His acquisitions of land and commercial interests have made him a rich man. He speaks no English.

67. Jamil al Urfali

Born about 1907, of a long-established Baghdad family. Sunni. Educated at Baghdad Law College, whence he graduated in 1930, and studied for a short time at the London School of Economics. On his return he edited a weekly legal journal. He joined the Iraqi Judicial Service 1933 and served as a Judge in Hilla, Diwaniya, Nasiriya and later as Chief Magistrate and President of the Execution Department, Baghdad.

Deputy for Diyala 1947, 1953 and again in 1954. Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies 1949 and 1953. Founder-member and member of the Central Committee of Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party, December 1949. Minister without Portfolio in charge of Arafat Affairs under Tawfiq Suweidi, 1950. Minister of Justice in Dr. Jamali's first Government, September 1953, and Minister of Education in his second, March 1954.

He is a protégé of Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, without much personal influence. He speaks very little English.

68. Kamil Chadirchi

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1901. Half-brother of Raouf Chadirchi (q.v.). His father was exiled in 1920 and he accompanied him to Istanbul where he studied medicine for a year.

On returning to Iraq he studied law and graduated from the Baghdad Law College in about 1925, when he was appointed to a minor position in the Ministry of Finance. Became Private Secretary to Yasin al Hashimi in 1929, and left official employment soon after to edit *Al Ikha al Watani*, the organ of Yasin Pasha's party of that name. In the early 30's he was associated with the Ahali group with Mohammed Hadid, Abdul Fattah Ibrahim and Abdul Qadir Ismail and started the newspaper *Saut al Ahali*, which has continued with some interruption and changes of name ever since. He was convicted under the Press Law in 1934 and arrested in the same year for publishing pamphlets against King Ghazi but released for lack of evidence.

The Ahali group was privy to the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'Etat* against Yasin al Hashimi in 1936 and Kamil became Minister of Economics and Commerce in the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman. He resigned in June 1937 because of the increasing influence of the Army. He later formed the Democratic Party with Mohammed Hadid, Majid Mustafa and Hikmat Sulaiman which had little success. He refused to enter Nuri Said's Cabinet in 1943. In 1946 he formed the National Democratic Party, which voluntarily suspended activity in 1948, but resumed in 1950. Both in 1946 and 1947 he was prosecuted on Press Law charges. He took a leading part in the agitation which led to the 1952 riots. He was interned for six weeks. Elected Deputy for Baghdad

June 1954 with the help of Hikmat Sulaiman and other friends of his family. He headed the "National Front," composed of the National Democratic Party, the Istiqlal Party and Peace Partisans with various fellow-travellers. Despite the fact that they only secured some ten seats in the Chamber, the National Front achieved a resounding propaganda success, conducting their election campaign with a thoroughness and efficiency which was a new feature in Iraqi politics.

Kamil is a muddle-headed idealist who holds progressive social democratic views with complete sincerity, but he is incapable of translating these views into a consistent policy suitable to Iraqi conditions. The poor success of the National Democratic Party in the past is largely due to his lack of leadership and organising ability. He is an unrelenting opponent of Nuri Said. He is known to have been in contact with the Soviet Legation in 1951 and 1952.

Formerly a rich landlord, he has now sold much of his land and is no longer wealthy. He speaks very little English.

69. Khalil Ismail

Baghdad Sunni, of an obscure family of Indian origin. Born 1903. Educated at the Baghdad Law College, he held various positions in the Ministry of Interior from 1925 to 1932.

Secretary of the Cabinet 1932-35. Appointed Director-General of Interior 1935; of Education 1936; for Foreign Affairs 1937. Mutasarrif of Amara 1937-38.

Appointed Director-General of Interior 1938; of Arafat 1940; of Census 1941; of Revenues 1942; of Finance 1943; and of Customs and Excise 1945.

In November 1948 he was made Under-Secretary in charge of the Ministry of Finance during Muzahim al Pachachi's Government. In January 1949 he became Minister of Finance under Nuri Said and held this post until the whole Cabinet resigned in autumn 1949. He became Deputy for Amara in a by-election in March 1949.

A competent though ponderous official of the old school. While Minister of Finance he gave the appearance of being friendly and co-operative, but his habit of distorting facts was apt to lead to difficulties. Both during and after his period of office he was widely accused of corruption on a large scale. Speaks excellent English and prides himself on his legal knowledge. His daughter appears modestly in mixed society.

70. Khalil Kanna

Sunni, born in Felluja about 1905. His family is of Turkoman origin. Educated at the American University of Beirut, and the Baghdad Law College, he entered Government service in 1933 and worked mainly in the Ministry of Communications and Works until 1941, when he supported Rashid Ali Gailani's *coup d'Etat* and was consequently interned.

In 1946 he was a founder-member of the Istiqlal Party, but he resigned from the Party with a flourish in 1947 and married a daughter of Ali Ridha al Askeri, thus becoming a relative of Nuri Said. Elected Deputy for the Dulaim in 1947, he was not returned in the 1948 elections. Deputy for Dulaim in by-elections of June 1950.

In January 1949 he started the newspaper *Al Ahd*, which was Nuri Said's mouthpiece. In December 1949 he became a founder-member of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party and was elected to its Central Committee.

Appointed Minister without Portfolio in Tawfiq Suweidi's Government in February 1950 to supervise press and propaganda affairs.

Appointed Minister of Education under Nuri Said in September 1950. His success in this post has

largely re-established his political reputation. He represented Iraq at the U.N.E.S.C.O. Conference in Geneva in June 1951. He visited the United Kingdom in the same year.

Elected Deputy for Falluja, January 1953. Re-elected June 1954. Minister of Education under Jamil Madfai, January and May 1953. Acted as Foreign Minister in August 1953 during absence of Tawfiq al Suwaidi in Cairo.

Led Constitutional Union Party Deputies during Dr. Jamali's Governments and failed to give him the unconditional parliamentary support promised by Nuri al Said.

A fervent Sunni and deeply distrusted by the Shias. A bitter opponent of Saleh Jabr and his party. He is a not very approachable personality, cold with strangers and slightly abrupt. Was, nevertheless, a competent Minister who got on well with the British Council representative. He speaks good English. His young wife speaks some English.

71. Mahmud I Sheikh Said : Sheikh

Kurd of the family of Barzinja Snayids. Born 1884. He inherited from his father considerable religious and tribal influence and a tradition of opposition to central authority. In Ottoman times he was notorious for his oppression and rapacity.

He was appointed Hukumdar of Sulaimaniya and given British advisers in December 1918. In June 1919 he attempted to throw off British control but was defeated, wounded and condemned to death. The sentence was commuted and he was imprisoned in India. He was again appointed Hukumdar in August 1922 but soon began to try to extend his personal power. He was summoned to Baghdad in February 1923 but took to the mountains with his personal following and remained an embarrassment to the authorities until his surrender in 1930. From 1931 to 1941 he was in forced residence at Nasiriya, Ramadi and Baghdad.

In 1941 he escaped to Kurdistan and prepared to oppose Rashid Ali's unconstitutional Government by force. Since the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion he has lived in semi-retirement at Dari Kella in Barsian near Sulaimaniya.

He is still very influential in Sulaimaniya and causes the local authorities some trouble. He hates all Arabs and holds the Baghdad Government in contempt. He has three sons, Raouf, Baba Ali (q.v.) and Latif. He speaks Turkish and Arabic in addition to Kurdish.

72. Majid Mustafa

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born about 1895. An officer in the Turkish Army during the First World War, he remained pro-Turkish for some time and later became an active supporter of Sheikh Mahmud (q.v.).

Appointed Mudir Nahiya 1927; Qaimmaqam 1928-35; Mutasarrif 1935-41; he was an able administrator.

His attitude during Rashid Ali's rebellion in 1941 was equivocal, and he forfeited the trust of both sides. On the Regent's return to Baghdad he was suspended for four years for having complied with Rashid Ali's orders.

Nevertheless in December 1943 the Regent reluctantly agreed to his appointment as Minister without Portfolio to advise on Kurdish affairs in Nuri Said's Government. He achieved a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa of Barzan in January 1944, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs under Nuri Said in September 1950 and elected Deputy for Erbil in November 1950. Minister of Social Affairs under Mustafa al Umari July 1952 and under Nuruddin Mahmud November 1952. Resigned in December 1952. Deputy for Sulaimaniya January 1953. Re-elected June 1954 largely through

Government intervention in the elections. Minister of Social Affairs under Jamil Madfai January and May 1953.

Although he is a Kurd first and an Iraqi afterwards, Majid has proved an able Minister. He has sought the assistance of this embassy on numerous occasions in connexion with the reorganisation of his Ministry. In the summer of 1951 he was given a tour of social services in the United Kingdom by the British Council and returned an enthusiastic admirer of Britain and with a much improved knowledge of English. Subsequently, however, the apathy of other members of the Cabinet to his ideas of social reform have discouraged him, and, with the resignation of Jamil Madfai's Government, returned to his large and successful business interests which include a marble quarry in Rowanduz.

73. Mar Shimun

Eshai Mar Shimun XXIIIrd, Patriarch of the Assyrians. Born about 1909, he succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury.

After his return to Iraq he inspired the mutiny of the Assyrian Levies in 1932 and the exodus of the Assyrians to Syria in 1933 which precipitated the massacres in Mosul liwa of that year. He was deported in 1933 and given asylum in Cyprus. He spent the next seven years in Europe, mostly in England and Geneva, trying to obtain assistance for his people. Granted British naturalisation in 1939 and went to Cyprus, but in 1940 he went to America and has since been living in Chicago, taking a full part in intrigues which split the Assyrians both inside and outside Iraq.

Mar Shimun's aim was to establish the whole Assyrian community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. His political inexperience and overweening ambitions caused his people much needless suffering.

74. Mudhaffar Ahmad

Sunni, born in Hilla in 1899. Educated in Baghdad, he was an officer in the Turkish army.

Gazetted Assistant Commandant of Police in 1921, he was promoted Commandant in 1932. After a course at the Birmingham City Police School he was appointed principal of the Inspectors' Training School and thereafter held several appointments on the headquarters staff of the police. As Director of the C.I.D. after Rashid Ali's rebellion he enforced energetic anti-Nazi measures. His reputation in the police was high.

Director-General of Civil Defence 1941-43; Mutasarrif of Ramadi 1943; Basra 1944-45; Mosul 1946; Bagdad 1946-48. He was allotted some of the blame for police action against the January 1948 demonstrations and was removed to the Administrative Inspectorate in March 1948. He was appointed Mayor of Bagdad in 1949, and in 1950 refused the Directorate-General of Police in succession to Ali Hejazi (q.v.). Director-General of the Dacc Association, 1951. Mutasarrif of Basra, February 1953.

Appointed Honorary O.B.E. for war services 1946.

He is a polished and popular man and a keen sportsman, but there were reports of corruption when he was Mayor of Bagdad. He is related through his mother to Nuri Said and to the Askari family, and his wife, who appears in public, is a Partow. He and his wife speak good English and Turkish and some French.

75. Muhammad Ali Chelabi

Shia of Kadhmain, born about 1910. Brother of Abdul Hadi Chelabi (q.v.). In 1933, after studying at the American University of Beirut, he

went to London to study economics. In 1938, was given a post in the Agricultural and Industrial Bank. In 1941 he was transferred to the newly-opened Rafidain Bank in Bagdad, of which he was appointed director in 1945.

He speaks good English and is married to a decorative Syrian who speaks good French.

An able but somehow rather unattractive character.

76. Muhammad Ali Mahmud

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1895. Educated Bagdad Law School and employed in the Ministry of Justice, in which he rose to become Director-General. He also held post of Director-General Tapu and in 1935 was a member of the Court of Cassation.

Deputy for Diyala in the Parliament of 1935 and for Erbil in those of 1936 and 1937. Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's re-formed Cabinet of 1937.

He was Minister of Communications and Works in Rashid Ali's unconstitutional Cabinet of April 1941. On its collapse he fled to Persia but was handed over to the British in September 1941. He was interned in Rhodesia and sent back to Iraq in 1944, where he was tried and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, but released in 1947. He was elected Deputy for Kor Sanjaq in November 1950.

His daughter is married to a son of Ja'far al Askari and probably because of this connexion he joined Nuri Pasha's constitutional party in 1949. Elected to the Central Committee of the Party in November 1950. Minister of Justice under Jamil Madfai May 1953. Appointed Deputy Prime Minister in Dr. Jamali's first Government September 1953 and Minister of Justice in his second, March 1954. He was appointed a Senator in March 1954.

A pleasant but not very intelligent man. He speaks no English.

77. Muhammad Fadhil Jamali

Shia of Kadhmain, born 1902. Educated American University, Beirut, 1921-27, and Columbia University 1927-29. Joined the Ministry of Education, 1929. Director-General of Instruction, 1933; Inspector-General of the Ministry, 1937. He visited Germany in 1937 and made arrangements for an Iraqi party to attend the Nuremberg Rally of 1938. Visited England in 1938 at the invitation of the British Council.

He was a founder member of the Muthanna Club, whose members were mostly Western educated nationalists, and whose political thinking was much influenced by national socialism. He strongly resisted British influence in the Ministry of Education and it was British influence which caused his transfer from that Ministry to a position in the Iraqi Embassy in Washington in January 1943. He did not take up this appointment, but became Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1944. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

Foreign Minister from June 1946 to January 1948 in the successive Cabinets of Arshad al Umari, Nuri Said and Saleh Jabr. During this time he attended the Palestine Conference in London in 1946 and the United Nations General Assembly in 1947. He was out of politics for a time after the failure of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, but was given a sinecure in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs later in the same year and was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo in February 1949. He was recalled almost immediately to become Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Pasha in March 1949. He resigned after six months under a constitutional rule, since he had no seat in Parliament, and was appointed Permanent

Iraqi delegate to the United Nations Organisation. He was elected Deputy for Diwaniya in the bye-elections of June 1950 and became President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1950. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Mustafa al Umari, July 1952, and Nuruddin Mahmud, November 1952. Headed Iraqi delegation to United Nations, October 1952. Deputy for Diwaniya, January 1953, and elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. Was appointed Prime Minister in September 1953 and in March 1954 formed a second Cabinet, which, however, only survived a few weeks. He attended the Arab League meetings of October 1953. Minister for Foreign Affairs in Arshad al Umari's Government April 1953, when he was taken ill with a gastric ulcer. Re-elected for Diwaniya 1954. Received an honorary degree from Columbia University (July 1954).

Jamali is a self-made man, and is one of the first of the type to reach a prominent position. Although he is ambitious, he is unlikely to become a powerful influence in the country, having little political support in his own right.

His period as Prime Minister was characterised by fair promises and lack of performance. Too much time was wasted on foreign and particularly Arab affairs and too little on social measures and much-needed reform of the Administration. It must be added, however, in fairness, that he had to contend with a Parliament with a Conservative majority which blocked or whittled down all attempts at reform and a vocal Opposition which tried with some success to shake the morale of his Ministers. His relations with both the British and the American Embassies were marked by complete frankness. He gave up the premiership in April 1954 with his reputation for integrity and sincerity unimpaired but his political weakness, instability of purpose and lack of powers of leadership had been exposed. He also showed a remarkable capacity for self-deception which led him to form his second Government when his political reputation made it much wiser for him to refuse to do so in view of his lack of support in the Chamber.

The xenophobic nationalism of his younger days has been greatly modified by his extensive contacts with the West and by a genuine conviction of the necessity for Iraq of co-operation with the West. But he will never forgive the British policy in Palestine and the Shia fanatic is not far below the surface. He is interested in Western literature and likes Western music.

He is married to a Canadian and has a large circle of British and American friends.

78. Muhammad Hassan Kubba

Shia of Bagdad, born 1891 and educated locally. In 1913 he became a teacher of Arabic at the German School in Bagdad. After the occupation he set up in commerce in a small way. He entered the Law School in 1920 and as a student was associated with the nationalist activities of Jafar Abu Timman. He graduated in 1923 and joined Government service. Judge at Suwaira 1927, at Kadhmain 1931; legal draftsman in the Ministry of Justice 1938.

Deputy 1944 and President of the Chamber 1947. Senator from July 1947 and Vice-President of the Senate December 1947. Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said 1943, he retained this portfolio in the succeeding Government of Hamdi Pachachi, but resigned to become President of the Chamber. Minister of Justice under Arshad al Umari 1946 and again in 1948 under Muzahim al Pachachi. Minister of Justice under Nuri Said January 1949. Minister without Portfolio in Nuri Said's cabinet in December 1950. Appointed Acting Minister of Health in April 1952.

A weak individual who would never have become a Minister had he been born a Sunni. He wished to resign from Arshad's Cabinet in 1946 owing to the Prime Minister's interference with the courts, but a word from the Regent restrained him. He is pleasant and friendly and proud of his erudition in Shariya law. He speaks no English.

79. Muhammad Hassan Salman, Dr.

Shia of Bagdad, born 1908. Was a teacher in Government primary schools. Entered the Iraqi Medical College, graduated as a doctor in 1934 and joined the Iraqi Medical Service. Member of the Muthanna Club. Appointed Chief Medical Officer of Health at the Ministry of Education in Rashid Ali's rebel Government, but after only one day in office he left for Turkey to undergo medical treatment. Returned to Bagdad after the war and re-joined the Iraqi Health Service as a Chief Medical Officer. Appointed Director of Amir Abdul Ilah Hospital for Chest Diseases at Tuwaitha in April 1951. Elected Deputy for Amara in January 1953 and again in June 1954. Became Minister of Health under Jamil al Madfai in January 1953. Remained Minister of Health on re-formation of Jamil al Madfai's Cabinet in May 1953. In this capacity he brought back into authority many doctors who supported Rashid Ali. He is reported to be corrupt. He speaks some English.

80. Muhammad Hussain Hadid

Sunni, born 1906 of a merchant family of Mosul. Educated at American University, Beirut, 1924 to 1928, and London School of Economics 1928 to 1931.

Employed in the Ministry of Finance 1931 to 1937; Deputy for Mosul 1937; Minister of Supply under Nuri Pasha in 1946, he resigned from this Government in protest against Government interference in the elections.

He was a prominent member of the so-called Ahali Group in the first half of the 1930's. This group advocated a mild form of socialism. Some of its members later became communists. In the later '30s he was associated with Kamul Chaderchi's Democratic Party and was one of the founder members of the National Democratic Party in 1946. He is Vice-President of this party which suspended activity in 1948 but resumed in 1950. He resigned his seat in the Chamber in 1950 with the rest of the opposition deputies in protest against the intolerance of the Government and of Nuri Said's majority party. Visited the United Kingdom in 1951, 1952 and 1953. He was in London at the time of the 1952 disorders. Letters of his criticising the "Old Guard" at that time were published in *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*. Re-elected Vice-President of the National Democratic Party November 1953. Elected Deputy for Mosul in the National Front June 1954.

Apart from his political activities, he has large business interests and is a partner with Kamul Khedairi in a flourishing soap business which exports to India and Egypt.

Mohammed Hadid is an intelligent and sincere democrat, an effective speaker and a persuasive writer, but he has not made the intellectual effort required to transform the ideas he learned at the London School of Economics into a suitable policy for Iraq. Although a nationalist and a critic of British influence in Iraq, he is friendly to us and has a number of British friends. He dislikes Americans. He speaks excellent English.

81. Muhammad Hussain al Kashif al Ghita

The most important Arab Shia mujtahid of Najaf. Born between 1880 and 1890 of a large family of Najaf, he was educated in the religious schools of

Najaf, and is said to be very learned in Shi'ite law and theology. He has published a popular book on the origins and doctrine of the Shia.

He was Iraqi delegate to the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931, and has since visited Persia. In 1935 he played a prominent part in the Euphrates tribal insurrections against Yasin al Hashimi's Government, hoping thereby to secure for the Shia a greater share in the Government of Iraq. After the defeat of the tribes he withdrew to the silence of Najaf.

Suspected in 1939 of accepting money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling, he issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in 1941, but recanted after Rashid Ali's defeat and managed to rehabilitate himself very quickly. His nephew Ahmad was, however, interned from 1941 to 1944. During the disorders in Nejjef in November 1952 he showed personal courage in driving round the town appealing to the mobs to go home.

Honoured by all Iraqi Shias, Sheikh Muhammad Hussain still has some influence with the tribes of Southern Iraq. A foxy, inscrutable man and a born intriguer, he maintains relations with several Shi'ite politicians. He hates Communist Russia, but will never forgive the British for their policy in Palestine.

82. Muhammad Mahdi al Jawahiri

A Shia born at Nejjaf in 1901. At one time he was employed by the Ministry of Education, but was removed from service prior to Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* in 1936. He has long been associated with various Left-wing newspapers, but is best known as a poet for which he has a considerable reputation throughout the Arab-speaking world. He has published two volumes of his works, and is at present working on the publication of a further two volumes, for which he received a grant from the Ministry of Education of £300 early in 1952.

He is a man of pronounced Left-wing views, but although he is ideologically a Marxist he is not an activist.

He has been prominently connected with the "Peace" movement in Iraq, and in November 1950 was elected as a member of the World Peace Council at the Second World Peace Congress, held in Warsaw in November 1950. In May 1951 he left Iraq for Egypt and is known to have attended a meeting of the Peace Council at Vienna before returning to Iraq in November 1951.

For this reason he has been severely criticised by leading Left-wing persons, and it has been alleged that the grant he received from the Ministry of Education for publishing his poetical works was the price of his silence. He was arrested after the riots in November 1952. Since his release he appears to have abandoned his Left-wing activities. He recited a poem in praise of the monarchy during the celebrations at King Faisal II's accession. Contested the 1954 elections but withdrew.

In January 1951 he became chief editor of a new Left-wing newspaper, *Al Thabat*, until its suppression by the Government in April 1952. He then became owner and editor of another new Left-wing daily newspaper, *Al Jihad*. This was suspended in November 1952. In 1953 he began publishing a new newspaper, *Al Jadid*.

83. Muhammad Mahdi Kubba

Born about 1900 of the well-known Bagdad Shia family of Kubba, he was educated in the religious seminary at Najaf in Grammar, Persian and theology.

After the First World War he engaged in quite a humble way in the textile trade in common with

other members of his family. He never held Government office of any kind until 1948, although he was once a Deputy for Bagdad in 1937.

He was a member of the Nationalist Muthanna Club from its foundation and was helped into politics by a fellow member Dr. Jamali (q.v.). He developed pro-Axis sympathies during a visit to Germany in the late 30's but took no active part in the Rashid Ali movement.

He was made president of the Istiqlal Party on its formation in 1946, probably owing to his Shia origin, well-known name, and clean record. His voice in its councils is less effective than those of Faiq Samarrai and Siddiq Shenshal. Re-elected president of the Istiqlal Party in November 1950, he strongly supported the Persian Government in their efforts to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951.

Minister of Supply in the Sadr Cabinet of January 1948, he resigned in June over the conduct of the elections. However, he became Deputy for Bagdad in these elections, but resigned his seat in protest, in common with the rest of the opposition, in March 1950. He was re-elected in the by-elections in June. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952. He took a prominent part in the agitation which led to the riots in November 1952, after which he was interned.

In November 1953 re-elected President of Istiqlal Party, and in June 1954 was returned unopposed for Bagdad. He took his party into the National Front in the elections of June 1954, collaborating with the National Democratic Party and the Peace Partisans. Though this manoeuvre obtained a measure of success there were indications that he was not altogether happy with all the policies of his associates, particularly the Communist line on "Peace with Israel."

An untidy looking man, he has a reputation for sobriety and honesty. His enemies accuse him of folly rather than knavery. Intelligent, but not politically astute, he only speaks Arabic and Persian. He is a strong opponent of British "imperialism."

84. Muhammad Ridha Shabibi

Shia of Nejjaf, born 1889. Educated in the religious schools of Nejjaf. In 1908 he began to publish poetry in the Egyptian periodical press and acquired a reputation as a literary man. He played some part in the nationalist disturbances in Nejjaf during the occupation. In 1919 he was sent to the Hejaz by some Iraqi nationalists to offer the Iraqi throne to the Amir Abdullah; thence he went to Syria and did not return to Bagdad until 1921.

He was a member of the Constituent Assembly and was Deputy for Bagdad in most Iraqi Parliaments until 1935. Senator from 1935 to 1943 and President of the Senate for a few months in 1937. He returned to the Lower House in 1943 and was its President in 1943-44. He resigned from Parliament with the Opposition deputies in March 1950. Deputy for Bagdad, January 1953.

Minister for Education under Yasin al Hashimi in 1924, he resigned from this Government with Rashid Ali Gailani over the Turkish Petroleum Company concession. Again Minister for Education in 1935 under Yasin al Hashimi, under Jamil Madfai in 1937 and 1941, and under Mohammed al Sadr in 1948.

In 1951 he played a prominent part in the formation of the United Popular Front and was elected Chairman of the Front's Political Committee. He was offered the Deputy Premiership by Nasrat al Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953. In November 1953 elected President, United Popular Front, succeeding Taha al Hashimi. Appointed Senator in February 1954.

A genial old bigot whose views on education are strongly reactionary. He is a strong critic of British

influence in Iraq, but he is personally friendly to Englishmen. He is on good terms with Nuri al Said. He speaks no English.

85. Muhammad Said Qazzaz

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born about 1903. Largely self educated. He began his career as a clerk in the Mutasarrifiya in Sulaimaniya in 1924. Appointed Qaimmaqani of Halebja in 1934. Transferred in 1939 to Zakho and in 1941 to Kifri. From 1941 to 1944 he served in the Ministry of the Interior. In 1944 he was appointed Mutasarrif at Kut. Transferred to Erbil in 1945 and to Kirkuk in 1947, after a short spell as an Administrative Inspector. Appointed Mutasarrif of Mosul in 1949. Was offered an appointment with the Basra Petroleum Company in the spring of 1952, but at Nuri Said's request agreed to remain at Mosul until the general elections.

Minister of Social Affairs under Nuruddin Mahmud, December 1952. Appointed Director-General of Iraqi Ports in February 1953 but resigned after a quarrel over the appointment of Finance Officer with Abdul Wahab Murjan (q.v.) in March. Reappointed in June 1953. In September 1953 was appointed Minister of the Interior in Dr. Jamali's Government and retained that post when Dr. Jamali reformed the Government in March 1954. In October 1953 by agreement with the Talabani family was elected Deputy for Kirkuk at a by-election. In April 1954 was Minister of the Interior in Arshad al Umari's Cabinet and responsible for the conduct of elections. Although he did not escape the accusation of interference especially from the Left, he conducted the elections well and did not allow a difficult security situation to get out of hand. He resigned directly the elections were over. His participation in these three Governments was not entirely in accordance with his desires, since he would much rather have retained the post of Director-General of Ports and he felt himself entitled to criticise Dr. Jamali's weaknesses, particularly the decision to allow students expelled for Communist tendencies to re-enter the Government schools and colleges. He succeeded in his nine months of office in building up the morale of the police which had remained at a low ebb since the events of 1952.

He has visited England and in the summer of 1950 he toured America as a guest of the United States Government.

Hard working, honest and fearless, Said Qazzaz is generally regarded as one of the best administrators in the country. He is a close friend of Mustafa al Umari and Majid Mustafa. He speaks good English.

86. Muhammad al Sadr (Sayid)

Shia of Kadhmain, born about 1885. Educated in religious circles at Kadhmain.

He was a strong nationalist in the early days of the British occupation and took an active part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria after its suppression and returned with King Faisal in June 1921.

Appointed Senator in 1925. He was president of the Senate from 1929 to 1937 and again after a short interval from 1937 to 1943. He was several times a member of the Regency Council during the Regent's and King Faisal II's absences from Iraq. Prime Minister January to June 1948. He administered the oath at King Faisal II's accession. Was elected President of the Senate in December 1953.

Muhammad al Sadr's political importance is due to his religious prestige and his nationalist past. For these reasons he is always consulted at moments of crisis but his weakness, ignorance and incapacity were amply proved by his total failure as Prime Minister

to restore normal conditions after the disturbances in Bagdad which removed Salah Jaber and secured the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948. He speaks no English but does his best to be friendly.

87. Muhammad Shafiq al 'Ani

Sunni of Ana. Born 1908. Graduate of the Bagdad Law College. Joined Government service in 1933. Served as a judge and in July 1946 became a Judge of a Court of First Instance. In October 1947 became President of the Sunni Sharia Bench of Cassation and in August 1952 Director-General of Auqaf. Minister of State in September 1953 and in temporary charge of the Ministry of Social Affairs in January 1954. Appointed to the Court of Cassation, March 1954. A devout Sunni, in close touch with the orthodox religious organisations. Speaks no English.

88. Muhammad Siddiq Shenshal

Sunni, born in Mosul about 1908. Studied law at Bagdad and Damascus. He subsequently studied at the Sorbonne, returning to Iraq in 1939.

After serving as a Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs he became Director of Propaganda under Rashid Ali in 1941. Although acquitted of the charges brought against him he was interned. In 1946 he took a leading part in the formation of the Istiqlal Party. Resigned with the other Istiqlal Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in February 1952. Did not contest the 1953 elections. In November 1953 elected Secretary-General of the Istiqlal Party and in June 1954 Deputy for Mosul.

Sadiq Shenshal is violently anti-British and he keeps up a flow of invective against the British connexion in Parliament and in the press. He is married to a sister of Yunis Sab'awi who was executed for the part he played in the Rashid Ali revolt. Is sometimes called the Iraqi Goebbels.

89. Muhammad Salim al Radhi

Sunni, born Bagdad 1899. He was educated in Bagdad, the American University of Beirut and the Universities of California and Texas, from which he obtained doctorates in Agriculture and Science. Returning to Iraq in 1926 he joined the Department of Agriculture, in which he eventually became, and remained for several years, Director-General.

Director-General of Labour in the Ministry of Social Affairs, 1946. Iraqi Minister in Tehran, 1947-49. Appointed first Iraqi Minister to India, July 1949. Ambassador there, 1953.

He is a landowner and is connected with the wealthy Shabandar family. His reputation in the Department of Agriculture was good, but as Minister in Tehran he was not popular with the Persians. Iraqi Shias accuse him of being a fanatical Sunni. He and his attractive wife both speak English well.

90. Mulla Mustafa

Kurdish chieftain of Barzan, born about 1898. Younger brother of Ahmad of Barzan (q.v.). Mulla is a name not a title.

He was the fighting leader of the Barzanis in the troubles of 1931-32, surrendered with Sheikh Ahmad in 1933, and was banished to Sulaimaniya, where he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government.

In 1943 he escaped to Barzan, where he soon became involved in skirmishes with the Iraqi police. At first concerned only with his own position, he later began to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism and won much Kurdish sympathy and support. He resisted successfully the forces of police and troops sent against him. In January 1944, a settlement was arranged, and he visited Bagdad to make submission to the Regent. Returning to Barzan, he remained

restless, but was formally pardoned in April 1945, when the Iraqi Government announced a programme for improving security and developing agriculture in the Barzan area.

Becoming impatient, he again took up arms against the Government in August 1945. Large Iraqi forces and clever bribery administered by Mustafa al Umari (q.v.) eventually defeated the Barzanis, and he and his brother Ahmed fled to Persia, where they were well received by the Russian authorities.

After the collapse of the Persian Kurdish independence movement led by Qazi Muhammad, Mulla Mustafa and his brother retired before the Persian forces and entered Iraq in May 1947. Sheikh Ahmad surrendered to the Iraqi Government but Mulla Mustafa refused unconditional surrender and managed to escape with a few hundred men through Turkey and Azerbaijan into the Soviet Union.

At first welcomed by the Russian authorities, but now, it is said, despised, Mulla remains in the U.S.S.R. Popular fear of his eventual return keeps his name alive in Iraq.

91. Musa Shabandar

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1899, the son of a wealthy landowner. His brother Ibrahim is a prominent Bagdad merchant. Educated in Bagdad and in Switzerland, he was in Europe from 1918 to 1932, mostly in Switzerland and Germany.

Joined the Iraqi Foreign Service, 1932; Secretary of Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations, 1933; First Secretary, Berlin, 1935. In 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain. He was recalled and arrested, but proceedings against him were dropped.

Deputy for Amara 1937 to 1939.

Re-appointed to the Foreign Service 1939 and sent to Berlin as chargé d'affaires. Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 1939. Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali in April 1941. He fled to Persia after Rashid Ali's collapse, but was caught and interned in Rhodesia and later sent back to Iraq for trial. He was sentenced in 1944 to five years' imprisonment and sequestration of property. Owing to ill-health he did not serve all his sentence.

He has been free since 1947 and in 1949 he joined Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party and was appointed Minister at Damascus. Appointed Ambassador in Washington in June 1953. In March 1954 was named as Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamali's second Cabinet but succeeded in staying in Washington.

Musa Shabandar is not a strong personality. He is intelligent and accommodating, an official rather than a politician. He is married to a Lebanese and speaks English, French and German.

92. Mustafa al Umari

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born in 1893 and educated at the Bagdad Law School, he served as an officer in the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia in the first world war and was taken prisoner.

He entered Government service at the end of the war, served as Qaimmaqam and Mutasarrif in several districts and also held the posts of Accountant-General and Director-General of Interior.

He was Minister of Interior under Hikmat Sulaiman in 1937; under Jamil Madfai, 1937-38 and in 1941; under Hamdi Pachachi, 1944-46 and under Muzahim Pachachi in 1948. He has also been Minister of Justice under Madfai in late 1938, of Economics under Muhammad as Sadr, January-June 1948 (Acting Interior from March 1948 onwards), and without Portfolio under Muzahim at the end of 1948 and under Nuri Said from December 1950. He has been a Senator since 1937. Acting Prime Minister during Nuri Said's absences from Iraq in the first

half of 1952, accompanied the Regent to Amman in June 1952. In July he became Prime Minister. He resigned when rioting broke out in November. His term as a Senator expired in 1954 and despite his wire-pulling has not been renewed. He tried to organise a bloc of young Deputies critical of the Government in the 1953 Parliament but it came to nothing. He pushes his political views through his son-in-law, Ramzi al Umari, Deputy for Mosul.

Of all Iraqi politicians and officials Mustafa is probably the most notorious for corruption. He is also one of the most capable administrators in the country. He may be said to exhibit the best and the worst features of the Ottoman idea of Government. His administration during 1945 and his conduct of the 1948 elections aroused severe criticism, but he served his country well during the Barzani troubles of 1945, when his well-directed bribery was of great assistance to the Iraqi forces operating against Mulla Mustafa. His term as Prime Minister was almost disastrous, however. His unimaginative handling of the Opposition parties' demand for direct elections was one of the causes of the riots in November 1952, and his resignation at the height of the disorders was almost criminally irresponsible. Is slowly on his way out. He speaks only a little English.

93. Muzahim Amin al Pachachi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888. Educated at the Law School in Bagdad and graduated in 1912. Before the 1914 war he was a strong Arab nationalist. He wrote for Arab nationalist papers and had to flee to Basra in 1913 to escape arrest. After the war he was employed as a magistrate by the occupation authorities in Basra and returned to Bagdad in 1922.

He joined Government service in March 1923 and became Minister of Communications and Works under Yasin al Hashimi in 1924. In 1927 he was sent to London as Iraqi Diplomatic Agent, returning in 1928. Minister of Economics and Communications under Nuri Pasha, January 1931, and almost immediately after Minister of Interior in the same Government. He resigned in October 1931 because of differences with his colleagues over his dismissal of the Amin al Asima, Mahmud Subhi Daftari. In May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous letters about the King. He was tried and acquitted in October 1932.

Iraqi Minister at Rome and Permanent Iraqi delegate at Geneva, 1934; Minister at Paris, 1939; he remained there as Minister to the Vichy Government and did not return when Iraq broke off relations in November 1941 but went instead to Rome. In 1944 he went to Geneva and sought facilities to return to Iraq, which were refused. He eventually returned in November 1945.

Prime Minister, June 1948 to January 1949; deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs under Ali Jawdat, December 1949 to February 1950. He was appointed Senator in 1948 but the appointment was held to be constitutionally invalid by a High Court in 1950. He left Iraq for Egypt and Saudi Arabia just before the issue of this decision. He returned to Iraq in November 1950 and took a leading part in the formation of the United Popular Front in May 1951. Resigned from the Front in May 1952.

Muzahim's character presents some contradiction. He is a strong nationalist and resents "imperialism" deeply, but he has been much influenced by the Social Democratic ideas which he has encountered during his prolonged residence in Western Europe. He is often reasonable, but can be stupidly obstinate. Politically courageous at times, at others he gives up without a struggle. His ideas on general policy are sensible, but as a political tactician he is inept. He hates Nuri Pasha and strongly resents his influence with the Crown Prince. This has led him to criticise

the latter indiscreetly on occasion. He is very deaf. He speaks English.

He has kept much in the background during the past two years and is still not reconciled with the Crown Prince.

94. Nadhif Shawi

Sunni, originally of the Ubaid tribe. Born Bagdad 1887. Educated at the Military College, Istanbul, and gazetted an officer in the Turkish army in 1909. He served in Syria in the Turkish Coastal Defence forces throughout the first world war. Afterwards he joined King Faisal's army in Syria and fought against the French at Maysaloun in 1920.

After the expulsion of Faisal from Syria he returned to Bagdad and for some years was a secondary school teacher. During this period he graduated from the Bagdad Law School.

He joined the Iraqi army in 1927. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England, and on his return was given command of the Iraqi Staff College. Brigadier and Assistant C.G.S., 1937; retired, 1939.

Minister of Defence under Jamil Madfai, June to October 1941. Deputy for Dulaim, 1943 to 1947. Founder member of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party, June 1951. He was described as a pleasant but colourless Minister.

95. Nadim Shakir al Pachachi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1914. Nephew of the late Hamdi Pachachi and of Muzahim Pachachi (q.v.). Educated at Victoria College, Alexandria and London University.

Returned to Bagdad in 1938 and was appointed to the Ministry of Economics in which he rose to be Director-General by 1944.

He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations in 1946 and visited London and America in 1948 to try to obtain support for the proposed Iraqi Oil Refinery at Baiji. Early in 1950 he quarrelled with his Minister, Dhia Jaafar, and tendered his resignation. His resignation was not accepted and he was appointed Director-General of Oil Affairs in June 1950. In this capacity he was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company in the summer and autumn of 1950. In March 1951 he again became Director-General of Economics. He again visited the United Kingdom in connexion with tenders for the oil refinery and the Iraq Government's gold case against the Iraq Petroleum Company. Played a leading part in the negotiations of 1951.

In July 1952 he became Minister of Economics under Mustafa al Umari. Joined Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet in the same capacity in December 1952. Minister of State under Jamil Madfai in May 1953. Elected Deputy for Bagdad in January 1953. In July 1953 was appointed Minister of Development in Jamil Madfai's Government. In 1954 he visited the United Kingdom as member of Iraqi Parliamentary Delegation and in June 1954 was re-elected Deputy for Bagdad running in double harness with Abdul Karim al Uzri (q.v.).

Nadim has not a very strong personality but he is an exceptionally intelligent and competent official whose rapid rise was not entirely due to the influence of his family. He is friendly and co-operative. In addition to his official position he is a landowner and farmer on a large scale. He divorced his first wife (a Pachachi) in 1947 in order to marry a cabaret artiste. He divorced his second wife in 1950 and married an American girl in 1952. He speaks excellent English.

96. Dr. Najib al Asil

Bagdad Sunni, born about 1895. A graduate of the Constantinople Medical School in Ottoman times, he

first became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. After Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz he became destitute and was deported to Iraq in 1925.

Employed in the Iraqi Military Medical Service from 1926, he was appointed Iraqi Consul-General and chargé d'affaires in Jidda in 1931 and transferred to Mohammerah in 1932. Acting Director-General of Foreign Affairs 1933-34; Counsellor in Tehran 1935; Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1936.

Minister for Foreign Affairs under Hikmat Sulaiman 1936-37, he went into retirement after that Cabinet's resignation until 1944, when he was appointed Director-General of Antiquities. Appointed permanent Iraqi delegate to the United Nations Organisation by the Sadr Cabinet in February 1948. He was recalled in June 1948 and returned to the Antiquities Department. Appointed an Active Member of the Iraq Academy in November 1949. He organised the Avicenna Festival in Iraq in March 1952. October 1953 was elected President of Iraq Academy.

A polished and intelligent but ponderous man, he is a close friend of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.) but is not now on close terms with the active politicians. He began well in the Antiquities Department but later his work was affected by his personal financial difficulties. He speaks English well.

97. Naji Shaukat

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891, brother of Sami Shaukat (q.v.). Educated Istanbul and became a reserve officer in the Turkish Army. Joined the Arab revolt at Aqaba in 1916.

He returned to Bagdad in 1919 and from 1921 to 1928 was Mutasarrif of various southern liwas, ending with Bagdad 1924-28.

He first became a Deputy in 1929; Minister of Interior under Abdul Muhsin Saadun in 1928 and again in 1929; Iraqi Minister at Ankara 1930-31; Minister of Interior under Nuri Said 1931; Prime Minister 1932; Minister of Interior under Jamil Madfai 1933; again Iraqi Minister at Ankara 1934. In this capacity he accompanied Tawfiq Rustu Aras, the then Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on an official visit to Iraq in 1937. He was then offered a portfolio in the Government of Hikmat Sulaiman, but declined because of his objection to Bekr Sidqi's influence. Minister of Interior under Nuri Said 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Minister of Justice under Rashid Ali March 1940.

After the collapse of France he became a strong advocate of reinsuring with the Axis and, with Rashid Ali's approval, he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador, Herr von Papen. He resigned from the Government in January 1941, but became Minister of Defence in the unconstitutional cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During the Rashid Ali rebellion in May he went to Turkey to try to enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause, and remained in Turkey after the collapse of the rebellion. He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. He spent the war years between Berlin and Rome, receiving a Minister's salary from the Reich Government. In the summer of 1945 he was arrested in Italy, sent back to Iraq and imprisoned.

He was pardoned by the Regent in May 1948, but rarely appears in public. He attended the memorial service for King George VI at the Anglican Church in Bagdad.

98. Najib al Rawi

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1898; brother of Ahmed al Rawi (q.v.). Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he worked for a short time as a clerk in the

Revenue Department under the British Administration. He has a large practice as a lawyer and was President of the Lawyers' Association in 1942 and again in 1947.

He entered politics as a protégé of Nuri Said in 1930 and was Deputy for Dulaim in the Parliaments of 1930, 1934, 1937, 1943, 1947 and 1948. He resigned his seat with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950.

Minister of Education under Tawfiq Suweidi 1946; Minister of Justice under Mohammed al Sadr in 1948; Minister of Education in the succeeding Governments of Muzahim al Pachachi, Nuri Said and Ali Jaudat, June 1948 to February 1950. He represented Iraq at the Paris Session of U.N.O. in September 1948. Appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo in August 1950, and Ambassador in November 1952. He has on the whole made a success of his mission to Egypt and successive Governments have been content with him. In January 1954 his term of duty was extended for a further two years.

Politically he is a trimmer and has a foot in several camps, though he is generally regarded as primarily a Palace man. He is friendly to the British connexion but is not altogether trustworthy. He is married to one of the Daghestani sisters and speaks a little English.

99. Najib al Rubaii

A Sunni Muslim of the influential Rubaii family. Brother of Hassib al Rubaii, the Deputy Chief of General Staff (Administration) (g.v.). Admitted Sandhurst in 1928 and is now a major-general in command of the 3rd Cadre Division.

Is a very well educated man, with considerable academic leanings, which he prefers to soldiering. His English is good, though he is too much an Arab to enjoy speaking anything but Arabic. He is very religious and is capable of interfering in politics if his conscience directed such a course.

100. Nasrat al Farisi

Sunni of Bagdad, born about 1890. Educated Bagdad Law School.

He was conscripted for the Turkish Army before he had graduated, and served as a warrant officer during the 1914-18 war in which he saw service against the Russians at Hamadan and against the British at Kut.

After the war he completed his legal studies in Istanbul and returned to Bagdad about 1922.

He served for several years in the twenties as legal draughtsman in the Ministry of Justice.

First Deputy for Bagdad in 1926 and again in 1932, and in most of the Iraqi Parliaments since then. He resigned his seat with the Opposition Deputies in March 1950.

Director-General of Foreign Affairs 1935. Iraqi delegate at Geneva 1937 to 1938. He was appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in April 1943 but did not proceed. In 1945 he was a member of the Iraqi delegation at San Francisco.

Minister of Finance under Naji Shaukat 1932 and again under Jamil Madfai 1933. Minister of Economics under Jamil Madfai, June to October 1941. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Nuri Said June to October 1943. In the Cabinet of Muhammad Sadr of 1948 he was first Minister without Portfolio, then Minister of Interior and finally Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was closely associated with the formation of the United Popular Front in May 1951. Resigned from the Front in May 1952. Appointed a Senator in April 1953.

After the elections in January 1953 he was asked to form a Cabinet. He first invited former members of the Istiqlal and National Democratic Parties to join but, when they refused, tried to form a coalition consisting of former members of the

United Popular Front and the Constitutional Union Party and a few Independents. At the last moment Nuri's supporters withdrew and he abandoned his attempts to form a Government. His name is still frequently mentioned as the next Prime Minister but somehow it never comes off and age makes his chances less likely.

Nasrat is more of a Turk than an Arab, although he was known as an Arab nationalist in the twenties when he was a member of the Sha'ab party of Yasin al Hashimi. He is honest, intelligent and cautious. His approach to political questions is legalistic and theoretical. His friend Hikmat Sulaiman calls him "Confucius." When considering any course of action he sees the difficulties more clearly than the advantages and is inclined to be obstructive. This characteristic made him one of Iraq's worst Ministers of Interior. He is a sincere reformer who believes in parliamentary democracy and resents the abuses of it which are normal in Iraq. He resigned from Nuri's Cabinet in 1943 as a protest against the Regent's interference in the elections. The nationalist views of his younger days have been modified by experience, but he is still a firm opponent of what he regards as undue British influence exercised through Nuri and the Palace. His wife is prominent in Ladies' Red Crescent activities, and both speak good English. He is personally friendly to the British.

He and his wife speak English.

101. Nuri al Qadhi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Graduated from Bagdad Law School in Turkish times, and in 1914 was a judge in Basra. During the first world war he served as a reserve officer with the Turkish forces.

He joined Iraqi Government service in 1921 after serving as judge in the Muntafik under the Civil Administration. Vice-President of the Civil Courts in several provinces, including Bagdad, 1925, and Mosul, 1937. Director-General of Waqfs, 1931, Head of Legal Drafting Department, Ministry of Justice, 1936. Director-General Ministry of Justice, March 1940. Secretary-General to the Council of Ministers, December 1941 and Head of the Diwan of the Council of Ministers in May 1950.

He accompanied Nuri Said to Ankara for the negotiation of the Iraqi-Turkish Treaty of 1946. Minister of Education, 1946, under Arshad al Umari, he afterwards returned to his post with the Council of Ministers. Appointed a member of the Development Board in June 1952. Resigned in November 1952.

102. Nuri Sa'id

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated at Military College, Istanbul and served in the Balkan war.

He was one of the founders of the Arab Nationalist Society, Al Ahd, in 1913 and joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in 1916. He served in this army as C.G.S. under his brother-in-law, Jafar al Askari. At that time he was described as a good strategist, clever and hard working, but rash and hot-headed under fire. He won the D.S.O. in 1917 and was appointed an honorary C.M.G. in 1919.

After the 1914 war he remained with Faisal in Syria and accompanied him to London and Paris in 1919 and 1920. He was opposed to Faisal's break with the French.

He returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and soon after became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, retaining these appointments until 1922.

He has been eleven times Minister of Defence, in 1922 (Acting), 1923, 1925, 1926, 1928, 1929 (twice), 1933, 1941 (Acting) and 1953 (twice) in Cabinets headed by Jafar al Askari, Abdul Muhsin Sa'adun, Rashid Ali Gailani himself and Jamil Madfai. Nine times Minister for Foreign Affairs, in 1930, 1933

(twice), 1934, 1938 (Acting), 1940 (Acting), 1942 (Acting), in Cabinets headed by Rashid Ali Gailani, Jamil Madfai, Ali Jaudat and himself. He has also been Prime Minister in 1930, 1931, 1938, 1939, 1941-43, 1946, 1949, 1950 and 1951.

His achievements in diplomacy are also impressive. He negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930; he negotiated the Bon Voisinage Agreement with Neja and the Hejaz, 1931. He signed the Extradition Treaty and a Treaty of Commerce with Turkey in 1932 and negotiated and signed the Economic and Commercial Treaty with Turkey in 1946. He represented Iraq at the London conversations in January 1939, which eventually resulted in the issue of the 1939 White Paper on Palestine, and he led the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations General Assembly which decided the partition of Palestine in 1947. He was a member of the Iraqi delegation which signed the unratified Portsmouth Treaty with the United Kingdom in 1948.

After the Bekr Sidqi military coup of October 1936, during which Jafar al Askari was murdered, Nuri retired with his family to Egypt. He returned a year later after Bekr Sidqi had been murdered and Hikmat Sulaiman's Government had fallen, but left again soon after and spent most of 1938 in Syria, Egypt and London, where he held a number of inconclusive conversations with politicians on the Palestine problem. In December 1938 he returned to Iraq and became Prime Minister as a result of a military demonstration organised on his behalf by Taha al Hashimi and Hussain Fawzi, against the Government of Jamil Madfai. In January 1941 he resigned from Rashid Ali's Government, in which he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis Powers. In April 1941, shortly before the army overthrew Taha al Hashimi and set up the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali, Nuri withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to return with the Regent in June. He became Prime Minister in the autumn of the same year and remained in power until June 1944. During this period he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

He accompanied the Regent on his travels to America and Europe during the summer of 1945, and to England in 1946. On his way home on the second occasion he had talks in Syria and Turkey in the hope of removing the difficulties between these countries.

He formed a Cabinet in November 1946 to carry out elections, and included in it some younger men and representatives of the newly formed National Democratic and Liberal Parties. Nuri's ideas about free elections did not agree with theirs, and they resigned after about a month protesting that Nuri and Saleh Jabr were preparing to exert undue Government influence on the elections.

Nuri collaborated with Saleh Jabr in the negotiation of the Portsmouth Treaty during 1947 and shared with him the nationalist resentment which was fermented against it in January 1948. Within a year, however, he demonstrated his mastery of the Iraqi political scene by returning to power as Prime Minister in January 1949. He succeeded in improving public security and in withdrawing the army from Palestine without incident. He took a very firm line with the organising committees of the Communist Party, five members of which were hanged. But he failed to do much to improve the financial position of the Government in spite of a personal visit to London. He was much disappointed by his failure to obtain an advance of royalties from the Iraq Petroleum Company. During the troubled period which followed Colonel Zaim's *coup d'état* in Syria

in the spring of 1949, Nuri worked hard, but unsuccessfully, for Iraqi-Syrian union. He resigned in December 1949.

In the summer of 1950 he went to London where he negotiated a temporary increase in oil royalties with the Iraq Petroleum Company. In 1951 he visited Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan. Accompanied the Regent when the latter visited Kuwait and Bahrain in the spring of 1952 and Spain in May. He attended the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth in June 1953. In March 1954 he accompanied the King to Pakistan and visited Delhi as delegate of Iraq Government to discuss Middle East defence.

103. Nuruddin Mahmud

Kurd, born in Mosul in 1899. Educated in Ottoman military schools, he was commissioned in the Turkish army in 1917 and in the Iraqi army in 1921.

A graduate of Camberley and Quetta, he was Iraqi Military Attaché in London in 1935 and became Lieutenant-Colonel in 1937. Promoted Colonel in 1939, he was appointed Ministry of Defence member of the Iraqi State Railways Board, and in 1940 he became Director of Military Operations.

In 1941 he opposed Rashid Ali's rebellion and after its collapse he took over command and initiated the Anglo-Iraqi armistice. Commander 2nd Division (Kirkuk), 1941-43; Assistant C.G.S., 1943; promoted Major-General and appointed Commander 1st Division (Diwaniya), 1944. In 1943 he visited the Western Desert battlefields, and in 1946 he attended the victory celebrations in London. In 1948 he was promoted Lieutenant-General and commanded the Iraqi forces in Palestine, where he was involved in the inter-Arab jealousies which prevented the establishment of an effective Arab High Command. In 1949 he returned to command the 1st Division. Appointed C.G.S. in July 1951. In November 1952 the Regent called on him to form a Government at the height of the riots. He quickly restored order and made a sincere attempt to improve the conditions of the lower classes. He held the portfolios of Defence and Interior in his own Cabinet. He resigned after conducting the elections in January 1953 and, to the disappointment of many officers, was prevented by the Regent from returning to the army. Promoted general in November 1952 and appointed to the Senate in January 1953.

He was probably the best Iraqi general officer and the army misses him. Many Iraqis sympathise with him for the ungrateful treatment he received after saving the country. He speaks English and Turkish well and his sympathies are steadily pro-British.

104. Rafail Petros Butti

Christian of Mosul, born 1901. Educated at the Assyrian Orthodox School, Mosul, and at Secondary School, Bagdad. He later attended night classes and graduated from the Bagdad Law School, 1929.

Served in minor posts in the Ministry of Interior from 1925 to 1929. Contributed to the newspaper *Al Iraq* while still an official and after his resignation published *Al Bilad* in partnership with Jebran Malcon. As a journalist he was consistently anti-British, but in Iraqi politics he frequently changed sides. He supported Nuri Said from 1921 to 1929, with occasional lapses. He supported Yasin al Hashimi from 1930 to 1935, Bekr Sidqi 1936 to 1937, and Rashid Ali 1938 to 1942. He was interned in 1942 but released in 1943 and resumed publication of *Al Bilad*. He went to Egypt in 1944 and remained there until 1948.

He was Deputy for Mosul in 1935, for Basra in 1939 and for Bagdad in 1948, in which year he attended the inter-Parliamentary Conference at Rome. He joined the Istiqlal Party in 1948 and was considered as one of its leaders. He resigned from

the Majlis with the other Opposition Deputies in March 1950 and from the Istiqlal Party in May, because of its decision to contest the by-elections occasioned by the resignations. Appointed Press Counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in Cairo in February 1951. Returned to Iraq in 1952. Elected Deputy for Bagdad in January 1953. In September 1953 was Minister of State entrusted with press and propaganda. As a Minister was byzantine and got little done, though it was true that circumstances were against him. His attacks on communism made him detested by the National Democratic Party and the fellow-travellers and they encompassed his defeat in the elections of June 1954.

Butri is a capable and fearless journalist but he is unscrupulous, venal and quite unreliable.

105. Rafiq 'Arif al Qaimaqchi

Sunni Kurd. Born 1907. An artillery officer who qualified at the Staff Colleges of Bagdad and Quetta. He was commandant of the former in 1947 and 1949. He has also commanded the Mechanised Force in Palestine 1948-1949, the Iraqi troops (strength two brigades) left in Jordan after the Iraqi evacuation of Palestine, and the 2nd Division from 1951 to 1953. He is now a major-general and Chief of the General Staff.

An outstanding personality with qualities of leadership and a special aptitude for picking other people's brains. His chief characteristics are his energy and his heartiness. He is very pro-British and will try to keep the army on British lines in spite of outside influence, provided he gets support from us. He has been decorated with the Order of Rafidain and the American Legion of Merit.

106. Rashid Ali al Gailani

Bagdad Sunni, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. A Waqf clerk in Ottoman times, he fled to Mosul with the Turks after the capture of Bagdad and practised as a lawyer after the fall of Mosul.

Appointed judge, 1921, he soon showed his ability. Minister of Justice under Yasin al Hashimi, 1924-25, he resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession. President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1925-26. Minister of Interior under Jafar al Askari, 1926-28.

Again elected Deputy in 1930, he resigned (with others) in 1931 in protest against the conduct of Nuri Said's Government, and became a prominent member of the nationalist Hizb al Ikha al Watani. Chief Private Secretary to the King 1932-33.

Prime Minister from March to October 1933 he was appointed Senator in 1934. He helped to organise the Euphrates disturbances which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in spring 1935, and became Minister of Interior in the Cabinet then formed by Yasin al Hashimi.

In 1936 he fled to Istanbul after Bekr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat*. Returning to Iraq in 1937, he opposed Jamil Madfai's Government and was deported to Anah for a short time in 1938.

Prime Minister from March 1940 to January 1941, he moved steadily towards a closer understanding with the Axis. He kept close contact with the Italian Legation in Bagdad, supported the intrigues of the Mufti of Jerusalem, sponsored the overtures made by Naji Shaukat (q.v.) to the German Minister in Turkey, and encouraged the pro-Nazi press. Forced to resign by British pressure in January 1941, he returned to office through a *coup d'Etat* in April, installed Sharif Sharaf in place of the Regent and, backed by the Iraqi Army, refused to allow more than one brigade of British troops in Iraq.

In May 1941, when hostilities broke out between the Iraqi Army and the British forces in Habbaniya, he tried to unite the country against Britain but failed to get substantial tribal support. After the defeat of

the Iraqi forces he fled to Persia, Turkey, and finally to Germany.

He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in 1942. Recognised by the Axis as legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq, he conducted an anti-British campaign by radio throughout the war.

In 1945 he escaped through the German lines to Prague and thence, with a false passport and the unwitting assistance of Allied military transport, to Marseilles, from where he sailed to Beirut. He arrived at Riyadh in September 1945, declared himself to Ibn Saud and was granted asylum.

He is still in Riyadh, an extra thorn in Saudi-Hashimite relations but his wife was permitted to return to Bagdad in October 1953 after twelve years' absence. His health is now said to be declining rapidly. King Saud is said to be tired of him, but schemes to move him elsewhere have not so far been satisfactory, and seasonal rumours that the Regent had pardoned him have proved untrue. These rumours gained in strength after the accession of King Faisal II and, since many of his former associates have returned to positions of authority, it is possible that he will soon be allowed to return to Iraq. He still has admirers in Iraq, particularly in the Istiqlal Party.

107. Rauf al Bahrani

Bagdad Shia, born 1897. Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance in 1922 and rose—it is said not entirely by merit—to be Director-General of Customs and Excise in 1935.

Minister of Finance under Yasin al Hashimi 1935-36. Again Director General of Customs and Excise 1938-40. Minister of Finance under Nuri Said 1940; of Social Affairs under Rashid Ali 1940-41; and again of Social Affairs in Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April-May 1941.

After Rashid Ali's overthrow he fled to Persia, where he was arrested by British forces in autumn 1941 and sent for interment to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for trial in 1944, he was condemned to three years' hard labour and sequestration of his property.

After his release he engaged in business and gradually reinstated himself until in May 1950 he was appointed Director-General of Income Tax. In July 1952 he was appointed a member of the Government Oil Board.

Although he talks the conventional Arab nationalist language, he was a tool rather than an associate of Rashid Ali. Early in 1950 he made himself known to a member of this Embassy and since then has regained his position in Bagdad society.

He speaks no English.

108. Rauf al Chadirchi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1884. Educated at Istanbul and at Berlin and Geneva Universities. Before the war he was successively a clerk in the legal drafting department of the Turkish Ministry of Justice, a professor of law at the Turkish Law College, Qaimmaqam of Diyala, and adviser on foreign affairs to the Turkish Governor of Bagdad. Immediately before its fall he was the Mayor of Bagdad. He went to Berlin shortly before the occupation, and later to Switzerland. He was not permitted to return to Bagdad until 1920.

In Bagdad he practised as a lawyer and took no part in Nationalist agitation, but was asked to go with his father when the latter was deported to Istanbul in August 1920. He returned in 1921 and took up his law practice, obtaining much of the business of foreign firms owing to his knowledge of languages. Professor at the Bagdad Law School 1922. Dean 1923.

Deputy for Hilla 1924, he opposed the 1922 Treaty. Minister of Finance under Abdul Muhsin al Sa'adun,

Minister of Justice under Jafar al Askari 1926. Iraqi Minister to Ankara 1929. He resigned in 1930 and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Iraqi Minister in London from 1936 to 1939 when he resigned. He generally spends the summer months in England.

Rauf has a charming and kindly personality and looks on the intrigues and enthusiasms of Iraqi politics with an indulgent contempt. He is universally popular and consequently well informed, but will not often talk about politics. He speaks English, French, German and Turkish. Is badly crippled with arthritis. In April 1952 he surprised Bagdad society by marrying Majda, the stepdaughter of Daud al Haidari (q.v.), who is at least thirty years younger than he is. He is the brother of Kamil Chadirchi (q.v.) by a different mother but the two are not on speaking terms.

109. Rayih al Atiyah, Hajj

Shia. Sheikh of the Bani Hassan tribe of Diwaniya. Born about 1890. Deputy for Diwaniya five times between 1933 and 1939. At that time he was a fervent nationalist. A Senator from 1944 to June 1952. In November 1952 he became Minister of Agriculture in Nuruddin Mahmud's Cabinet. Re-appointed to the Senate in April 1953. He is not of much political importance. He speaks Arabic only.

110. Sa'ad Umar

Born in Kerbala in 1917. Shia. Son of Umar Haj Alwan, one of the Kerbala representatives on the Constituent Assembly. Educated at Kerbala and Bagdad. Graduated in the Law College about 1941. Thereafter he practised as a lawyer in Kerbala until 1947, when he became Deputy for Kerbala. He was not re-elected in 1948, but was put in in a bye-election later in the year. Minister for Social Affairs in Ali Jaudat's Government of December 1949, and of Education in Tawfik al Suweidi's Cabinet in February 1950. A member of Nuri Pasha's Constitutional Union Party November 1949.

In the Chamber of Deputies after he had failed to substantiate allegations of corruption which he had made against four Cabinet Ministers, he was suspended for the remainder of the parliamentary session.

A protégé of Saleh Jabr, who was a friend of his father. He owns a little property in Kerbala. He is full of large ideas but very inexperienced and unintelligent.

111. Sadiq al Bassam

Bagdad Shia, born about 1895. Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he practised as a lawyer for several years.

Elected Deputy for Kut in 1930, he supported Yasin al Hashimi and was a member of the Ikha al Watani Party. Minister of Education under Yasin al Hashimi 1935-36. Minister of Economics under Nuri Said 1939-40 and of Education under Rashid Ali in 1941.

Remaining inactive during the 1941 disturbances, he was Minister of Justice 1941-42 and of Communications and Works December 1943 to June 1944 under Nuri Said: of Finance under Mohammed as Sadr, January to June 1948; and of Defence under Muzahim Pachachi from June to October 1948. A Senator from 1941, his appointment was not renewed in 1949. A founder member of the United Popular Front, May 1951. He left the Front in June 1952 and was elected Deputy for Bagdad in January 1953. Re-elected 1954. He owns and edits the influential newspaper *al Difa* which was banned by Dr. Jamali's Government but reappeared under the title *al Hiyad*.

Sadiq is a xenophobe with violent prejudices and ill-concealed fanaticism. As Minister of Defence in 1948 he was mainly responsible for the fierce sentences passed on Jews by the courts martial and for encouraging anti-Jewish feeling. He does not like the British, and his policy is often indistinguishable from that of the Istiqlal Party. He speaks Arabic only. His private life is disreputable. He suffers badly from diabetes which his addiction to whisky does nothing to improve.

112. Saleh Haidar

Shia of Bagdad born in 1914. After completing his secondary school education in Bagdad, he went for a year to the American University of Beirut and from 1933-36 to the London School of Economics where he took a degree in economics. Assistant Collector of Customs, 1936-37. In 1937 he returned for a year to the London School of Economics for further study. On his return to Iraq he studied land problems and went back again to his London School of Economics from 1939-42. Ph.D. of London University, 1942. In 1943-46 he held various appointments in the Ministry of Supply, and in 1946-48 in the Ministry of Finance.

Member of the Iraqi Delegation to the San Francisco Conference 1945. Acting Director-General of State Domains, 1948. In the same year he was seconded from the Ministry of Finance and made Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Iraq. In 1950 he went to Washington and London in connexion with the negotiations for the International Bank loan to Iraq and the Scarce Currency Agreements. His appointment as Deputy Governor of the National Bank was suddenly though not unexpectedly terminated in June 1952. Appointed Assistant Director-General of State Domains August 1953 and Director-General of Revenues by Dr. Jamali in October 1953.

A supporter of Saleh Jabr, he is intelligent, but conceited, and he does not get on well with his colleagues. He also has the reputation of being untrustworthy. He was on very bad terms with the Governor of the National Bank, Abdul Ilah Hafiz (q.v.), who refused to deal with him or give him any work to do. He appears to suspect that British influence was to blame for this treatment, but he is on friendly terms with members of the embassy staff. He speaks excellent English. His wife is the sister of the wife of Abdul Karim al Uzri (q.v.).

113. Saleh Jabr, K.B.E.

Shia, born about 1897 in Nasiriya. His father was a carpenter, originally from the Beni Zaid tribe of Shatt. Educated in Nasiriya, he became a clerk in the Najaf court in 1919.

By 1924 he had risen to be head clerk in the Ministry of Justice. He entered the Bagdad Law College the same year, and after graduation in 1927-28 he was appointed as a judge and served for over two years in the Middle Euphrates.

Elected Deputy for the Muntafik in 1930 and 1934, he was Minister of Education under Jamil Madfai November 1933 to February 1934. Mutasarrif Kerbala 1935-36. Appointed Minister of Justice under Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936, he resigned in June 1937 over the Euphrates disturbances and left the country. He returned after Hikmat's resignation and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Minister of Education December 1938 to February 1940 and then of Social Affairs until March 1940 under Nuri Said. Mutasarrif of Basra from June 1940, he supported the Regent when his Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali. Arrested by Rashid Ali, he narrowly

escaped a heavy sentence and was released on condition he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned after Rashid Ali's fall.

Minister of Interior October 1941 to October 1942, of Finance until June 1943, and again of Interior until October 1943 under Nuri Said. Minister of Finance June 1944 to February 1946 and Acting Minister of Supply August to December 1944 under Hamdi Pachachi. During Pachachi's absence he acted as Prime Minister and was expected to form a Government when the Pachachi Cabinet resigned. He was not, however, chosen, and spent much of the summer of 1946 in England.

He was appointed honorary K.B.E. for war services in 1946.

After a short time as Minister of Finance under Nuri Said in November 1946 he became the first Shia Prime Minister of Iraq after the elections of March 1947. Forced to resign in January 1948 by popular demonstrations against the Portsmouth Treaty, he spent much of 1948 abroad, but gradually recovered his position during 1949 and became Minister of Interior under Tawfiq Suweidi in February 1950. He was not invited to join Nuri Said's cabinet in September 1950 and he spent the winter months abroad. His relations with Nuri improved in the spring of 1951 but efforts to bring him into the cabinet did not succeed. In June he was granted permission to form the Popular Socialist Party. Saleh now seems determined to wrest the political leadership in Iraq from Nuri and the rift between the two has widened since 1951. This rivalry has been intensified by the supporters of both sides. Unfortunately Saleh is much under the influence of Saiyid Abdul Mahdi (q.v.) and as a result his party has become more and more identified with extremist Shia sectarianism. For purely political reasons he and his party opposed the oil agreements in Parliament in February 1952. For similar reasons they joined in the demand for direct elections which led to the riots in November 1952. Several party members were arrested after the disorders. Saleh called on his followers to boycott the elections of January 1953 on the grounds that they were being rigged. All except six of his followers withdrew and the six were later expelled. Although ever since that time he demanded fresh elections, he was known privately to be none too sanguine about their outcome and, sure enough, the elections of June 1954 gave his party fewer seats than they had hoped for. In the spring of 1954 Saleh Jabr was used as an unofficial envoy of the Iraqi Government of Dr. Jamali to discuss with the Lebanese Government oil questions (particularly the diversion of the Haifa pipe line) and Iraqi designs on Syria.

Saleh's merit has justified his rise from obscurity to be the first Shia Prime Minister and most powerful Shia politician in Iraq. He has a strong personality and is capable, energetic and courageous. His influence in the Euphrates area is greater than any other man's and many of the better young officials are his admirers. On the other hand, as he showed when Prime Minister, he is dictatorial, secretive, pompous and vindictive; and thus he makes many bitter enemies.

As an administrator Saleh Jabr left a good name, though he was too aloof to make many personal friends. As Prime Minister he concerned himself too much with long-range economic planning and foreign policy, neglecting his colleagues and his enemies and the necessary short-term economic measures. This neglect was the ultimate cause of his fall.

His sympathies are with Britain, but he is a hard bargainer for the interests of his country. His great disappointment in foreign affairs was his failure in 1947 to persuade the Arab League to impose oil sanctions on the Americans as a reprisal for their pro-Zionist policy. He is an ardent advocate of

Arab Unity and in particular of the Fertile Crescent Plan.

His first wife died in 1936 and in 1942 he married the strong-minded and meddlesome daughter of the late Addai al Jeryan, chief of the influential Albu Sultan tribe of Hilla. During the war her interference lost him much support when the Albu Sultan were divided, but in recent years he has regained, and profited by, the full support of the Hilla district.

He speaks English.

114. Saleh Saib al Jubhuri

Sunni of the Jubur tribe of Mosul, born in 1898. Commissioned in the Turkish army in 1916 and in the Iraqi army in 1921, he was appointed instructor in the newly formed Small Arms School in Bagdad. During this appointment he attended a small arms course at Hythe, and later attended courses at the Iraqi Staff College and the Staff College, Camberley. A personal friend of Bekr Sidqi and a supporter of the 1936 *coup d'Etat*, he was retired after the assassination of Bekr Sidqi and appointed Assistant Director-General of the Iraqi State Railways. In 1941, after Rashid Ali's flight, he was invited to rejoin the army and was appointed G.O.C. 3rd Division. In 1944 he succeeded Ismail Namiq (q.v.) as Chief of the General Staff. He still holds this appointment. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1945 and general in 1950. On handing over the office of Chief of General Staff in 1951 to General Nuruddin Mahmud (q.v.) he became a Senator. He was offered the Ministry of Defence by Nasrat-al-Farisi during his abortive attempt to form a Cabinet in January 1953.

He neither drinks, smokes nor gambles, and is said to be just and honest; but he had neither the ability nor the personality to be a good Chief of General Staff and his impotence as a leader was displayed in the 1948 Palestine campaign. He speaks English.

115. Saleh Zakki Tawfiq

Sunni Muslim, born in Bagdad in 1908 of mixed Turkish and Arab parents. Attended Senior Officers' School, Enderbost Park, in 1948. He was appointed to command the 2nd Division as a Brigadier in June 1954, having held the command in an acting capacity since October 1953.

He is pro-British in outlook. His English is only fair and he has few social graces. He is genuine and very interested in his profession. A live personality with drive and enthusiasm, who makes his presence felt in the formation he commands.

116. Sami Fattah

A native of Mosul of Kurdish origin, born in 1905. Educated at the Teachers' Training College in Bagdad, he taught in Iraqi schools from 1922 to 1925.

In 1925 he joined the Iraqi Army and was sent to Sandhurst in 1926. Commissioned in the Iraqi Army in 1928, he was attached to the newly formed Royal Iraqi Air Force and returned to England for training with the R.A.F. When he came back to Iraq he was appointed to the Royal Iraqi Air Force, in which he has served ever since.

He graduated from the Iraqi Staff College in 1937 and in 1941, after the Rashid Ali rebellion, he was appointed Commander of the R.I.A.F. He has held this appointment ever since (with the rank of Brigadier until 1952 when he was made a Major-General), except for a short interlude in 1948 when he was sent to Europe on a secret arms purchasing mission which was a complete failure. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in April 1954 and placed on pension from that date. Transferred to the Ministry of Development June 1954.

He is an energetic and jovial man, a good disciplinarian, and one of the Iraqi army's best leaders. He made every effort to improve the training and equipment of the R.I.A.F. After the comparative discipline and efficiency of the armed forces, the inefficiency of the Iraqi Civil Service came as a great shock to him and he tried to wield the new broom. Entrenched incompetence is, however, proving too much for him. He speaks English well and his sympathies are pro-British.

117. Sami Shawkat

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Brother of Naji Shawkat (q.v.). Graduated from Military College of Medicine, Istanbul, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919.

Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921; Director-General of Education 1937; Director-General of Public Health 1936; again Director-General of Education 1939.

Minister of Social Affairs 1939 and of Education 1940 under Nuri Said. He was re-appointed Director-General of Education in April 1940 and retained this position through the disturbances of 1941 until 1943, when he became Director-General of Social Affairs.

Resigned from Government service in 1945 and started the newspaper *Ba'th al Qawmi*, which was violently nationalist, anti-Communist and anti-British and was suppressed in 1946. In 1949 he started a political party named Islah, together with a few retired officials. Elected Deputy for Kut in the by-elections of June 1950.

He is earnest, obtuse and fairly honest, with an exaggerated sense of his own importance. He speaks Arabic and Turkish only.

118. Shakir Maher

Born about 1915. A lawyer and prominent member of the Istiqlal Party until 1951, when he resigned. Elected as an independent Deputy for Bagdad (Samarra) in 1953 and again in 1954. He has spoken consistently against the Governments in office and is regarded as one of the younger and more ambitious Opposition Deputies. His ideas are still very much those of the Istiqlal Party.

119. Shakir al Wadi, M.V.O.

Bagdad Sunni, born 1894. An officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the Armistice, he joined the Iraqi army in 1921.

Promoted captain in 1928, he was attached for training to British units in the United Kingdom in 1929. In 1930 he was promoted major and made A.D.C. to King Faisal, on whose staff he served during His Majesty's State visit to Britain in 1933. He was promoted lieutenant-colonel and attended the Staff College, Camberley, in 1935.

Returning to Iraq in 1936, he was appointed G.S.O.I. in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bekr Sidqi was the G.O.C., and was the latter's right-hand man in the 1936 *coup d'Etat*. Appointed military attaché in London after the murder of Bekr Sidqi in 1937, he was dismissed and placed on the retired list a few weeks later, and soon began to take part in political intrigue.

Appointed second secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran in 1939, he later fell under the influence of the German Legation there and as *chargé d'affaires* in 1941 he dutifully carried out the instructions of Rashid Ali's rebel Government.

Consul at Jerusalem 1941-44. First secretary (and sometimes *chargé d'affaires*) in the Iraqi Legation in London 1944-46. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1946.

Minister of Defence under Nuri Said November 1946 to March 1947; under Saleh Jabr March 1947 to January 1948; under Muzahim Pachachi October 1948 to January 1949; under Nuri Said

January 1949 to December 1949; and under Tawfiq Suweidi from February 1950 and under Nuri Said from September 1950. He acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs from September 1950 to February 1951, and acted in the same capacity in 1951. He became a member of the Central Committee of the Constitutional Union Party in November 1950. Appointed Senator March 1949. He led the Iraqi parliamentary delegation to the United Kingdom in 1954.

Shakir used to enjoy the personal friendship and confidence of the Regent, to whose influence he owed his frequent ministerial appointments since 1946, but in 1952 he fell from favour. He is widely disliked in political circles, partly on account of his very disreputable private life. He speaks English well and supports Iraq's British connexion.

120. Shawkat al Zahawi, Dr.

Kurd, born about 1898, the son of a colonel in the Ottoman army. Educated in Bagdad and at the Military Medical College in Constantinople, he joined the Iraqi Health Service in 1922.

He has specialised in pathology, on which he has written a number of articles. He is now Director of the Central Pathological Institute and Professor of Pathology in the Royal Medical College.

He was Minister of Social Affairs under Tawfiq al Suweidi for a short time in 1946.

In the Royal Medical College he is an incompetent intriguer, but since he is married to a daughter of the late Mohammed Fadhil Pasha al Daghestani, and therefore has connexions with Najib al Rawi (q.v.) and Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.), he cannot easily be unseated. He speaks English.

121. Taha al Hashemi

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888. Educated at Istanbul and served in the Turkish army in Arabia and the Yemen during the First World War. Appointed to the Turkish General Staff 1920.

He returned to Bagdad in 1922, joined the Iraq army and was given command of the troops in Mosul. C.G.S. 1923. He was on the staff of the High Commissioner for the frontier negotiations with Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne 1924. When the post of C.G.S. was abolished he became tutor to the then Crown Prince Ghazi 1924; Chief of the Census Department 1926; and Director of Education 1928. In 1930 he again became C.G.S. In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahya and concluded the Iraq-Yemen Treaty of Friendship. He was in Turkey in October 1936 when the Bekr Sidqi *coup d'Etat* forced the resignation of the Prime Minister (Taha's brother, the late Yasin al Hashemi), and he did not return to Iraq until September 1937, after the murder of Bekr Sidqi.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad December 1937 and again in 1939. In December 1938, in collaboration with the C.G.S., Husain Fawzi (q.v.), he organised the military demonstration which caused the resignation of Jamil Madfai (q.v.) and replaced him as Prime Minister by Nuri Said. Taha became Minister of Defence in Nuri's Government and retained this portfolio in the succeeding Government of Rashid Ali in 1940. He resigned in January 1941 and himself became Prime Minister in February. He failed to break the influence of the pro-Axis military clique, who overthrew him and set up the unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali a month later. He then retired to Turkey, where he remained for the rest of the war, because Nuri Said was unwilling to allow him to return.

He spent much of the time after the war in Syria, but in May 1951 he played the leading part in the formation of the United Popular Front. He was elected President of the Front's Supreme Committee, but in the spring of 1953 showed signs of losing

interest in domestic politics and when in August 1953 he was appointed Vice-President of the Development Board, he gave up all political activity. He knows no English but speaks French, Turkish and Arabic.

He is no friend of the British, nor for that matter of the Crown Prince with whom he engaged in a slanging match in 1952 before a gathering of ex-Prime Ministers.

122. Tahnin Qadri, K.C.V.O.

Sunni of Damascus, born 1893. He was with King Faisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in 1920. Came to Bagdad with the King and was appointed A.D.C. in 1921.

Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1932, he accompanied King Faisal on his State visit to England in 1933. He resigned in 1936 owing to Princess Azza's scandalous marriage. Counsellor to Iraqi Legation, Tehran, 1936. Consul-General, Bombay, 1937. Director of Protocol in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February and Consul-General, Beirut, in July 1939. He became, in addition, Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government in 1943. Accredited as Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in 1944. Acting Director-General, Foreign Affairs, 1945. Minister at Paris 1946. Master of Ceremonies at the Palace 1947. In June 1949 he was temporarily appointed Minister at Tehran when the Regent visited Persia in that year, but returned to his post at the Palace a few months later. In June 1952 he accompanied the Amir Abdul Ilah to Amman. He was responsible for arranging King Faisal II's Accession celebrations in May 1953 and was a member of the Iraqi delegation to the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth the following month. Accompanied His Majesty to Pakistan March 1954.

Tahnin is sociable and clever and makes a not very efficient but agreeable Master of Ceremonies. He much enjoys his whisky and the company of European ladies. Politically he is a lightweight. He is married to the heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qurtas of Basra. He speaks Turkish, French and English. His ambition is to succeed the Amir Zaid as ambassador in London.

123. Tariq al Askari

Sunni, born in Aleppo in 1914. Son of the late Jaafar Pasha al Askari. Nuri Said is his uncle. Educated at King's College, Cambridge, from 1932-35 and took a degree in engineering. In 1936-37 worked as engineer with the Grampian Electricity Supply Company in Scotland. Engineer in the Directorate-General of Irrigation, 1937-42. Deputy for Kut, 1943-48. From May to October 1948 served with the Arab Legion in Jerusalem and held the rank of captain. Appointed Director of the Agricultural Section of the Development Board in April 1952. He resigned in the autumn and was elected Deputy for Qadasiyah in January 1953. Re-elected 1954. Was chosen Second Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies December 1953.

Tariq was a member of the Higher Committee of Nuri's Constitutional Union Party. Intelligent, wealthy, able and witty, he is one of the few younger Iraqis with a balanced judgment. Although a sincere Nationalist he regards the shortcomings of his own countrymen with amused cynicism. He is a genuine friend and admirer of Britain and a believer in the British connexion, though he has been known to criticise it publicly. He is also friendly with the United States Embassy. Tariq speaks excellent English, Turkish and some French. His wife, a daughter of the late Jaafar al Pachachi, also speaks good English and appears in mixed society. They entertain frequently and well.

124. Tawfiq al Mukhtar

Born about 1900. A former officer of Iraqi army. Elected Deputy for Bagdad in 1950, 1953 and again in 1954. Was chairman of Military Affairs Committee in the 1953 Chamber. Member of the so-called Nationalist bloc in the 1950 Parliament and always in opposition to the Government of the day. A vociferous critic of the British connexion. He stands for Parliament as an independent. Speaks no English.

125. Tawfiq al Naib

Sunni, born about 1895. A student at the Law School in Bagdad at the outbreak of the First World War, he completed his studies after the British occupation and was appointed to a post in the Department of Justice in 1923.

From 1926 to 1943 he was a judge and served in many parts of the country, though the bulk of his service was in Bagdad. He gained the reputation of a strong and just judge without political ambitions.

Appointed Mutasarrif of Kut 1943, and transferred to Diwaniya 1944. Minister of Economics under Saleh Jabr from September 1947 to January 1948, and of Interior under Nuri Said from March to September 1949. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in November 1949.

He is a quiet, retiring man who neither smokes nor drinks.

He was a good judge, but a poor administrator. He is impassive and unimaginative, and needs always the letter of the law to support a decision that others may enforce. Though not a member of Saleh Jabr's party, he is one of his principal supporters. He speaks no English.

126. Tawfiq Suweidi

Sunni, of a well-established Bagdad family, born about 1889. Educated at Bagdad, Istanbul and Paris, where he studied International Law, he was appointed interpreter to the Ministry of Education at Istanbul in 1913. In the same year he represented Iraq at the Arab Conference in Paris. During the First World War he was in Istanbul. After the armistice he joined the Arab Government in Syria and was appointed a judge at Damascus. He returned to Bagdad in 1921 and was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School.

Deputy from 1924. President of the Chamber 1929, he has held the following Cabinet posts: Education under Abdul Musin Sa'adun 1928; Foreign Affairs under Jamil Madfai in 1934; Justice in Jamil Madfai's twelve-day Cabinet of 1935; Foreign Affairs again under Madfai 1937; Foreign Affairs under Taha al Hashimi 1941. He was Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri Pasha for a short time in 1943 but resigned the following year when the constitutional validity of this office was called in question. He was Prime Minister in 1929, 1946 and 1950 and joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1951. Resigned from the Cabinet in July 1951. Member of the Regency Council during the Regent's brief visit to Amman in June 1952. Foreign Minister under Jamil Madfai in January 1953.

Tawfiq was Iraqi Minister at Tehran in 1931 and has had considerable diplomatic experience. As Minister for Foreign Affairs he headed the Iraqi Delegation to Geneva in 1937, where he is said to have handled the Palestine and Assyrian questions with tact and moderation. He again represented Iraq at Geneva in 1938 and afterwards visited London to discuss the Palestine problem with the British Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. He was a member of the Iraqi Delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and in 1948 he was one of the signatories of

the unratified Portsmouth Treaty. Attended meeting of the Arab League Political Committee in April 1953 at Cairo. Accompanied King Faisal to Jordan August 1953.

His elder brother, the late Naji Suweidi, was a prominent member of Rashid Ali's rebel Government but Tawfiq was not implicated in the movement. Nevertheless, he is not completely trusted by the Regent and was not appointed a Senator until 1947. The Regent also vetoed Nuri's proposal to include him in his Cabinet in the autumn of 1949.

Tawfiq is intelligent, subtle and not altogether honest, either politically or financially. In Arab affairs he generally follows the Egyptian lead and in Iraqi politics he is normally opposed to Nuri Said but has co-operated with him on occasion. He is popularly supposed to be a Liberal. It was he who permitted the operation of political parties in 1946 after they had been banned for many years, and for a short time in 1946 he was president of the Liberal Party. He also has some reputation as a nationalist, but it is doubtful if any of his political convictions are strongly held. He is a rich man, a landed proprietor, who has also wide business interests, in many cases in partnership with Iraqi Jews. He is known to have used his political influence in favour of his business interests. He has a keen sense of humour, is excellent company and speaks French and English fluently but incorrectly.

127. Tawfiq Wahbi Ma'ruf, C.B.E.

Kurd of Sulaimaniya, born in 1887. Graduating from the Turkish Military College in 1904, he served in European Turkey and was a regimental commander and later a staff officer in the Ottoman army during the 1914-18 war.

After the war he joined the Iraqi army and was appointed Military Adviser to Sheikh Mahmud (q.v.) in 1923. Leaving Sheikh Mahmud when the latter's conduct became impossible, he was appointed Commandant of the Bagdad Military College with the rank of colonel. In 1929 he was sent on the Senior Officers' School course to the United Kingdom.

Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya for a short time in 1930, he remained unemployed for several years afterwards but was ultimately appointed Director-General of Surveys. He resigned from Government service in 1941 and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor.

Minister of Economics under Hamdi Pachachi 1944-46, of Education under Saleh Jabr in 1947, and of Social Affairs under Tawfiq al Suweidi in 1950. Made a Senator in 1948.

Appointed Honorary C.B.E. for war services in 1946. Elected second vice-president of Saleh Jabr's Popular Socialist Party in July 1951. Re-elected second vice-president in 1954. Although at first an enthusiastic supporter of Saleh Jabr, his faith in the party weakened and he was not upset when all political parties were abolished in November 1952.

Tawfiq is keenly interested in Kurdish culture and has spent much time compiling Kurdish dictionaries and writing Kurdish grammars. To young Kurdish nationalists he pleads moderation, but he is not influential with them.

He is a kind man, frank, affable and an Anglophile being honorary vice-president of the British Institute Club and chairman of the Board of Governors of the British Council-sponsored Preparatory School in Bagdad. His achievements in office fall short of his excellent intentions, and he is not a man to sway his colleagues. He speaks English, Persian and Turkish as well as Kurdish and Arabic. His wife, though a woman of little education, is very active in good works and ran the early stages of flood relief in 1954. She has established herself as the leading spirit in this field among the women of her

generation. She speaks a little Turkish but almost no English.

128. Umer Nadhmi

Kurd, born Kifri 1893. Educated at the Bagdad Law School, he was a civil judge before the 1914-18 war and Public Prosecutor to the Bagdad Military Court during the war.

He served as a judge again from 1921 to 1927, and from then to 1937 he was Mutasarrif in a number of provinces. Director-General of Revenues 1937-38.

Minister of Economics and Communications and later of Interior under Nuri Said 1939-40; of Communications and Works under Rashid Ali in 1940; of Interior under Taha al Hashimi in 1941 and under Nuri Said 1943-44; of Justice under Tawfiq al Suweidi in 1945, under Nuri Said November 1946 to March 1947 and under Mohammed al Sadr January to March 1948; and of Interior under Muzahim Pachachi 1948-49. Deputy Prime Minister under Nuri Said 1949. Again Minister of Interior under Ali Jaudat December 1949 to February 1950 and again in February 1951 under Nuri Said, whose cabinet he joined as Minister without Portfolio in December 1950. He has been a Senator since 1939.

He probably owes his rise to eminence to the friends he made in the provinces (especially in the North) where he served as Mutasarrif, to the support of Nuri Said, and to a cautious and dignified demeanour. He is detested by Saleh Jabr's party. He speaks no English. He enjoys the Regent's confidence. He is disillusioned and in poor health and says he will take no further part in politics.

129. Yahya Qassim

Sunni of Mosul, born 1913. Educated Bagdad Law College.

He joined Government service in 1936. Was appointed Superintendent in the Council of Ministers' Office in 1937 and later transferred to the Iraqi State Railways.

He was at that time an active Left-winger, and was reported to have a hand in the publication of the clandestine newspaper *Al Sharara*. In 1943 he was arrested for the distribution of Leftist literature and was discharged from the Iraqi State Railways. In 1944 he started the newspaper *Al Sha'ab* as the organ of the now defunct Leftist party of that name. He now owns and edits this paper himself, and it is no longer connected with any party. By the middle of 1953 it had become the best and most popular newspaper in Bagdad. He visited England with a party of journalists in 1945 and became a convinced and outspoken admirer of the British people. In 1946 he joined the National Democratic Party but soon resigned owing to personal differences. He was taken up by Saleh Jabr in 1947 and accompanied him to London in January 1948 for the signature of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty. He again visited England in the summer of 1949 and 1952. In addition to journalism he practises as a lawyer and is paid a retainer by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Elected for Telafar in June 1954, displacing the paramount Shaikh of the Shammar. He claims to be a moderate progressive on the lines of Nadim al Pachachi (q.v.) and Abdul Karim al Uzri.

Yahya is a clever young man with a frank and friendly manner and a pronounced stammer. His newspaper is above the low level of the Bagdad press, and he has the courage on occasion to express unpopular opinions. He regards Saleh Jabr as Iraq's main hope for the future, but he is also on close terms with Nuri. He has not abandoned his Socialist leanings and is a sincere advocate of reforms, but he is now no revolutionary. He is married to a niece of the late Amin Zaki Suleiman and speaks good English.

130. Yusuf Abdullah al Gailani (Saiyid)

Sunni, born 1907 of the family of the Naqibs of Bagdad. Educated at Bagdad and Balliol College, Oxford.

He returned to Iraq in 1934 and was appointed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in which he became Director of the Political Section in 1945, Director-General in 1949, Acting Under-Secretary in January 1951 and Under-Secretary in 1952. He became a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Iraqi Foreign Service in November 1950. He was a member of the Iraqi Delegations to Arab League meetings in 1949 and 1950. Member of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations Assembly, 1951.

Yusuf is intelligent and friendly, cautious and a little shy. He takes no part in politics and is well informed only on those questions of Iraqi foreign policy on which he is employed. He complains of the amateurish and emotional conduct of Iraq's foreign relations by his successive political chiefs, and

is occasionally critical of the intervention of the Regent in the detailed conduct of foreign affairs. He is, however, a loyal, discreet and competent official. He speaks excellent English, and his wife, who is also a Gailani, appears in mixed society.

131. Wajih Yunis

Born 1900. Joined Government service in 1921 and, after years of service as Inspector, was promoted in 1951 to be Senior Inspecting Officer. In 1954 was appointed by Suid Qazzaz to be Director-General of Police—in the interests rather of filling senior police appointments from the ranks of the service than for any enthusiasm about Wajih Yunis's personal qualities, which are not outstanding. He is known to have been corrupt when Director of Police of Dulaim Liwa. He is not a strong character and without a strong Minister of the Interior little can be expected of him.

Speaks little English.

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No. 29

IRAQ: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Sir John Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received June 28)

(No. 126. Confidential)

Bagdad,

June 11, 1954.

Sir,
With reference to my despatch No. 113 (1905/3/53) of the 29th of June, 1953 to the Minister of State, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the accompanying report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Bagdad.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

Enclosure

**Report on the Heads of Foreign Missions
in Bagdad, 1954**

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous Reports)

Afghanistan

Abdul Samad Khan, Minister (May 29, 1952).

*Abdul Samad Khan has served in London, Paris and Rome. Before coming to Bagdad was Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Written in 1952.)

He speaks English and is friendly, but he does not play a very prominent part in Bagdad life. He is also accredited to Amman, Beirut and Damascus and this appears to involve him in various expenses which he is reluctant to meet. He is unmarried.

Belgium

There is at present no Belgian Minister accredited to the Iraq Government.

M. Laurent Janssen has resided here as Chargé d'Affaires for the past eleven years. He is shortly to retire. He is a quiet but friendly and charming person, with a pleasant wife. Despite the length of their sojourn in Iraq they speak little English and not a word of Arabic.

One can count on him to be sound on the subject of communism, as he spent a year in a Russian prison during the war.

China

Shen Yueh, Chargé d'Affaires (January 1, 1951).

*Shen Yueh represents the Formosa régime. Consequently I have no relations with him. (Written in 1952.)

*He came to the Embassy to a party I had, as Dean, to give to all Heads of Mission here. He is a friendly little South Chinese who was Head of the South-East Asia Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the last days of the Nanking régime. He is married, but both he and his wife are not of much significance. (Written in 1953.)

Egypt

Taufiq Ismail Qatamish, Ambassador (April 18, 1954).

A graduate of the Cairo School of Law, Taufiq Qatamish has served in various consulates and missions, including New York and Berlin before the late war. He returned to New York as Consul-General in 1945 and was subsequently First Secretary and later Counsellor in the Egyptian Embassy in London. Since 1953 until his appointment to Bagdad, which he had never even visited before, he served in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is unmarried, speaks excellent English and shows every desire to be friendly.

France

Ludovic Chancel, Ambassador (July 9, 1953).

Before he came here M. Chancel was Ambassador in Hayti. He entered the French Consular Service in 1928 and served in London, Shanghai, Tallinn and Bucharest. He joined the Free French in 1941 and was Free French Delegate in Addis Ababa during the war. Was Consul-General in New York before going to Hayti.

In 1953 the status of the French Mission was raised to that of an Embassy and M. Chancel, who had arrived in Bagdad as Minister, presented new letters as Ambassador.

M. Chancel is a pleasant colleague with a dry sense of humour. He needs it, as he has been continually at the receiving end of the late Prime Minister's and present Foreign Minister's (Dr. Jamali) diatribes on French iniquity in North Africa. He appears to bear them with equanimity. Both he and his charming wife manage to get about Iraq a good deal. Both speak English.

Germany (Federal Republic)

Wilhelm Melchers, Minister (September 19, 1953).

Dr. Melchers is a Doctor of Law and a career diplomat. He opened the German Legation in September 1953.

I knew him when he was Secretary in the German Legation in Addis Ababa in 1930-31. Since then he has served in Haifa, Tehran and Tokyo, among other places. He was in Ethiopia, I recall, a strong German Nationalist and I expect he became a convinced Nazi. In any case, he served in the German Foreign Ministry in January 1939 and was used to remove Rashid Ali from Berlin to South Germany in April 1945, at the time of the final Allied advance.

Dr. Melchers speaks French and English. He married (for the first time) a pleasant deutsche Hausfrau in April 1953, who also speaks a rather Teutonic brand of French.

They both make great efforts to be friendly and seem genuinely grateful for any attention.

Holy See

Mgr. Armand Etienne Blanquet du Chayla, Apostolic Delegate (November 20, 1948).

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Mgr. du Chayla, the Latin Archbishop of Bagdad, was appointed Apostolic Delegate on November 20, 1948. He is a Frenchman and a member of the Carmelite Order. He is a cousin of the du Chayla in the French Foreign Service. His appointment represents a departure from the stand hitherto taken by the Iraq Government that the Apostolic Delegate in Iraq should not be the national of a major Power. He is an agreeable and cultivated man, and it is always a pleasure to meet him; but his health is indifferent and one does not see much of him.

*Mgr. du Chayla's diplomatic position is still not regularised. (Written in 1949.)

*Mgr. du Chayla is a sick man. He has returned to France in order to have an operation. (Written in 1950.)

*He has returned to Bagdad, but makes no secret of his opinion that twelve years' residence here is enough. Aristocratic and fastidious, he does not seem to have taken very kindly to Iraqis, whether of the Muslim or Christian persuasion. (Written in 1951.)

He is now nearing fifteen years in Bagdad!

Indonesia

Mohd Latjuba, Minister (July 16, 1953).

I have met M. Latjuba only rarely, as I was on leave when he presented his letters and he himself has been much in Tehran, where he is also accredited. He is far less seen in Bagdad society than his predecessor.

Italy

Guelfo Zamboni, Minister (November 3, 1951).

*M. Zamboni, who came here from Moscow, was regarded by my former American colleague as both intelligent and charming. I have not yet discovered any great qualities in M. Zamboni myself, perhaps because I am so little of a bridge player. (Written in 1952.)

M. Zamboni's qualities still elude me and I am precluded from any further search for them since he has left for Italy due to ill-health. He is (so far as I know) unmarried.

Jordan

Abdullah al Zuraikat has been Chargé d'Affaires since January 1, 1952.

*He goes out of his way to show courtesy to this Embassy. (Written in 1952.)

Rumours of his promotion to the substantive rank of Minister or even Ambassador at Bagdad have been current throughout the past year, but somehow nothing has ever come of them. He is a pleasant man speaking some English. His wife appears in society.

Lebanon

Kazim al Solh, Ambassador (November 3, 1953).

*Kazim al Solh is a cousin of the late Riad al Solh, former Prime Minister of the Lebanon. Born about 1903, a Sunni Muslim of Beirut, he is a graduate of the Damascus Law School. He started life as a journalist until his paper was suspended by the French. Subsequently he organised a small but influential Nationalist (but not anti-British) political party, the Nida al Qawni. He speaks good French and some English. (Written in 1948.)

His wife does not appear in mixed society. He is not often in Bagdad and he seems to have made little impression here.

*Kazim al Solh does not seem to have acquired any influence with the Iraqis and I have seldom met him in Iraqi houses. (Written in 1950.)

*He circulates in society more than he used to, but his personality does not become more impressive

on closer acquaintance. I constantly find myself in the embarrassing position of forgetting who he is. (Written in 1952.)

*I can now recognise M. Solh when I meet him (written in 1953), which is not very often, as he contrives to be absent from Bagdad for long periods.

M. Solh's wife, I am told, has paid only one short visit to Bagdad, returning abruptly to Beirut—a circumstance which has given him the reputation of a "wife-beater."

Netherlands

M. B. A. Piets, who was Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires in Bagdad from July 1949 till June 1954, has been transferred to Wellington, New Zealand. He is shortly to be replaced by M. Lewé van Aduard, who, I understand, has been serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at The Hague.

Persia

Hussain Ghods-Nakhai, Ambassador (November 24, 1953).

M. Ghods was Ambassador in Bagdad in 1951 and 1952, when he was removed by Dr. Musaddiq's Government. He was replaced by the Shah after the downfall of Dr. Musaddiq in August 1953. M. Ghods has held various posts in the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has served in Washington, London and Izmir. He was in London during the war.

He is liked by the Iraqis, particularly by comparison with his predecessor in 1951 and the man who replaced him during the Musaddiq régime. Reports preceded him that he was violently anti-British, but my experience of him suggests quite the contrary and his removal by Musaddiq bears me out. He makes no secret of his conviction that an understanding on the oil question is essential for Persia and criticises his countrymen for mixing nationalism into what is essentially business.

He speaks fluent English and his wife speaks passably. He has a boy at Haileybury.

Saudi Arabia

Abdullah al Khaiyal, Minister (February 9, 1947).

*After a period in the Legation as a Secretary and then as Chargé d'Affaires, Abdullah al Khaiyal was appointed Minister in February 1947. He is friendly and intelligent, a genuine Saudi from Riyadh, but is disliked by the Iraqis, who suspect the Legation of acting as an intermediary between Rashid Ali and his friends in Iraq. I would not trust him far. He has taken lessons in English from the British Council staff and has made considerable progress.

Last year he surprised Bagdad society by giving the first Saudi party to which ladies were invited. He went home for a month on leave in April for the first time in many years. (Written in 1950.)

*He is a regular visitor to the British Institute and circulates a good deal in society. (Written in 1952.)

*Is not now very popular with the Iraq Government on account of his intrigues here, and he particularly infuriated the Palace during the preparations of the Accession ceremonies by making outrageous requests, which they attribute to the Minister himself, on behalf of the Amir (now King) Saud, the chief Saudi delegate. (Written in 1953.)

Soviet Union

*There is still no Soviet Minister accredited to Iraq. M. Nemchinov was replaced in February 1953 by M. Ivan Iakoushin as Chargé d'Affaires. His first post was Tehran, where he was from 1947 to

1951. Immediately before coming here he had been in Moscow.

The Soviet representatives only appear at official parties, but M. Iakoushin, like his predecessor, maintains contact with a good number of Iraqis whom one seldom sees except on the Soviet National Day. M. Iakoushin has a not unattractive personality. He speaks some English and is always ready to discuss Russian literature and theatre, both old and new. His wife, who was (and looks like) a school-teacher, speaks excellent English considering that she learnt it only in Moscow, where she and her husband were born. They have the haziest ideas about England and life in the United Kingdom. He hazarded a tentative but correct guess as to which King George had recently died when he called to condole on the death of Queen Mary.

He appears to have received instructions to make an outward show of friendliness. He and his staff turned up in force at the Embassy on The Queen's Birthday, and he has taken the unprecedented step of inviting me to a cocktail party. (Written in 1953.)

In the course of the year he made an attempt, on instructions from Moscow (he said), to get mass instruction in English for himself and his staff from the British Council, presumably to increase their range of contacts here.

Spain

Pedro E. Schwartz Diaz-Flores, Ambassador (November 12, 1953).

*Joined the Spanish diplomatic service in 1912 and served as Consul at Genoa, Quito and Bayonne. He was made Consul-General in Montreal in 1939 and later took charge of the Spanish Missions in Caracas and Ciudad Trujillo. Before he came here he was Consul-General at Antwerp.

M. Schwartz is a little difficult to converse with as both his English and his French are poor. But his gaiety and affability are an asset to Bagdad society. He is married. Though his wife speaks no English and only a little French, she makes an agreeable impression. (Written in 1953.)

The status of the Spanish Legation has now been raised to that of an Embassy and M. Schwartz presented his letters as Ambassador on November 12, 1953.

Syria

Haidar Mardam Bey, Minister (April 18, 1954).

A member of a leading Damascus family and a cousin (and brother-in-law) of a former Syrian

Nationalist Prime Minister. He held, during the French Mandate, several high administrative posts. Has served as Syrian Minister in Jedda and Rome, where he was on good terms with Her Majesty's Ambassadors. He speaks French and a little English. His wife has not yet joined him. He is more approachable than his predecessor.

Turkey

Naci Perkel, Ambassador (December 7, 1953).

Mr. Perkel is not a career diplomatist. He has been a Government official in Turkey for many years and before coming to Bagdad had for some time been Head of the Turkish Security Organisation. He attributes his removal from that important post and his honourable exile to Bagdad to the Americans in Turkey. He considers the British his friends and was their guest at the coronation in London.

He is greatly handicapped by the fact that he speaks no language other than Turkish and a very little English. His conversations with Iraqi Ministers tend therefore to be unintelligible to both sides. He was also at a disadvantage in succeeding a suaver colleague, Mr. Nedim Ikin, whom the Iraqis were just beginning to like and who was, as became known in Bagdad, whisked away after only a few months' residence to allow a job to be found for Mr. Perkel.

Despite these handicaps, he is a pleasant man and obviously of some ability. He has shaken up his Embassy and cleaned it out. He is married but his wife is socially a dead loss, having never been out of Turkey and speaking no foreign language.

United States

Mr. Burton Berry left Iraq, retiring from the Foreign Service at his own request, in May 1954. The Counsellor of the Embassy, Mr. Philip Ireland, has remained in charge. I had previously known him in Cairo, where he was as much disliked by his own American colleagues as he is here. Nevertheless, he has a first-class knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs and particularly of Iraq, having written what still remains a text-book on Iraq in the 1920's and early '30s, while he was a professor at the American University of Beirut. Both he and "my lady" (as he invariably calls his Canadian-born wife) were at Oxford. He is fairly co-operative, but one always wonders what he is really at. Like other members of the United States Foreign Service, he is depressed by the "witch hunts" in Washington.